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I caused mortals to cease foreseeing their doom, 
I caused blind hopes to dwell within their breast, 
In addition, I gave them fire, 
And from it, they shall learn many arts. 
--- Prometheus--- 
Summary 
Why does the level of international cooperation vary across countries and issue 
areas? How can we explain variances in energy and climate policy outcomes across 
countries? This thesis contends that domestic structural and political attributes like 
the level of globalisation, number of veto players, and quality of governing 
institutions explain a large part of variances in energy and climate policy outcomes 
across countries and by extension level of international cooperation.  
  
Using a large-N quantitative (N=60, T=20) research this thesis concludes 
that in the area of energy and climate policy the world overall is on a convergent 
path; a sort of marathon to the top. The pace of change, however, is extremely slow 
and may not be sufficient to avert a climate catastrophe. Nevertheless, states across 
the world are phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, diversifying national energy baskets, 
using energy more efficiently, and cutting down the growth rate of carbon emissions. 
However, these trends differ between the OECD and non-OECD countries, with 
the latter showing a lot more variance than the former - the United States remains an 
outlier. The higher quality of governing institutions, higher levels of globalisation, 
and membership in international environmental institutions, all have a favourable 
impact on energy and climate policy outcomes. The greater number of veto players, 
however, is negatively associated with these outcomes. Furthermore, contrary to the 
vi 
 
traditional belief, democracy and party ideology have no significant explanatory 
power.  
 
 The analysis and findings challenge the mainstream rationalist – neorealist 
and neoliberal institutionalist – theories of international cooperation or its lack 
thereof. The rationalists construe international collective action problem as states 
failing to cooperate because of the concerns for relative gains and/or fear of 
cheating. Both these schools offer international system level explanations and 
assume that states are rational unitary actors and hence domestic factors can be 
ignored. This thesis argues on the contrary that the unitary rational actor model 
underestimates the role of domestic structural and political factors in determining the 
level of cooperation as well as translating policy outputs into outcomes. 
 
This thesis problematizes the rationalist understanding of the issue of 
international cooperation in the context of energy and climate change. It defines 
global collective action problem as gaps between two or more states’ expectations of 
one another’s policy outcomes. Policy outcomes are determined by domestic 
structural and political factors. The gaps in expectations result from states’ respective 
internal structural and political attributes. International cooperation thus means 
reducing the gaps in both actual policy outcomes and expectations. 
International institutions play an important part in reducing the gap in 
expectations through developing consensus as to what is beneficial as a whole, what 
is the required pace of change, and what are the constraints faced by states. 
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However, ignoring domestic factors may lead to incorrect inferences, as 
demonstrated in this thesis, domestic structural and political factors systematically 
explain the level of international cooperation (or a lack thereof) in the area of energy 
and climate change.   
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Abstract: The problem of international cooperation is construed as a 
rational choice collective action problem in the mainstream IR literature. The 
rationalist schools offer international system level explanations for 
international cooperation or the lack thereof. This chapter points out the 
problems in the rationalist theories of international politics and makes a case 
for an alternative theoretical construction of the problem by incorporating 
domestic structural and political factors including national perceptions of 
fairness and friendship.  
 
The political problem of mankind is to 
combine three things; economic efficiency, social justice, 
and individual liberty. 
--- John Maynard Keynes --- 
1.1. Introduction 
Why does the level of international cooperation vary across countries and issue 
areas? How can we explain variances in energy and climate policy outcomes across 
countries? The mainstream rationalist – neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist – 
schools of International Relations (IR) offer international system level explanations 
to these questions. The two rationalist schools argue that domestic structures and 
politics can be ignored in order to develop a parsimonious theory of international 
politics (Keohane 2002; Waltz 2008). However, if domestic structural and political 
factors systematically explain the variances in energy and climate policy outcomes 
across countries over time and by extension the level of international cooperation, 
then, ignoring domestic factors may lead to incorrect inferences.1  
 
                                                 
1  In differentiating structural and political, I follow Ostrom’s (2007, 27-45) and Williamson’s (2000, 
597) lead. By structural I mean all the long-term physical and socio-economic variables that make an 
agent a price/rule taker at any given point in time; in that sense institutions can also be considered as 
structures (Pontusson 1995; Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 1992). By political I mean relatively fluid 
political processes including perceptions and preferences where interest groups are fighting within the 
structural boundaries to change the rules of the game.  
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The two neo- rationalist schools have produced an impressive body of 
literature that deals with the questions and prospects of international cooperation. 
These rationalist theories of international cooperation (or its lack thereof) are termed 
the neo-neo synthesis because of the similarities in their substantive assumptions and 
ontological and epistemological dispositions (Andreatta and Koenig-Archibugi 2010; 
Waever 1996). According to the neo-neo synthesis, states are the primary and 
rational unitary actors in the international system striving for self-interest (security 
and prosperity) maximization2 under anarchy – the absence of a central authority 
with a legitimate monopoly over the use of force. Anarchy means there is no 
superior legitimate authority over sovereign states that may define property rights 
and enforce rules.  
 
From these simple and plausible assumptions, the two schools arrive at the 
supposedly dissimilar conclusions about the causes of conflict in international 
politics. Neorealists claim that because of anarchy the pursuit of national interests 
(security and prosperity) remains unchecked and leads to conflict (Waltz 1979). That 
means one state’s defensive military apparatus to ensure its own security makes 
others feel threatened and gives rise to an arms race or what scholars call a security 
dilemma (Herz 1951; Jervis 1978). Therefore, the distribution of military and 
fungible non-military power in the international system becomes the main 
preoccupation of states. Since the distribution of power determines the outcomes of 
                                                 
2  Neoliberals and defensive neorealists are generally biased in favour of merely ‘securing’ instead 
of ‘maximising’ but to be consistent with the overall rational choice framework, I use the term 




international politics, therefore, states care about the relative distribution of power in 
the system. International cooperation is difficult to achieve because states care about 
the relative gains (distributional conflict) from cooperation and its consequences for 
the distribution of power (Grieco 1993; Mearsheimer 1995; Waltz 2008). 
 
Neoliberal institutionalists, however, contend that despite realist 
assumptions, cooperation can nevertheless emerge due to the presence of mutual 
interests. Keohane and Nye ([1989] 2012, 9-37) argue that interdependence3 not only 
creates common interests but also restricts states’ policy autonomy and available 
policy choices. Internationalisation renders the use or threat of force ineffective as a 
policy instrument, because internationalisation erodes clear hierarchy of issues in a 
dense web of linkages. Furthermore, internationalisation of national economies 
exposes them to international price trends, competition and shocks. The state 
policies not only lose their efficacy but the available policy choice set shrinks 
(Keohane and Milner 1996). The ‘loss of control’ over policy choices means states 
cannot pursue their security and welfare goals independently, rendering power 
resources irrelevant. Therefore states can, and do, cooperate in a wide array of issue 
areas to achieve their common interests.  
                                                 
3  I use the terms interdependence, internationalisation, integration, and globalisation interchangeably. 
Besides all the different uses in the literature, what remains common in these terms is the connectivity 
across political borders. Nevertheless, I use interdependence when it simply refers to the fact that actions 
of one actor have consequences for others. I use internationalisation/integration when referring to greater 
cross-border goods and capital mobility coupled with some regulatory coordination. I use globalisation 
when it means all of the above and influence of non-state actors and ideas. 
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According to neoliberals what impedes cooperation is not primarily conflict 
of interests or distributional concerns but fear of opportunistic behaviour by others. Because 
there is no authority to monitor and enforce agreements, states fear that others may 
renege on their commitments leading to the problem of assurance (Axelrod and 
Keohane 1985; Keohane 1984, 2002; Martin and Simmons 1998; Oye 1986; Stein 
2008). Borrowing insights from the developments in non-cooperative game theory 
and new institutional economics, these scholars argue that the problem of 
international cooperation is a typical collective action problem or political market failure.4 
This means a situation where states would have been better-off by cooperating but 
the lack of an enforcement authority, complete information, and certainty gives rise 
to high transaction costs. Consequently, a rational course of action leads to non-
cooperation that is collectively sub-optimal.   
 
Therefore, states demand and voluntarily create international institutions in 
order to reduce transaction costs and overcome collective action problem, argue 
neoliberal institutionalists (Keohane 2002). Institutions by definition are intentionally 
                                                 
4  Collective action problem in the neo-neo debate mainly refers to the fear of cheating or 
opportunism. In general it is a situation, like market failure, where there is a disparity between 
individual and collective rationality. Self-interest maximising behaviour leads to outcomes that are 
least preferred by each actor.  Market failure refers to a situation when free market activity results in 
Pareto suboptimal allocation of resources from a collective perspective, that is, a different allocation is 
possible to make at least one actor better off without making anyone worse off. A typical example is 
the famous Prisoner’s dilemma where two rational egoist prisoners are placed in separate isolation cells 
and have been made the following offer: If one confesses (D) and the other remains silent (C), the 
former goes free and the latter serves a substantial sentence of say three years. If both confess, both 
serve a sentence of say two years. If both remain silent, they are handed over a minor sentence of say 
a year. For each player, the preference ordering DC > CC > DD > CD means there is an incentive 
for each to confess leading to a collectively suboptimal outcome (DD). See the literature on collective 
action problems (Hardin 1982; Holzinger 2003; Olson 1971; Ostrom 1990) and market failures 
(Weimer and Vining 2010). 
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devised rules that rein in unconstrained action in interdependent relations. 
International institutions thus facilitate cooperation by providing information, 
revealing states’ preferences, monitoring their actions and providing bargaining 
forums. As such international institutions bring predictability. They constrain states’ 
behaviour through formal rules, but more importantly, by establishing norms of 
reciprocity and reputation that facilitate credible commitments. Therefore, ingenious 
international institutions can be rationally designed to deal with the issues of 
distributional conflicts and fear of cheating (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2003). 
 
Despite their dissimilar conclusions about the prospects for international 
cooperation, both the neorealist and neoliberal schools have similar assumptions and 
systemic understanding of the causes of conflict. Both emphasise the unitary rational 
actor model of international politics while ignoring domestic politics. For both 
‘national interests’ remain exogenously given and constant across countries over 
time. Both these schools construe the problem of international cooperation as 
rational choice collective action problem since distributional conflicts can be treated 
as a subset of collective action problems (Fearon 1998; Holzinger 2003). 
Nevertheless, an increasing number of international institutions and ensuing 
cooperation, even if limited, remain a puzzling phenomenon that begs explanations 
from neorealists. On the other hand, continued discord despite growing globalisation 





1.1.1. The Problematic 
Since international cooperation is defined as mutual policy adjustments (Axelrod and 
Keohane 1985; Grieco 1993; Milner 1997), an inquiry into the problem of 
international cooperation is an inquiry into the dynamics of policy change. This 
implies that scholars cannot simply assume a frictionless domestic policy making 
environment under the notions of rational unitary actor. Therefore, ‘the level of 
cooperation’ means that variances across countries over time on energy policy 
outcomes (like fossil fuel subsidies, energy efficiency, and carbon emissions) reflect 
the level of policy effort invested by each country in order to meet the challenges of 
energy and climate change.  
 
By treating the state as undifferentiated unitary actor, the neo-neo rationalist 
theories obscure the domestic structural and political constraints faced by 
governments. The neo-neo synthesis assumes state preferences or national interests 
are exogenously given. However, Robert Jervis (1988, 322) cautions us against such 
an approach to international politics: ‘by taking preferences as given we beg what 
may be the most important question of how they were formed [and draw] attention 
away from areas that may contain much of the explanatory “action” in which we are 
interested’. These rationalist approaches do not factor in the differing perceptions of 
national interests, leave aside value conflicts, across countries. In a similar vein, 
Milner (1997, 234) contends that ‘cooperation among nations is less plagued by fears 
of other countries’ relative gains or likelihood of cheating than it is by the domestic 




Furthermore, the contractarian approach of these theories continues to give 
analytical privilege to the politics of legislative bargaining among states over states’ 
capacity to implement policies within their jurisdictions. Consequently the inability of 
states to reach agreements is viewed as a matter of ‘unwillingness’ motivated by 
assumed relative gains concerns or fear of cheating. There does not seem to be a 
place for perceptions of fairness and value conflicts in their rational choice 
framework.5 For example, the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities’ towards climate change, that is so 
vehemently emphasised by all the developing countries in the climate change 
negotiations, finds no analytical significance in the neo-neo dialogue. Similarly, an act 
of noncompliance is viewed as simple ‘cheating’ in these frameworks disregarding 
the issues of state capacity to implement policies. Again this goes against the 
empirical observations. Virtually all international institutions acknowledge and take 
into account the implementation capacity problems faced by their members.  
 
In short, the neo-neo synthesis offers an ahistorical billiard ball model of the 
international state system that does not take into account domestic political struggles 
and capacity problems. As Keohane (2002, 6) puts it, neorealism may be useful as 
‘first cut’ but it leaves out too much, particularly domestic politics and the role of 
ideas/perceptions, to be a comprehensive doctrine of international relations. But 
                                                 
5  Although Goldstein and Keohane (1993) elaborate on the role of ideas in policy formulations 
and Keohane (2002) acknowledges the role of ideas but does not extend treatment of ideas as 
perceptions and a source of conflict. Perceptions as heuristic device do not fit well within the core of 
the neoliberal institutionalist theory. 
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neoliberal institutionalism makes the same mistake. Some realists acknowledge that 
domestic variables need to be incorporated into realist perspectives (Grieco 1988b; 
Krasner 1993). Waltz (1996) also acknowledges that neorealism is not a theory  of 
foreign policy but of international politics and is applicable only to security issues 
among great powers. For both Keoahne and Waltz, a progressive research program 
needs to incorporate domestic politics and the role of ideas/perceptions. 
  
1.2. Bringing Domestic Politics In 
Realising the inadequacies of rationalist systemic theories in explaining diverse state 
actions, scholars have offered three alternative approaches to understand the 
interactions between national and international politics. The first is what Waltz 
(1959) calls ‘the second image’ analysis. In the second image analysis of international 
politics, scholars explain state action with reference to domestic politics and 
institutions. Most classical liberal and realist studies of international politics fall into 
this category (Doyle 1983, 1997; Moravcsik 1997, 2003; Morgenthau 1951, [1948] 
1960). In this line of analysis state preferences or national interests originate within 
domestic politics and are projected into international politics by governments. 
Consequently, international political outcomes can be explained by domestic political 
and institutional variables. The most famous theory from this perspective is the 
democratic or commercial peace theory (Russett and Oneal 2001).  
 
A more nuanced analysis within this camp, what Putnam (1988) calls ‘two-
level games’ or what Moravcsik and Legro (1999) call ‘two step approach’, concedes 
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that the structure of international system influences the outcomes of international 
bargaining. However, these scholars continue to emphasise that state preferences or 
national interests originate within political borders of the nation-state (Drezner 2007; 
Evans, Jacobson and Putnam 1993; Milner 1997; Moravcsik 2003). In the two-level 
or two-step approach, scholars first attempt to identify domestic forces that shape 
national policies and then explain outcomes of international bargaining through the 
distribution of power in the international system. Although this approach has 
significantly advanced the research agenda in the analysis of international politics, it 
has been criticised for ignoring the reverse influence, that is, the influence of 
international actors and norms on shaping domestic interests and preferences.  
 
The second approach is termed the ‘second image reversed’ by Gourevitch 
(1978). In the second image reversed analysis, domestic politics becomes a 
dependent variable. Scholars explain domestic politico-economic and institutional 
outcomes with reference to the international environment in which states operate 
(Cerny 1997, 2000; Cox 1987; Drezner 2007; Elkins and Simmons 2005; Gill 2008; 
Strange 1996). From historical analysis of impacts of war and colonisation on 
domestic politics to the modern era globalisation, scholars in this tradition argue that 
domestic political and economic institutions are a function of their external 
environment. Particularly the literature on the consequences of globalisation for the 
nation state observes diffusion of neoliberal policies and paradigms across the world 
(Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006). Similarly, there is a plethora of literature that 
observes the diffusion of norms and practices across states that originate from 
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outside the state (Acharya 2004; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The main channels of 
these influences are identified as direct coercion, competition, learning, and 
socialisation (Bernstein and Cashore 2012; Holzinger, Knill and Sommerer 2008).  
 
A third approach has emerged in recent years as an attempt to bridge the 
second image and second image reversed traditions. It is a direct result of deliberate 
attempts to synthesise knowledge from IR and Comparative Political Economy 
(CPE) (Caporaso 1997; Milner 1998). Cao, Milner et al. (2014) particularly appreciate 
this emerging trend in the literature on environmental politics by stating that ‘the 
traditional divisions between international relations and domestic politics have begun 
to erode in the environmental field’. Scholars identifying with this approach attempt 
to avoid the futile debates as to what, domestic or international factors, exclusively 
determine state actions. Instead, these scholars model international and domestic 
factors simultaneously (Bernauer, Kalbhenn et al. 2010; Cao and Prakash 2012; 
Holzinger, Knill and Sommerer 2008). The dialectical relationship (Figure 1.1) 
between domestic and international forces becomes an empirical question instead of 
an exercise in deduction.  
 
Scholars have increasingly taken a middle path and argued that the state and 
its institutions are not passive victims of international forces nor are they all 
powerful (Howlett and Ramesh 2006; Ramesh 2006). Instead, pressures from 
international forces are mediated by domestic political and economic institutions, 
which in turn adapt to the new international environment as well as project changing 
11 
 
national interests into the international arena (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall and 
Thelen 2009; Swank 2002, 2006).  
 
The idea of national policy regimes is employed by scholars from Policy 
Studies (PS) in order to demonstrate that relatively stable constellations of domestic 
institutions, interests, and ideas produce relatively stable policy outcomes and resist 
change (Esping-Andersen 1990; Jochim and May 2010; Wilson 2000). May and 
Jochim (2013) define policy regimes as ‘governing arrangements that foster 
integrative actions across elements of multiple [policy] subsystems’. In fact, the 
domestic policy regime lens highlights the sources of variations in energy and 
environmental policy outcomes across countries over time. 
 
There are also calls from PS scholars to incorporate the cumulative 
knowledge from IR and CPE into the policy dynamics frameworks (Jochim and May 
2010; John 2013). Such a synthesis is also required across the supposedly 
incommensurate epistemological divides (positivist v. constructivist) within these 
disciplines if we are to accumulate knowledge in a progressive way (Checkel 1997; 









1.3. The Research Question 
Following this third approach, I argue that instead of a priori behavioural 
assumptions like fear of cheating and relative gains concerns, contemporary IR and CPE 
scholars need to ask: do national policy responses to international collective 
problems systematically vary? If they do, what are the sources of these variations? 
What is the relative strength of domestic and international variables in explaining 
cooperation and discord? By ‘responses’ I mean both the revealed preferences during 
international bargaining but more importantly the actual policy outcomes. Such a 
formulation frees us from assumptions (like relative or absolute gains) about the 
sources of harmony/conflicts of interest in the absence of an international 
agreement. In the case that an agreement has been reached, it would highlight the 
real sources of variations in compliance instead of assuming opportunistic behaviour. 
 
As Frieden and Rodrik (2012) put it, ‘if we are to have a clear sense of the 
prospects for international economic cooperation, then, we need a clear sense of the 
domestic political constraints under which policymakers are likely to operate’. 
Problem driven research, as opposed to the method driven research, is more likely to 
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produce rich theories with many causal variables useful for policy makers, rather than 
elegant theories with few (Hirschman 1985; Krasner 2009, 256; Shapiro 2005, 179). 
 
1.4. The Policy Issue 
‘When everyone is dead the Great Game is finished. Not before’, declared Rudyard 
Kipling a century ago.6 After the Cold War a new great game of energy and 
environment has begun, in which Europe, the United States, China, India and other 
emerging powers are all active players. A cursory survey of the vast literature on 
‘energy wars’ and ‘politics of climate change’  highlights the tensions between the 
United States, China and other major powers (Bolin 2007; Burns and Osofsky 2011; 
Dauvergne 2012; Giddens 2009; Goldthau and Witte 2010; Keohane and Victor 
2013; Klare 2008, 2012; Yergin 2008, 2011).7  
 
For example, Washington accuses the Chinese leadership of ‘acting as if they 
can somehow lock up energy supplies around the world’ and for seeking ‘to direct 
markets rather than opening them up’ (Chanis 2011).8 Beijing, on the other hand, 
                                                 
6  The Great Game referred to the geopolitical rivalry between the British and Russian Empires 
vying for domination over Central Asia. The importance of the central Asian landmass for the Empire 
was highlighted by the British strategist Halford Mackinder in his famous theory of the heartland in 
1904 (Mackinder 2004). Olaf Caroe extended this argument and inspired American Cold War 
strategists to keep the Soviet Union away from Southwest Asian energy resources (Brobst 2005; 
Brzezinski 1997; Caroe 1951; McMahon 1988). 
7  Some other academic and popular texts include (Ahrari and Beal 1996; Akiner 2004; Amineh 
and Guang 2010; Brenton 2013; Chakarova 2010; Deutch, Schlesinger and Victor 2006; Douglas, 
Nelson and Schwartz 2006; Dubash and Florini 2011; Ehteshami 1994; Green, Freeman et al. 2010; 
Harris 2003; Helm and Hepburn 2011; Hults, Thurber and Victor 2012; Klare 2001, 2004; Kleveman 
2003; Lodhi 2009; Marsden 2011; Michel, Beuret et al. 2009; Nilsson, Nilsson et al. 2011; Nötzold 
2012; Shum 2011; Skocpol and Jacobs 2011; Victor 2011; Victor, Jaffe and Hayes 2006; Yergin 2006).  
8  See ("The National Security Strategy of the United States of America"  2006, 41). The White 
House raises two main concerns with regard to China’s foreign energy policy. One, that the Chinese 
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retorts that it ‘supports direct overseas investment[s] … in the construction of 
overseas energy infrastructure’.9 Despite an emphasis on opening up the markets for 
others, the United States itself keeps a ban on its oil and gas exports.10 It also denies 
Chinese companies acquisition of stakes in American energy interests.11 Chinese and 
Indian firms are also locked in geopolitical rivalry from Central Asia to Africa. Such 
conflicts could be mitigated if energy was covered under some ‘fair’ energy regime as 
Beijing calls upon the international community to ‘foster a new energy security 
concept featuring mutually beneficial cooperation, diversified development and 
common energy security through coordination’.12 
 
Energy security – uninterrupted and sustainable supply of energy resources at 
affordable prices – is of paramount importance for China, India and other 
developing countries to ensure their continued economic development. Access to 
cheap energy was, in fact, one of the key factors in economic development and 
military modernisation of developed countries. Throughout the twentieth century, 
powerful countries used every means possible in order to access energy resources 
                                                                                                                                     
government backs long-term investments to acquire energy resources abroad, consequently distorting 
the global energy market. Secondly, China makes such investments often in countries that are non-
democratic and abuse human rights [and are hostile to the West in general]. Furthermore, keeping 
access to the Middle Eastern and African energy resources open is a stated foreign policy goal of the 
United States to which Chinese acquisitions appear threatening. 
9  China did not have any coherent energy policy or even a state body till 2007. It was only after 
the China threat propaganda (unclear what it is?) that China issued a white paper ("China’s Energy 
Conditions and Policies"  2007). This was converted into a more coherent energy policy in 2012 
("China’s Energy Policy 2012"). 
10  The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (Epca  1975). 
11  ("Cnooc Withdraws Unocal Bid"  2005) 
12  ("China’s Energy Policy 2012") 
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beyond their borders. Today’s developing countries, on the other hand, are already 
paying a much higher price to fuel their economic development. They are also 
constrained by rules and norms established by the post-war international order 
established under the American hegemony (Evans 2008; Gilpin 2002; Keohane 1984; 
Odell 1994; Strange 1987). 
 
Similarly, the deadlock in negotiations at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference 
of the UNFCCC (and successive conferences up until the 2014 Lima conference) 
shows the fundamental disputes among major carbon emitters (Bodansky 2010; 
Christoff 2010; Roberts 2011). The United States refuses to accept binding 
commitments to reduce carbon emissions on the pretext that China and other 
developing countries are polluting the environment without any such restraint. The 
developing countries, on the other hand, argue that developed countries are 
responsible for the hitherto global warming and hence need to shoulder greater 
responsibility. Nevertheless, political disagreements aside, there is a near unanimous 
consensus within the scientific community that climate change is real and caused by 
human activity (IPCC 2014). However, the impacts of climate change are not 
uniformly distributed. Ironically, developing countries, including China and India, are 
more threatened by climate change than the United States or Europe (IPCC 2014).13  
 
                                                 
13  ("A Bad Climate for Development: Developing Countries and Global Warming"  2009; IPCC 
2014). International energy security and environmental issues also concern global development, 
human rights and justice movement (Nakhooda 2011; Sovacool 2013; Sovacool, Sidortsov and Jones 
2013; UN-Energy 2005; WB 2009). From this perspective access to sustainable energy for the 
betterment of substandard living conditions in the developing world is a fundamental human right. 
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Nevertheless, despite these overt tensions between major players, what we 
observe in the area of energy and environment across the world is a sort of 
convergence to the top. From an international cooperation point of view, all major 
countries including the G2014 and members of the International Energy Forum 
(IEF)15 agree on a few basic points. For example, to ensure global energy security, to 
take new steps to phase out inefficient fuel subsidies, promote energy market 
stability, invest in efficient and renewable technologies, encourage balanced national 
energy baskets, and reduce carbon emissions (G20 2009). What we observe in reality 
is consistent with these policy statements. The share of coal and oil in national 
energy baskets has been decreasing across the world over the last two decades with 
some exceptions from the developing world. Similarly fuel subsidies, carbon 
emissions, and energy intensity – unit of energy consumed per unit of output – are 
all on a declining trend across the world. 
 
Nevertheless, there are structural differences between the developed and 
developing countries. As the logic of Kuznet curve (see the Figure below) suggests, 
the developed economies are maturing to a level where they can increase their energy 
efficiency and reduce carbon emissions due to a multitude of factors including 
advanced industrial base and public opinion. The developing countries, on the other 
                                                 
14  The G20 was originally conceived as a grouping of major economies to coordinate their 
financial market regulations after the 1999 financial crisis. However, over the years, the G20 has 
enlarged its agenda to include energy and other global issues. It works in collaboration with other 
international organisations. The member countries include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. 




hand, are on a level of development where they are likely to continue using energy 
relatively inefficiently till they develop a mature industrial base or there is a massive 
technological transfer from the developed to the developing countries. Therefore, I 
differentiate between the developed and developing countries using a proxy of the 
membership to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD).  
The Kuznet Curve 
 
 
The graph below (Figure 1.2) shows a gradual increase in fuel prices (fewer 
subsidies and more taxes) across the world. However, this process has not been 
uniform across countries. Within the OECD countries we observe a convergent 
pattern of rising prices. The non-OECD developing countries are the source of 
divergence. This means the developed countries are increasingly taxing each unit of 
petroleum consumed and there is a convergence in this trend. In the developing 
countries the trend is the same but not as steep a curve as in the case of OECD. This 
is because of continued variances in the developing world, particularly among the 
energy rich countries. Energy intensity is also sharply declining across the world 
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showing efficiency gains (Figure 1.3). The slope of the two lines is almost the same. 
It shows that the developing countries are making efficiency gains with the same or 
increasing rate as developed countries given the slowdown in economic growth of 
the developed countries. However, carbon emissions per capita have increased over 
the same period across the world. Again we observe a convergent pattern of 
reduction in the growth rates of carbon emissions within the OECD countries 
(including the United States which remains an exception) while there is a divergent 
pattern of increase in the rate of carbon emissions in the non-OECD countries. 
 
All three energy indicators (fuels subsidies, energy efficiency, and carbon 
emissions) show improvements over the years but with diverging experiences across 
the developing world. What explains these similarities and variances in energy policy 
outcomes across countries over the years? Does it mean the OECD countries are 
more cooperative than the non-OECD countries? Are they more cooperative within 
their group than outside? Or are there other historical and national factors that need 
to be explored in order to understand policy change across countries over time? Why 
have some countries made substantial improvements while others continue to face 
challenges?  What does it imply for the creation of international institutions for 
energy and environmental governance?  
 
Three decades ago when Keohane offered the neoliberal institutional theory, 
the problem was to explain the unexpectedly high levels of cooperation as opposed 
to neorealist predictions. Today the problem is to explain the lack of cooperation 
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despite a manifold increase in internationalisation of national economies and the 
complex web of international institutions, the two central explanatory variables in the 




Figure 1.2: Domestic Gasoline Prices (left) and Subsidies/Taxes (right) 
  
Source: EIA/WB 
Note: The line in the centre is mean and the shaded area is confidence interval of the fitted lines. A negative (-) value 
indicates a tax and positive (+) value indicates a subsidy. In 1995 total numbers of countries are 23, 37, and 60 in OECD, 
Non-OECD, and world categories respectively. In 2012 total numbers of countries are 28, 32, and 60 in OECD, Non-




Figure 1.3: Energy Intensity (left) and Carbon Emissions growth rates (right) 
  
Source: EIA/WB.  
Note: In 1995 total numbers of countries are 23, 37, and 60 in OECD, Non-OECD, and world categories respectively. In 
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1.5. The Thesis 
The main thesis developed here is that the level of international cooperation in the 
area of energy and climate change is a function of national structural and political 
factors. The argument developed in this thesis is based on a redefinition of 
international collective action problem as a gap between two or more actors’ expectations 
about one another’s policy actions/outcomes. These gaps result from their respective internal 
structural and political environments. This definition recognises pre-existing differences 
between states. The neo-neo literature, however, is singularly focused on shared 
external situational attributes like anarchy in the international system and does not 
differentiate structural and value differences among states.  
 
International cooperation, thus, means reducing the gap in expectations as 
well as actual policy outcomes. Inasmuch as this gap is reducing because of deliberate 
policy decisions we would call it cooperation. The policy action to reduce this gap 
has to be in a direction that is based on mutual understanding of as to what is 
beneficial as a whole, what is the required pace of change, and what are the 
constraints faced by states. It is this mutual understanding of rights, obligations, and 
constraints that is important for international cooperation (Sovacool, Sidortsov and 
Jones 2013; Vanderheiden 2008). For example, in the area of energy and climate 
change, the incidence of fuel subsidy or the rate of growth in carbon emissions is 
decreasing across countries.16 The narrower the gap between countries the easier it 
                                                 
16  The carbon emissions continue to grow in China and other developing countries but the rate 
of growth is not accelerating and expected to reverse once it peaks, in case of China that is 2030. 
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would be to negotiate an agreement. Nevertheless, these structural conditions only 
facilitate cooperation; final outcomes of cooperative behaviour are determined by 
national perceptions of fairness of international agreements. 
 
Expectations stem from perceptions that are embedded in historical 
experiences, ideology, and the larger national context. In short the shadow of history 
looms larger than the shadow of the future. The perceptions of friendship or enmity 
between two countries based on their historical interactions impinge on the 
outcomes of future interactions. The perceptions about the fairness of other party’s 
demands for action are the key element in ensuring that these demands would be 
considered. Similarly, perceptions about the legitimacy of international institutions 
play a critical role in the effectiveness of the institutions. For this reason, countries 
would have to agree through discourse as to what is perceived fair and what is not. 
The rational choice research program of the neo-neo synthesis somehow shies away 
from these thorny normative questions.  
 
The efforts to reduce the gaps in both expectations as well as actual policy 
outcomes for an actor require varying levels of domestic adjustment costs. The 
adjustment costs include financial, administrative, political, and ideological capital. 
The actual benefits from international cooperation may or may not be greater than 
the costs. The benefits from international cooperation are uncertain and in the 
distant future. The adjustment costs, on the other hand, are in the present and 
determined by the historical and structural factors. Governments can rarely be 
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certain about the full cost-benefit matrix and there are no guarantees that today’s 
calculations would continue to hold tomorrow. Furthermore, even the most 
simplistic of cost-benefit analysis requires subjective weights to be assigned to 
different costs and benefits. The subjective weights are provided by heuristic devices, 
what March and Olsen (2008) call the logic of appropriateness instead of the 
rationalist logic of consequences. Since adjustment costs are internal to states, 
sources of discord also need to be traced back within the state. 
 
Therefore, states mulling over cooperation on issues like reduction in 
subsidies or carbon emissions will be faced with these adjustment costs. Economic 
and institutional characteristics of states pose various levels of adjustment costs to 
policy change. For example, states with high quality of bureaucracy are better placed 
to implement policies compared to those with low levels of governance quality. 
Similarly, higher number of veto players means governments would find it difficult 
to make policy changes. Perceptions and public opinion also bear on adjustment 
costs. If there is a widespread public opinion in favour of a policy change then it 
would reduce adjustment costs as opposed to when constituents are overwhelmingly 
against the proposed policy change. Furthermore, cooperative ventures with states 
that are perceived friendly are likely to incur small ideological and political costs as 
opposed to the situation where two historically hostile states are pondering on 




Contrary to the neo-neo synthesis perspective, according to which we can 
ignore domestic factors, my proposition is that domestic structural and political 
factors systematically explain variances in energy and climate policy outcomes and by 
extension the level of cooperation. Therefore, we cannot ignore domestic factors if 
we are to understand the sources of conflict and cooperation in the international 
arena. In short, controlling for other factors, the relatively greater convergence 
within OECD in domestic factors (higher quality of bureaucracy, higher levels of 
globalisation, and membership in international environmental institutions) leads to 
fewer subsidies on fossil fuels, more energy efficiency, and decrease in carbon 
emissions (the United States remains an outlier in certain aspects). In the non-
OECD countries, on the other hand, the relative divergence in domestic factors and 
relatively lower quality of bureaucracy, lower levels of globalisation, and non-
membership in international environmental institutions lead to more subsidies, 
reduced energy efficiency, and greater carbon emissions.  
 
The empirical findings in the following chapters affirm that the domestic 
structural and political factors systematically explain the variances in energy and 
climate policy outcomes. First, the higher level of globalisation and quality of 
governing institutions have a negative impact on fossil fuel subsidies and carbon 
emissions, and a positive impact on fossil fuel taxes, fuel diversification, energy 
efficiency, and carbon emissions. Contrary to the common belief, the converging 
trend across the world does not reflect a race to the bottom, but symbolises more of 
a marathon to the top in terms of global energy and environmental concerns. Nevertheless, visible 
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variances persist, particularly between the two groups of OECD and non-OECD 
countries, largely as a result of structural and political features of states. These 
differences are gradually shrinking under increasing internationalisation and the role 
of international institutions and have important facilitative consequences for 
international cooperation.  
 
Domestic institutions mediate international pressures for policy change. For 
example, an increase in veto points is associated with more subsidies on gasoline. 
This suggests that countries with multiple centres of power (or fractionalised politics) 
would not, at least in the short run, phase out subsidies or reduce carbon emissions. 
Similarly, high quality of bureaucracy is associated with lower levels of subsidies (or 
higher levels of taxes). This suggests that countries with higher quality bureaucratic 
institutions would be able to phase out subsidies or cut carbon emissions more 
effectively as compared to their peers with lower levels of bureaucratic quality. 
Nonetheless, the nuanced analysis of interaction between the level of globalisation 
and quality of bureaucracy further elucidates the impact of internationalisation of an 
economy on energy policy outcomes as dependent on the quality of bureaucracy and 
vice versa. At the lower levels of globalisation, improvements in bureaucratic quality 
have greater impact on reducing subsidies or cutting carbon emissions as compared 
to more globalised countries. Alternatively, increasing globalisation has greater 
impact on reduction in subsidies or carbon emissions in countries with low 
bureaucratic quality as compared to the countries with the higher levels of 




Furthermore, contrary to the traditional belief, democracy or ideology of the 
ruling party has no statistically significant association with either subsidy on gasoline 
or cuts in carbon emissions. The results reinforce two points. First, the veto players 
theory offers a more sophisticated way of conceptualising differences across political 
systems as compared to simplistic measures of regime type (binary or ordinal 
measures of democracy/non-democracy) or political systems 
(presidential/parliamentarian). Second, in the post-Cold War era the traditional 
measures of ‘left’ or ‘right’ party ideology have become meaningless. This is not only 
due to the difficulty of subjectively coding a party ‘left’ or ‘right’ but also due to the 
fact that both left and right oriented parties across the world have followed by and 
large similar policies.  
 
Finally, international institutions matter. They facilitate negotiations and 
reciprocity. They also provide information and greater certainty. Nevertheless, the 
raison d’etre for international institutions may not be their efficiency enhancing 
function as neoliberal institutionalism claims, but their role as forums to shape the 
policy discourse and propagate certain policy paradigms. Perceptions (including so 
called values and the logic of appropriateness) play a critical role in the decisions to 






1.6. Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
The framework that I develop in this thesis attempts to bridge the two divides in the 
literature, that are, domestic-foreign and high-low politics. IR scholars often 
distinguish between domestic and foreign policy using terms like ‘foreign policy’ or 
‘foreign economic policy’. The implicit assumption seems to be that there are few 
issue areas where only domestic political economy plays a role and international 
actors have no role. But there are other areas where only systemic level interactions 
play a role in outcomes and domestic politics have no role. Such a conception is a 
logical consequence of the Westphalian system founded on the concept of 
sovereignty. However, what such conception obscures is the fact that often one 
country’s purely domestic policies have spillover effects that hurt or benefit other 
countries. Good examples of such spillover effects can be subsidies to export 
industries or capital tax rates. At what point a policy is a domestic policy and at what 
point it is a foreign policy is clear neither analytically nor empirically (see Figure 1.4 
below). 
 
Similarly, the traditional divide between realists’ ‘high politics’ and liberals’ 
‘low politics’ is also misleading. The distinction was a way to differentiate between 
pure security (high politics) related issues such as nuclear disarmament from pure 
economic issues (low politics) such as trade and investment. The scholars on both 
sides of the debate acknowledged that the two are interlinked in the sense that 
economic gains translate into military power and military power can be used to gain 
more material benefits. However, high politics and low politics are not two opposite 
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ends of a spectrum. If an issue has high economic stakes, it is going to be highly 
political (see Figure 1.4 below). The issues with low economic/political stakes would 
be easier to bargain about and would be used as side payments for bargaining in 
more crucial issues. 
 
In the two dimensional graph of the two spectrums in Figure 1.4 below, the 
horizontal axis stretches from pure domestic issues to pure foreign issues. The 
vertical axis has low economic stake issues at the bottom and soft political issues at 
the top. The circle at the intersection represents the core of international political 
economy. By choosing different dependent variables from the four distant corners of  
Figure 1.4, one can prove every conceivable theoretical argument in IPE. For 
example, regime theorists and global society schools tend to point out the 
widespread cooperation and shared norms in the top right corner. Historical 
institutionalist literature tend to choose their dependent variable from the lower or 
upper left corners and point out the continued relevance of domestic institutions. 
The Universalists and globalists of various shades tend to choose their dependent 
variables from the lower right corner and observe a convergence. 
 
My choice of policy issue – energy and climate change – is appropriate 
because it presents the most pressing international collective action challenge of our 
day. It also lies at the crossroads of security and economy, containing both domestic 
and foreign policy dimensions. There is a plethora of geopolitical studies of energy 
resource competition or climate change bargains in the IR literature and comparative 
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studies of energy and environmental policy-making focusing mainly on OECD. But 
to my knowledge there is no study that deals with energy and environmental issues 
from a domestic-international interaction perspective in a comparative framework.  
 
 





From a theoretical perspective, the thesis offers a progressive research 
programme that bridges the disciplinary and epistemological divides. From a public 
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policy perspective, it fills the policy research gap in our understanding of the 
dynamics of energy and environmental policy in an internationalising world. Such an 
understanding is required for effective international governance of these issues 
(Dubash and Florini 2011). The analysis attempts to bring a more nuanced 
understanding of the policy choices open to governments in an increasingly 
internationalising world, given the fact that ‘globalisation is both a constraint on state 
behaviour as well as a resource to tap into’ (Howlett and Ramesh 2006; Weiss 2003). 
Finally, an appreciation of nuances would enable policy makers to constructively 
engage and design flexible international institutions. 
 
This inquiry is strictly grounded in positive political theory. The first point of 
departure from the neo-neo rationalist paradigm is not to treat the state as unitary 
rational actor but a complex of institutions and political bargains. Consequently, we 
acknowledge that the policy-making process is path dependant and boundedly 
rational. The second point of departure is that we need to give more weight to 
perceptions and ideas such as ‘fairness’ besides security and efficiency when 
evaluating reasons for cooperation and discord. I concur with moderate 
constructivists that ‘ideas matter’ and ‘all research is theory laden’. However the two 
assertions neither justify intellectual anarchism nor the abandonment of the scientific 
approach to social inquiry. The point of departure from the interpretivist research 
programme is their relative disregard for material power structures influencing inter-
subjective/communicative discourses. The question is not if ideas matter. The actual 
question is whose ideas matter and how. We can overcome these problems in both 
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rationalist and constructivist research programmes using a critical realist approach 
(Brown 2007; Checkel 1997; Shapiro and Wendt 2005). A critical realist approach 
takes ideas more seriously than the traditional Marxist or Rationalist approaches in 
IR. But unlike modern constructivists, it does not ignore the underlying structural 
power relations and methodological problems. I develop a framework of interactions 
in international political economy within the broader meta-theoretical contours of 
critical realism.  
1.6.1. Research Methodology 
The research takes a quantitative approach. It uses a cross-sectional-time-series panel 
dataset assembled from various sources. The unit of analysis is country-year. The 
statistical model used is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. The panel dataset 
is comprised of 60 countries over 20 years (1993-2012) slightly unbalanced due to 
missing values. For the 60 countries selected, there are 28 OECD and 32 non-
OECD countries considering 2012 as base year, or 23 and 37 respectively 
considering 1993 as base year. Together these countries consumed over 90 percent 
of total world petroleum consumption, 80 percent of total world primary energy 
consumption, and emitted 90 percent of all energy related per capita carbon 
emissions in the world. As such my sample size is virtually the whole population of 




1.6.2. The Dependent Variable 
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Energy policy regime, like any other issue area, is a highly complex web of 
interrelated policies generally formed around few particular broad objectives. The 
exact goals of energy policy may differ from country to country in details and may 
never be available in a coherent and concrete way. Furthermore, a wide array of 
policy instruments is used to achieve those goals. Nevertheless, the main goal of a 
country’s energy policy is to provide energy security. All major energy consumers 
and producers have stated policy goals to that effect. This means the energy policy 
regime of a country ensures that:  
1. Fuel prices incorporate externalities and international price trends 
2. National energy baskets have a balanced mix of fuels 
3. Energy resources are used efficiently 
4. Carbon emissions or growth in carbon emissions is reduced 
 
Therefore, I choose policy outcomes as my dependent variable. The four 
dependent variables include (a) subsidies/taxes, (b) energy mix, (c) energy efficiency, 
and (d) carbon emissions. Policy outcomes are the impact of policy decisions on the 
relevant population. Policy outputs, on the other hand, are explicit government 
decisions taken to achieve a certain policy goal. Some scholars prefer policy output as 
dependent variable since its direct links with the policy process can be traced. 
However, choosing policy outputs leads to many problems. For example, 
governments often make policies to satisfy domestic or foreign constituencies. Either 
such policies are not implemented, or the government in question knows that it does 
not have the capacity to implement such policies. The literature on the politics of 
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implementation also indicates that not all policy outputs seamlessly translate into 
policy outcomes (May 2014). Furthermore, choosing outputs leads us to another 
challenge that is operationalising ‘policy change’ becomes an elusive task (Howlett 
and Cashore 2009). The comparative environmental policy literature, like policy 
convergence literature, is rife with such problems because most studies choose policy 
outputs as their dependent variable (Busch and Jorgens 2005; Heichel, Pape and 
Sommerer 2005; Knill, Schulze and Tosun 2012; Konisky and Woods 2012). Finally, 
from an international cooperation perspective, international negotiations only yield 
policy outputs. Only when compliance/implementation has been done can we say 
cooperation has occurred and not before. It is for this reason that many scholars 
argue that the dependent variable in a comparative perspective needs to be actual 
performance (Lijphart 2012; Roller 2005; Scruggs 2003). Hence, policy outcomes are 
a better candidate. 
1.6.3. Explanatory Variables 
From the discussion in the literature, I identified power, interests, institutions, and 
ideas, in both domestic and international spheres, as the determinants of policy 
change. The operationalization of these concepts tends to generate controversies. 
These variables may belong to either domestic or international sphere if traditional 
conceptualisation is followed. They may also belong to either the category of 
economics or politics. Nevertheless, following my argument against the strict 
conceptual divides between domestic-foreign and economics-politics, I treat all these 
explanatory variables equally. The table below (Table 1.1) summarises the main 
explanatory variables of the empirical model; namely (a) globalisation, (b) 
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international institutions, (c) domestic institutions, (d) relative market power, (e) 
sensitivity and vulnerability, and (f) the structure of national economy.17  
 
 Although by definition institutional variables can also be considered as 
structural, I differentiate in the table below more rigid physical structural attributes 
like endowments or the relative power in the international system from relatively 
fluid institutional attributes like the political system and process and the membership 
in the international institutions. Nevertheless, the stock and flow conceptualisation 
of change in policy regimes elaborated in the third chapter means that both structural 
and institutional attributes work as constraints on change in policy regimes and their 
outcomes. The political process of joining international institutions and changing 
domestic institutions works on the margins to bring about long term changes in 
policy outcomes. 
 
Table 1.1: Explanations of Policy Change and Energy Policy 
 Structural Institutional 
International relative capabilities, market power, and globalisation 
UNFCCC (Kyoto Protocol), 
IMF, WB, etc. 
Domestic 
 




political institutions  / veto players, 
and administrative capacity 
 
 
                                                 
17  It would have been ideal to include ideational/perception variables here. However, the only 
cross national time series dataset that asks environmental questions is World Value Survey. Some of 
the waves of these surveys asked questions that could be relevant in the context of climate policy and 
international cooperation. Unfortunately, it does not provide enough consistent data points to include 
them in our regressions.  
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1.7. The Roadmap  
In the next chapter, I review the IR and CPE literature particularly focusing on the 
problem of international cooperation, international institutions, and globalisation in 
the context of energy and climate change. This chapter highlights the contemporary 
debates in the literature and substantive claims of various schools of thought. In the 
third chapter, I develop a modified rational actor framework to analyse the 
interaction between domestic and international factors. The alternative construction 
of the collective action problem allows me to build a model that incorporates the 
role of domestic institutions and ideas. In this chapter, I develop falsifiable 
propositions based on the existing literature and my alternative construction of the 
problem of international cooperation. 
 
The fourth chapter test these propositions using a quantitative approach. The 
empirical results are discussed above and in the respective chapter. The concluding 
chapter offers a brief cogent argument as to why my alternative construction of the 
problem of international cooperation is better than the neo-neo approach. The 
chapter highlights some of the limitations of the current research and extrapolates on 




2. International Cooperation and National Political Economy: 
The State of the Art 
 
Abstract: This chapter reviews the theoretical literature that attempts to understand 
and explain the issues of international cooperation or more precisely determinants of 
states’ policies. The literature comes from two distinct sub-disciplines, namely IR and 
CPE. First, I survey the IR literature that mainly focuses on systemic variables like the 
distribution of power in the international system and the role of interdependence. 
Second, I survey the CPE literature that mainly focuses on similarities and variations 
in ‘domestic structures’ in order to explain policy outcomes across countries.  
 
If you don’t synthesize knowledge, scientific journals become  
spare-parts catalogue for machines that are never built.  
--- Arthur Marshall --- 
2.1. Introduction 
In the first chapter, we noted that it is in the collective interest of all states to 
cooperate in the area of energy and climate change. However, states have repeatedly 
failed to cooperate, be it the agreement on reductions in carbon emissions or phasing 
out of subsidies. Since international cooperation is understood as mutual policy 
adjustments, therefore, by definition, an inquiry into the problem of international 
cooperation is also an inquiry into the dynamics of policy change. The question then 
is: how do international and domestic factors interact to shape policy outputs and 
outcomes in the area of energy and environmental policy?  
 
The two subfields of political science that have been concerned with similar 
questions have evolved in relative isolation. The reason for such disconnect is that 
these subfields deal with somewhat different questions with varying levels of 
abstraction. For example, IR scholars look to explain the outcomes of interactions 
between states or the determinants of particular foreign economic and security 
policies. Scholars in CPE attempt to explain variances (or convergence), across 
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countries, in areas like state-society and capital-labour relations. The sources of these 
variances and similarities are then traced in the domestic or international arena. A 
new wave of scholarship in this domain is particularly interested in looking at the 
consequences of globalisation for the state.  A multitude of different schools of 
thought within these sub-disciplines further complicate the matter. Each of these 
schools represents a particular philosophy of social science. I postpone the 
discussion on the epistemological and ontological dispositions of these schools for 
the methodology chapter that is to follow.  
 
In this chapter, I mainly review the substantive claims of these approaches to 
the question of international cooperation and policy change, particularly the role of 
globalisation, international institutions, and domestic variables. The aim is to identify 
common threads where a broad synthesis can be developed. Besides all the contested 
points, at least four common threads stand out. First, the news of the death of the 
state is greatly exaggerated. States, no matter how much constrained, remain the 
primary actors in international and domestic politics. Secondly, rationalist systemic 
theories have very limited applicability. By ignoring domestic structures and politics, 
the rationalist systemic theories leave out too much to be able to account for a large 
amount of state action that transcends ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ policy boundaries. 
Thirdly, domestic structures and politics including perceptions have a critical role in 
explaining policy outcomes. Although domestic institutions and politics can be 
treated as dependent variables in the tradition of ‘the second image reversed’ that is 
determined by international influences, the historically sticky nature of domestic 
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institutions mean they have a greater explanatory role in explaining state action. 
Finally, whether state preferences originate from within or outside is a misleading 
research endeavour. Such a research question assumes, quite incorrectly, two isolated 
spheres of modern political existence. There is a fine dialectical relation between 
domestic and international determinants of state policies and that students of 
international and comparative politics would benefit by incorporating both in their 
analysis of policy outcomes.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I survey 
the IR literature on the role of globalisation and international institutions in 
international cooperation.  The third section brings in the CPE literature to weigh in 
on the debate from both the second image and second image reversed perspectives.  
 
2.2. Theories of International Politics and Cooperation 
The scholarly attempts to understand the character of international politics have 
produced many schools of thought in IR. A non-exhaustive list of different 
perspectives within IR may include (a) realism - classical and structural, (b) liberalism, 
the British School, and constructivism, (c) the international regimes theory and its 
three off-shoots, namely hegemonic stability, neoliberal institutionalism, and global 
governance.18 Each of these approaches has different assumptions about the main 
actors in the international system, the appropriate level of analysis in order to 
understand international collective action problems, and different understandings of 
                                                 
18  The usual disclaimer applies as all taxonomies are problematic. 
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what are the most important explanatory variables. The main explanatory variables 
include power, interests, and ideas.  
 
2.2.1. Realism: power, interests, and perceptions 
In realist thought,19 conflict and war are considered the norms of international life. 
According to realists, states are an ontological given and therefore the primary actors 
in the international system. The primary goal of states is survival, which means 
security. Almost all states have sufficient capabilities to unleash organized violence 
on a large scale. Classical realists associated international conflicts with a multitude of 
domestic and international factors including human nature, culture, the ruling 
regime, and the absence of a Leviathan (Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1948). According to 
realists, the primary reason for conflict (and war) is anarchy in the international 
arena. Anarchy – absence of a central authority with a legitimate monopoly over the 
use of force – does not mean chaos. It merely means that there is no superior 
authority over sovereign states, i.e. a legitimate authority that is able to define 
property rights and enforce rules. Consequently, the pursuit of national interests – 
irrespective of how they are defined – remains unchecked and leads to conflict and 
war (Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1959).  
 
                                                 
19  The historical accounts of this school refer to Thucydides (4th BC), Machiavelli (1469-1527), 
Hobbes (1588-1679), and Clausewitz (1780-1831). Other non-western traditions have similar views of 
international politics though some of these traditions place more importance on the identity or 
divinity as driving force behind a nation’s approach towards its peers. See, for example, various 
ancient writings of Sun Tzu (5th BC) a Chinese strategist, Kautilya (3rd BC), an Indian political 
economist, and Ibn-e-Khaldun (1332-1406) a socio-political economist of the Islamic empire in the 
greater Middle East. 
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 Waltz (1979), however, in his systemic theory of international politics – 
neorealism - emphasises the causal logic of the international system over its 
constituent parts. He argues that it is not human nature (first image), or national 
ruling elites, institutions, and ideology (second image), but the anarchic structure of 
the international system (third image) that compels states to strive for survival in a 
self-help system. States continuously try to balance against one another. This leads to 
a zero-sum security competition. One state’s defensive military apparatus, to insure 
its own survival or to further its national interests, makes its neighbours fearful, 
leading to a security dilemma and an arms race (Herz 1951; Jervis 1978). The 
outcomes of international interactions are then a function of the distribution of 
power in the system. The prospects for cooperation are dampened because of the 
distributional conflict, that is, states care about relative gains from cooperation 
because it changes the distribution of power in the system (Grieco 1993; 
Mearsheimer 1995).  
 
It follows from the neorealist reasoning that the tensions surrounding the 
energy and climate issues are normal characteristics of the international system 
(Klare 2012; O'Sullivan 2013). States striving for wealth and power come in conflict 
with others pursuing the same aims. Energy is critical for economic development and 
military uses. Therefore governments find it necessary to intervene in the markets as 
part of national security strategy (Yergin 2011). High concentration of energy 
resources in politically weak states invites meddling by foreign powers. Resource 
nationalism and substantial rents provide another impetus for government 
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intervention (Colgan 2010). Both producers and consumers have also used energy as 
a tool to further political aims. The state policies to secure energy supplies from 
abroad or banning energy exports are threatening to other states, or are perceived as 
such. Similarly, the climate change mitigation policies not only require substantial 
resources but also raise the cost of production making economies less competitive. 
Therefore, no state is willing to take action. This gives rise to an energy security 
dilemma. Security competition is played out in the international arena where power 
or threat of force is the final currency. In short, hopes for cooperative collective 
solutions overcoming distributional conflicts are doomed (Mearsheimer 1995, 2001; 
Waltz 1979, 2008).  
 
To be fair, neorealism does not attempt to explain all foreign policy 
interactions (Waltz 1996). Waltz argues that inasmuch a systemic level analysis can 
explain a large part of international politics, particularly in the area of security among 
great powers, the more complicated accounts of domestic politics can be ignored 
(Waltz 1979, 67). However, two objections can be raised here. One, the scope of 
applicability of the theory needs to be explicitly and clearly defined, which successive 
generations of neorealist scholars have not done. Second, assuming that the broader 
scope of the theory is the great power-security competition (high politics), the 
separation of security from other issue areas is questionable.  
 
A security apparatus requires material and organisational resources that need 
to be generated from within or outside the national economy, which interacts with 
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the international political economy. Therefore, security policies of states may not be 
isolated from broader international political economic interactions. Furthermore, 
there are widespread disagreements among scholars. IR scholars, within and outside 
of the neorealist tradition, have contested almost all of neorealist assumptions (of 
survival, anarchy, and the state as primary actor) as well as the causal inferences 
(security dilemma, relative gains, and balance of power) that can be drawn and 
supported by empirical evidence. 
 
First, many scholars have pointed out that neorealists have a very narrow and 
crude understanding of power, how it is acquired, exercised, and used to ensure  
security/survival (Baldwin 1989, 2002; Guzzini 1993, 2000; Petersen 2011). These 
scholars argue that power is not mere possession of resources, but the exercise of 
influence internally as well as externally; for which there is no straight forward 
relationship between power as possessions and influence. Furthermore, states can 
neither calculate the security consequences of their every action, nor can they know 
how much security/power they need to have in order to survive. Sometimes states’ 
efforts at survival from external threats lead to internal weaknesses, regime change, 
or disintegration (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2012; Dillon Savage 2012; Fazal 2001).  
 
Second, the question for states then is, how much power is necessary to 
insure one's own internal and external security. This divides realists into defensive 
and offensive camps (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998; Kadercan 2013). Defensive 
realists, like Waltz and Grieco, continue to emphasise that states maintain a fine 
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balance between various uses of resources internally and a parity with competitors 
externally (Tang 2010; Waltz 2008). However, offensive realists argue that states 
maximise their security as much as they can (Mearsheimer 2001). The best way to be 
secure, according to Mearsheimer, is to be a hegemon in the system. The implication 
of this proposition, in the words of power cycle/transition theory (Chan 2005; 
Doran 1995; Organski 1958), is that all major powers are inherently revisionists. In 
the world of defensive realism, on the other hand, states would prefer a stable 
balance of power.20 Thus, a working cooperative relationship is not unthinkable so 
long as the distributional conflict is not all that great. 
 
Third, Walt (1987) contends in his seminal work on alliance formation that 
states do not merely balance power capabilities of other states, but they also balance 
against perceived threats. States decide, based on their perceptions of threat, whether 
to balance against or ally with the powerful state. Walt’s argument is a significant 
departure from the neorealist logic. For neorealists, perceptions, intentions or ideas 
are not a reliable guide for statecraft (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 2008). For example, 
Mearsheimer argues that today's friends are potential adversaries of tomorrow; for 
ideas and intentions can change with the change in material or political conditions. 
Other scholars have extended Walt’s argument in order to explain the absence of 
balancing against the United States in the post-Cold War world (Lieber and 
Alexander 2005; Pant 2004). These scholars argue that the American hegemony is 
                                                 
20  This also leads to disagreements on the question if unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar world is 




perceived as benign and all other potential balancers (Russia, China, and India) have 
closer ties with the United States than with one another. In a different vein, but with 
a similar argument, Jervis (1976) highlights the importance of perceptions and 
misperceptions. He elaborates on the institutional and situational sources of 
misperceptions that lead to conflict situations.  
 
Fourth, the importance of perceptions is also important for both realist and 
non-realist scholars who do not subscribe to a strict anarchic conception of the 
international system (Caporaso 1997; Dillon Savage 2012; Donnelly 2006; 
Gourevitch 1978; Hancock 2002; Keene 2007; Krasner 1999; Lake 1996). These 
scholars argue that the power inequalities among states are so great that a large part 
of international interactions is essentially hierarchical. Krasner (2009) rejects Waltz’ 
billiard ball model of international politics and instead calls the modern concept of 
sovereign states an ‘organised hypocrisy’. An earlier generation of scholars, both in 
IR and those tracing the origins of the modern state, offered a ‘second image 
reversed’ conception of the international system (Gourevitch 1978; Tilly 1984). The 
scholars in this tradition argue that the character of domestic institutions is 
historically shaped by factors outside their borders. Recently, Owen (2002; 2010), in 
his seminal work of over 200 historical cases of regime change, shows that powerful 
actors have always interfered to change domestic regimes and institutions in other 





Finally, there are various channels through which influence is exercised. 
Strange (1987, 1988, 1996) conceptualises power as structural position in the global 
political economy instead of mere military possessions. It means that being powerful 
in the modern political economy gives a state the capacity to extend or deny access 
to security, production technology, capital, and information. More importantly, a 
state in a structurally superior position shapes the paths to production, security, and 
knowledge that other states can adopt. Cox and his colleagues (Cox 1987; Cox and 
Schechter 2002; Cox and Sinclair 1996) extend this analysis of the modern 
production process to the attendant policy, organisational, and ideological paradigms 
that follow. Applying the Gramscian concept of hegemony of discourse, Cox and his 
colleagues demonstrate that structural power translates into hegemony over 
organisational and ideological forms of the international system and consequently to 
the diffusion of these forms and ideologies to other countries. Some liberal scholars 
may call this influence of ideas as ‘soft power’ (Nye 1990, 2011). 
 
From the above discussion, it becomes clear that the structural theory of 
international politics put forward by neorealists remains inadequate to explain a large 
part of international interactions. As Keohane (2002, 6) puts it, neorealism may be 
useful as ‘first cut’ but it leaves out too much, particularly domestic politics and the 
role of ideas/perceptions, to be a comprehensive doctrine of international relations. 
Some realists acknowledge that domestic variables need to be incorporated into 
realist perspectives (Grieco 1988b; Krasner 1993). Even Waltz (2000) concedes the 
importance of domestic politics and ideas/perceptions when he states that ‘the error 
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of realist predictions that the end of the Cold War would mean the end of NATO 
arose not from a failure of realist theory to comprehend international politics, but 
from an underestimation of America’s folly’. It is for this reason that now we turn to 
the schools which give greater importance to domestic institutional arrangements 
and perceptions/ideas.    
 
2.2.2. Liberalism, the British School, and Constructivism: Institutions, Values, and Norms 
Historically, unsatisfied with the pessimistic worldview of realists, liberal 
philosophers maintained a normative approach to human affairs and international 
politics. From this perspective, conflict and war is aberration and not the norm, 
often inflicted by few misguided people in authority. In international relations, 
liberalism is based on three postulates put forward by Immanuel Kant. Firstly, a 
national political order that ensures the liberty of its citizens is likely to be peaceful in 
its foreign affairs (democratic peace theory). Secondly, free economic exchange 
within and across borders creates vested interests that are hostile to conflict and war 
(commercial liberalism). Thirdly, international law and institutions, in the same spirit 
as domestic ones, would ensure peaceful management of conflict (institutional 
liberalism). Liberty in this tradition means juridical equality, consent and 
representation of the governed, right to free economic exchange and property. 
Therefore, applying the same principles to states means that mutual respect for these 




As such liberalism is not a positive theory but a normative political 
philosophy of international politics. Only recently some scholars have attempted to 
put forward liberalism as a positive theory (Moravcsik 2003). In Moravcsik’s 
argument, security is not an end but a means to other goals that actors in a society 
seek. Although states, by and large, remain dominant actors operating under anarchy, 
they are not treated as an ontological given. Nor does anarchy retain an overarching 
explanatory power (Moravcsik and Legro 1999). The actual decision makers, for 
liberals, are individuals and interest groups of individuals with their national and 
transnational roles. This means that the state is embedded in the national and 
transnational society and represents aggregated preferences of the society. Therefore, 
a theory of international politics needs to take seriously the distribution of 
preferences, as opposed to capabilities, along with the institutional and ideological 
make-up that shapes these preferences (Moravcsik 1997, 2003). Russett and Oneal 
(2001), in their landmark work, empirically demonstrate the validity of all three 
claims of liberalism, namely democratic, commercial, and international institutions 
leading to peace.  
 
The English school and liberal tradition have developed parallel to each 
other, and share many intellectual strands. Despite their differences, the two 
traditions have a lot in common. The primary element that links these schools is the 
role of international law and institutions. The British school scholars trace their 
lineage from the Grotius (1583-1645) tradition, which laid down the body of modern 
international law governing the contemporary state system and the principal of 
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sovereignty (Manning 1962; Wight 1949). These laws define statehood, rules of war 
and peace, and how states ought to use the global commons. Some scholars in this 
tradition concede that the international system is characterized by anarchy. But, they 
argue, the consequences of anarchy depend on the density of interactions and not 
merely the distribution of power or interests. With an increase in interactions, states 
develop ‘by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of 
their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these 
arrangements’ (Watson 2009, 14). In short, states in the system form an ‘anarchical 
society’ (Bull 1977; Watson 1992).  
 
While I reserve the ontological and epistemological discussion, with regards 
to these schools, for the next chapter, it is in order to mention that there are two 
discernible strands in both these traditions. One approach offers a 
sociological/constructivist explanation of ‘international society’ and the other points 
to the calculated benefits (rationalist/functionalist) of living in a rule governed 
environment. For example, Watson (2009, 11) states that the international order 
brought about by these arrangements reinforces the belief that ‘it pays to make the 
system work’. Similarly, other scholars, often dubbed integration theorists, emphasize 
rational prudence that binds states in interdependent relationships to achieve 
common interests (Haas 1964, 1982; Mitrany 1948, 1975; Young 1989, 1991).21  
 
                                                 




The sociological, or more precisely, constructivist strand argues that the very 
act of interaction between two or more entities presupposes convergent expectations 
based on some sort of common values (Buzan 1993, 331-32).22 The ‘common values’ 
are primarily internalized norms and ideas like liberty and property rights, that are 
universally appealing to the global society,  and  not just to the society of states 
(Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Ruggie 1975, 1982, 2007). Wendt (1992, 394) argues 
that the common understanding and convergent expectations emerge from the 
‘intersubjective conception of the process in which identities and interests are 
endogenous to interaction’. Anarchy, in this tradition, is not an exogenous character 
of the international system but an institution resulting from the process of state 
interactions. These scholars argue that international law and institutions do not 
merely influence state behaviour (while keeping interests exogenous, as in the case of 
neorealism), but shape and reshape interests and identities (Barnett and Finnemore 
1999, 2004; Finnemore 1996).23 Nevertheless, it follows from this proposition that 
conflict and war are aberrations largely resulting from a breach of shared customs 
like restraint on use of force, sanctity of contract, and property rights. Some actors 
are uncivilized or deviant and need to be brought (back) into the ‘society’ by 
persuasion, inducement, and legitimate threat or use of force (Bull and Watson 
1984). 
                                                 
22  Rittberger (1993, 394) points this out quoting  (Durkheim [1897] 1952) and (Parsons 1937). 
Also, one finds Hume’s (1711-1776) and Bentham’s (1748-1832) influence on these scholars, 
particularly when they refer to the notions of rational prudence, common interests, common goals, 
and socialization. In short the rationalist-sociological distinctions often get blurred. 
23  Yet for others within the constructivist tradition, international interactions are not the 
primary influence in shaping interests and identities, but it is instead the historical processes local to 





From the above three perspectives the solution to the problem of 
cooperation in energy and climate change is one of deepening the norms of the 
sanctity of property rights, establishing specific property rights, and promoting well-
functioning rule governed markets. In cases where there is market failure, the 
cooperative norms and principles can be established by identifying rights and 
obligations and seeking consent through communicative discourse. On the particular 
issue of global climate change regime, liberal scholars have extended the Rawlsian 
theory of justice into a cosmopolitan theory of justice that takes into account 
inequalities in responsibilities, obligations, and capabilities (Sen 2009; Vanderheiden 
2008). However, the mere fact that the negotiations over responsibilities and 
obligations are stalled in the climate change regime is indicative of the weakness of 
the persuasive power of these ideas.  
 
Nonetheless, the three schools effectively highlight the problems with a 
narrow conception of anarchy and interests as motivation for action. However, the 
introduction of the concepts like ‘international society’ and ‘collective legitimate 
authority’, ‘common norms/values’ do not take us too far. Scholars in both these 
traditions remain unconvincing on questions like, what dominates when there is a 
conflict between security/interests and values/norms. How do they converge and 
what happens when they don’t? For instance, unless one believes in teleology or the 
intrinsic superiority of one idea, no amount of intellectual exercise could 
demonstrate that the idea of slavery was accepted by African slaves through inter-
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subjective understanding and communicative rationality. This is precisely what some 
constructivists seem to believe when they put forward the abolishment of slavery as 
supporting evidence for their argument (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Ruggie 
1998b). For if the abolishment was achieved through discourse, and discourse alone, 
how could we explain the establishment of slavery in the first place?24 
 
It is not surprising then that these schools are derided as ‘idealism’. Realists 
and other scholars argue that there are no international laws or society, but mere 
power arrangements in the system. Powerful states with vested interests put on a 
moral and legal cloak to sell their own interests and values as universals and good for 
everyone. Marx, Mao, Carr, and Morgenthau called morality and law a product of 
power. Other scholars have theorised that it is structural hegemony that produces 
legitimizing superstructures (Cox 1987; Strange 1982, 1996). Even Kant criticized 
many of the international law practices as immoral and perpetuating injustice. 
Constructivism – with all its emphasis on intersubjective discourse, communicative 
rationality, or appeal of universal ideas – is subjected to the same criticism. 
Huntington (1993, 51) puts it succinctly, ‘the West won the world not by the 
superiority of its ideas or values or religion … but rather by its superiority in applying 
organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact’. 
 
                                                 
24  Marx once ridiculed German idealists by referring to a valiant fellow who thought that men 
were drowned in water only because they were possessed with the idea of gravity. In a similar vein, 




Some liberal apologists acknowledge the above criticism but argue that this is 
a better state of affairs than complete anarchy, or an order not governed by liberal 
values of rights to liberty and property (Friedman 2000; Ikenberry and Mastanduno 
2003; Ikenberry 2011; Mead 2005). Adherents of the English school agree with some 
of the above criticism too, on the grounds that ‘all legal systems need to be backed 
by some coercive power’ (Hurrell 1993, 55). Other constructivists closer to the 
English school consider it a legitimate fusion of power and social purpose (Ruggie 
1982); even Keohane (2012) seems to have taken this position lately. In short, all 
three of these schools stand accused of having a ‘normative bias’ and face scathing 
criticisms regarding their methodologies.  
 
2.2.3. International Regimes & Institutions 
The problems discussed above highlight the weaknesses of the grand schools of 
thought, particularly in explaining the thick and mundane layers of interactions 
among states. The increasing number of cross border interactions and international 
organisations in the post War era required more nuanced and rigorous theoretical 
explanations, from both realist and non-realist scholars. Realists continued to treat 
the growing interdependence, the scope and effectiveness of the UN, the GATT, 
and the Bretton Woods institutions, as inconsequential for the international system 
because these are changes in the system but not of the system (Waltz 2000). The 
studies of international organisations in this era, particularly from the liberal or 
British school perspective, were considered insufficiently theoretical and were always 




Moving away from the high politics to the economic and other interactions 
among states, liberal as well as reaslist scholars agreed on the need for more nuanced 
analysis. (Copeland 2003; Keohane 2002; Krasner 2009, 255-73; Moravcsik and 
Legro 1999; Stein 1982). Baldwin (1979) goes as far as to claim that ‘the notion of a 
single overall international power structure unrelated to any particular issue area is 
based on a concept of power that is virtually meaningless’. This understanding, that 
overall military power was not very helpful in explaining the outcomes of 
interactions in so many issue areas, led to the development of issue-specific analysis. 
The studies of international organisational and transnational relations, particularly 
among policy elites, laid down the foundations for the theories of ‘international 
regimes’ (Keohane and Nye 1974; Ruggie 1975; Young 1968). These scholars defined 
international regimes as ‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision 
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue area 
of international relations’ (Krasner 1983, 1) or ‘sets of mutual expectations, generally 
agreed-to rules, regulations and plans, in accordance with which organisational 
energies and financial commitments are allocated’ (Ruggie 2007). Some of the 
questions these scholars attempted to answer were; when do regimes develop and 
change? What is the role of power, interests, and values in shaping regimes? What are 
their consequences for state behavior? And, through what channels do regimes 




  Nevertheless, the regime analysis was also criticized for being a ‘fad’ and 
obscuring the underlying power relations in an imprecise language (Strange 1982, 
1994). Other scholars criticized regime analysis for continuing to be state centric and 
ignoring the role of non-state actors, particularly transnational networks of 
businesses and technocrats (Haas 1989). Issue-specificity was also criticized on the 
grounds that we don’t need a different theory for each issue area (Lake 1996). It was 
therefore not surprising that the efforts to make the regime analysis more precise, on 
the one hand, and to expand its scope of analysis, on the other, resulted in three 
divergent developments within the regime theory. Over the years, regime theory took 
three different routes, namely realist, liberal, and constructivist.  
 
Firstly, liberal scholars pointed to the growing interdependence and offered 
an alternative explanation for international cooperation called neoliberal 
institutionalism. Neoliberal institutionalism demonstrates that even by starting with 
the pessimistic neorealist assumptions, international cooperation could still emerge. 
Secondly, realists continued to explain the emergence of regimes as hegemonic 
efforts to establish an international order, often termed the hegemonic stability 
theory. Finally, the global governance literature developed as a result of liberal and 
constructivist scholars’ efforts to give greater weight to ideas and non-state actors 
(including sub-national, supra-national, and transnational) who were absent from the 
neo-neo dialogue. Some other scholars viewed international policy regimes as a 
stepping stone towards a world government. In the following passages, I briefly 
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Since the lack of international cooperation is ascribed to anarchy in the international 
system, many scholars entertain the notion that a central authority may be a solution 
to international conflicts.25 The literature in this domain ranges from prescriptions by 
idealist activists calling for the formation of a world government (Davis 1961; 
Tännsjö 2008; Yunker 2011) to functional approaches (Haas 1964; Mitrany 1948, 
1975; Rodrik 2008) to hard-headed analysis of the political developments pointing 
towards an inevitable eventuality of a world government (Marx and Engels [1847]  
2000; Wendt 2003).   
 
However, the feasibility of a world government, as well as its desirability, 
remains questionable in the foreseeable future (Beitz 1979; Held 1995; Mearsheimer 
1995; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Waltz 2008), no matter how theoretically 
inevitable it may be in the long run. A world government would require legitimate 
monopolization of organized violence. This implies disarming of the constituent 
parts, which remains unlikely without a bloody war. Intra-state conflicts during the 
long periods of state formation and disintegration suggest that a world government is 
                                                 
25  The idea, as a prescription to the solution of international cooperation, has been around in the 
Islamic (7th Century) tradition and in the Western tradition since at least Alighieri Dante (1265-1321). 
The positivist case for the inevitability or eventuality of a world government was most forcefully put 
forward by Karl Marx (1818-1883). For a detailed history of the world government idea see Yunker 




no guarantee for cooperation and peace either. Furthermore, the literature in the new 
institutional economics also points to the fact that ‘central authority’ or ‘markets’ 
may not be the only, or even the most efficient, solution to collective action 
problems (Ostrom 1990, 2009). Instead, Ostrom et al. argue that polycentricity – 
disaggregated action at multiple levels and scales – may be the solution, in addition to 
internationally coordinated large scale agreements for many of the global collective 
action problems (Ostrom 2012). 
 
Global Governance: A Research or Policy Agenda? 
The concept of global governance is similar to that of polycentricity. Global 
governance refers to the cooperative transnational problem-solving arrangements 
(laws, institutions, organisations, networks, norms, etc.) that involve state and non-
state actors at various levels (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Weiss and Thakur 2010). 
The problems that require global governance are by definition transnational in nature 
and beyond the capacity of any one or more states to deal with. These problems are 
largely confined to non-traditional human security issues like trade, investment, food 
and energy security, pandemics, and the environment.  
 
Global governance, though originally conceived as a research program by 
Rosenau and his colleagues (1989; 1992) to understand the emergent transnational 
governance mechanisms, has come to represent an active normative policy agenda 
(Bevir and Hall 2011; Farer and Sisk 2010; Ruggie 2007; Weiss 2013). As such, global 
governance may be conceived as an attempt to meet the conflicting demands of 
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those who want more globalisation and of those who resist it. While the former 
boost the benefits of an interconnected open world, the latter point to the downsides 
of globalisation, not least the lack of democratic ideals like equity, inclusiveness, 
transparency, and accountability in the contemporary process of globalisation.26  
Proponents of global governance usually eschew highly centralised and 
technocratic intergovernmental solutions to global problems. Global civil society, at 
the forefront of the global governance agenda, views multilateral organisations 
lacking in transparency and democracy. The concept of global governance was 
preceded by the wholesale liberalisation of economies and a sense among scholars 
that the authority and governance functions are shifting from states downward 
(decentralisation), upward (international institutions) and around (multinational 
corporations). It was also paralleled with an interpretivist turn in social sciences. 
Therefore, we see a hotchpotch of dispersed private sector and civil society 
approaches, informed by free the market paradigm, normative ideals of participation 
and ‘governance through love’, under the umbrella of global governance. 
 
Nevertheless, for many academics global governance remains an analytical 
concept rather than a substantive policy agenda (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006; 
                                                 
26   For example the journal Global Society describes its aims and scope as ‘[it] covers the new 
agenda in global and international relations… It promotes the analysis of transactions at multiple 
levels, and in particular, the way in which these transactions blur the distinction between the sub-
national, national, transnational, international, and global levels. An ever integrating global society 
raises a number of issues for global and international relations which do not fit comfortably within the 
established ‘Paradigms’. The globalisation of normative superstructures, such as of liberal capitalism, 
or of communications, such as the Internet, influences transactions at all levels and challenges state 




Finkelstein 1995; Hewson and Sinclair 1999). However, the still evolving ‘theory’ of 
global governance has generated an enormous amount of literature, yet it still 
grapples with theoretical and methodological problems. For example, after fifteen 
years of publishing, the editors of the journal Global Governance acknowledge that 
‘the concept as a research agenda neither brings us much analytical clarity nor does it 
provide precise ways of explaining the causes and consequence for public policy’. As 
an analytical concept it merely asserts that ideas, norms, and transnational networks 
of non-state actors matter in world politics (Finkelstein 1995; Rosenau and Czempiel 
1992, 4-9; Weiss 2013).  
 
Some scholars argue that the term global governance is an instrument to 
promote a hegemonic discourse, a particular set of normative paradigms that benefit 
the contemporary powerful actors in the international system, that is, the western 
countries led by the United States (Brand 2005) and international institutions like the 
World Bank and IMF. Carroll (2007) attributes the overall project, under the 
stewardship of the World Bank, as the extension of market relations to hitherto 
unaffected areas in order to make the Washington consensus reforms more 
penetrating/embedding through Socio-Institutional Neoliberalism (SIN). For others, 
global governance is merely a fancy new word for an old concept of interdependence 




Neoliberal Institutional Theory 
The earlier studies of growing interdependence and transnational relations noted the 
consequences of such developments for international politics (Keohane and Nye 
1972). These observations were developed into a theory of international politics by 
Keohane and Nye ([1989] 2012). They took inspiration from integration theorists 
(Haas 1958, 1964; Mitrany 1975), economic theories of interdependence (Cooper 
1968; Hirschman 1970, 1980), and constructivist theories of international regimes 
(Ruggie 1975, 1982; Young 1977, 1982). The theory offered by Keohane and Nye in 
Power and Interdependence was further fine-tuned in the two successive seminal works. 
In Power and Interdependence, internationalisation and transnational relations play an 
important causal role in the creation and persistence of international regimes. 
However, in the later works, particularly Keohane’s (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation 
and Discord in the World Political Economy, and Cooperation under Anarchy edited by Oye 
(1986), neoliberal scholars accepted the realist assumptions of states as primary and 
rational unitary actors in the international system that are striving for survival under 
anarchy. These scholars argue that despite these assumptions cooperation can 
nevertheless emerge due to the presence of mutual interests. 
 Keohane and Nye ([1989] 2012, 9-37) contend that interdependence not only 
creates common interests but also restricts states’ policy autonomy and the available 
policy choices. States become more sensitive and vulnerable to the policies of other 
states and to the changes in the international political economy. Interdependence 
renders the use or threat of force, as a policy instrument, ineffective by making it 
costly and eroding any clear hierarchy of issues in a dense web of linkages. 
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Furthermore, internationalisation of national economies exposes them to 
international price trends, competition and shocks. Not only do state policies lose 
their efficacy, but the available policy choice set shrinks (Keohane and Milner 1996). 
The ‘loss of control’ over policy choices means that states cannot pursue their 
security, economic and welfare goals independently, rendering power resources 
irrelevant. Therefore states can, and do, cooperate in a wide array of issue areas to 
achieve common interests.  
Building on this argument, neoliberal institutionalists (Axelrod and Keohane 
1985; Keohane 1984, 2002; Martin and Simmons 1998; Oye 1986; Stein 2008) claim 
that what primarily impedes cooperation is not conflict of interests or distributional 
concerns, but fear of opportunistic behavior; because there is no authority to enforce 
agreements, states fear that others may renege on their commitments. Borrowing 
insights from the developments in non-cooperative game theory and new 
institutional economics, these scholars argue that the problem of international 
cooperation is a typical collective action problem or a political market failure. This is 
mainly because of the high transaction costs resulting from incomplete and 
asymmetric information, lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, 
bargaining costs and uncertainty. Consequently, actors cannot make credible 
commitments.  
 
From this point of view, states demand and voluntarily create international 
institutions in order to reduce transaction costs that inhibit cooperation (Keohane 
2002, 30/39-62). Institutions by definition are intentionally devised formal and 
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informal rules that keep a check on rein in unconstrained action in interdependent 
relations. International institutions thus facilitate cooperation by providing 
information, revealing states’ preferences, monitoring their actions and providing 
bargaining forums. As such international institutions bring predictability. They 
constrain states’ behavior through formal rules, but more importantly, by 
establishing norms of reciprocity and reputation that facilitate credible commitments. 
Therefore, ingenious international institutions can be rationally designed to deal with 
the issues of distributional conflicts and opportunism (Koremenos, Lipson and 
Snidal 2003). 
 
Nevertheless, most cases of international institutions analyzed by these 
studies were in fact clubs. For example, Keohane’s original argument was based on a 
case study of IEA. The IEA was easy to create by the United States, because most of 
its members were already dependent on the United States through security 
guarantees of NATO. Similarly, OPEC was led by Saudi Arabia and joined by states 
that shared many interests and, to a certain extent, cultural identities, but have 
minimum interdependence. In many other international institutions, states form 
groups based on the perceptions of identity of interests and solidarity instead of a 
demand to reduce transaction costs or correct market failures. What neoliberals 
called international institutions, neorealists understood them as alliances or political 
and economic security guarantees by the most powerful state in the system (Waltz 
2000). Furthermore, Keohane and other scholars have noted that the success of both 
these clubs remains questionable and member countries have often employed other 
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strategies, instead of depending on these clubs, to achieve their policy aims (Colgan 
2014; Katzenstein 1978; Keohane and Nye [1989] 2012; Keohane and Victor 2013). 
 
Clubs are qualitatively different from open membership international regimes 
(Cornes and Sandler 1996; Kahler and Lake 2003). Besides identity of interests and 
shared perceptions, formation of clubs depends on the character of good these 
international clubs provide. In cases where it is relatively easy to exclude members 
from enjoying the good produced by clubs, we can expect coherent and well-
functioning clubs. The presence of a hegemon that can provide a large amount of 
resources and stands to benefit the most also facilitates the formation of a club. 
However, since a large number of international regimes are concerned with the 
provision of public goods, the question arises as to what would be the consequences 
of power and interest asymmetries. Keohane and his colleagues concede that the 
asymmetries in power and interests would lead to ‘regime complexes’ (Colgan, 
Keohane and Van de Graaf 2012; Keohane and Victor 2011).  
 
Regime complexes are defined as ‘an array of partially overlapping and non-
hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue area’ (Keohane and Victor 2011; 
Raustiala and Victor 2004). The development of the concept of regime complex is 
yet another proof that neoliberal institutionalism is inching closer to neorealist 
position in order to explain the consequences of power asymmetries and 
distributional conflicts. Whatever the origins of a regime in a particular issue area, 
powerful actors that are dissatisfied with the existing institutional arrangements are 
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likely to sabotage/change the regime. A failure to achieve these outcomes leads to 
forum shopping or creation of yet newer institutions.   
 
Hegemonic Stability Theory 
Contrary to the functionalist neoliberal institutional explanations of 
international institutions, neorealists argue that the mere presence of common 
interests or interdependence is not a sufficient condition for international 
cooperation (Gilpin 1981; Kindleberger 1973; Krasner 1976; Waltz 1970). Grieco 
(1988a, 1993) and Mearsheimer (1995) argue that states contemplating cooperation 
do not merely care about their own gains but also the relative gains from 
cooperation. Since states are positional egoists, relative gains from cooperation 
matter for self-interest maximisation. Therefore, cheating is not the primary concern 
for states, but in fact the distribution of benefits from cooperation is. Since both fear 
of cheating and relative gains concerns make it difficult for states to create 
cooperative institutions, the hegemon in the system creates international institutions. 
The hegemon not only has the necessary wherewithal to create such institutions but 
also stands to benefit more than others.27  
 
This proposition is primarily founded on Olsen’s (1971, 2) logic of collective 
action, that is, ‘unless there is coercion or some other special device to make 
individuals act in their common interest, rational self-interested individuals will not 
                                                 
27  For a recent critical appraisal of the argument that the hegemon stands to benefit more from 
establishing order through various mechanisms, see Drezner (2013). However, he only considers 
military dominance and not the overall structural power, for which Drezner (2007) finds evidence in 
his earlier work of net benefits to the hegemon because of its structural power. 
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act to achieve their common or group interests’. The theory of public goods28 poses 
a free rider problem for large groups. However, in smaller groups, where actions of 
actors are noticeable to others, some social mechanisms or ‘spillover’ or ‘selective 
incentives’ may prevent free riding. Similarly, in cases where benefits to one actor 
from the provision of the public good are greater than the cost, that actor may 
provide the public good. It then follows from this reasoning that international 
institutions provide public goods and are themselves public goods. Hence countries 
have no incentive to provide them. Only the powerful actor who receives net 
benefits from providing international institutions would do so. Following the same 
logic, a small concert of actors may provide international institutions if there are 
other ‘selective’ or ‘spillover’ incentives for all the members.  
 
Again, it follows from the above reasoning that most institutions created this 
way would fit the definition of clubs, instead of open membership international 
institutions. For example, a stable oil price regime would benefit all the countries in 
the system, making it a public good. However, any international institution aimed at 
achieving this goal may be created by a single hegemon, if the benefits exceed costs 
to the hegmon. Alternatively, the hegemon, in collaboration with few other actors 
with which it shares interests and perceptions of threat, may provide such a regime. 
The hegemon may use side payments and issue linkage strategies to achieve this goal. 
                                                 
28  Public goods are by definition non-excludable and non-rivalrous. The difficulty of excluding 
others from using the good and the fact that consumption by one user does not diminish the 
availability for others mean that the provision of such goods suffers from undersupply because of the 
free rider problem. In large groups, particularly since the contribution of one person would not be 
noticeable, there is incentive for actors to free ride. 
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In all these scenarios there is always a tendecy of the small to ‘exploit’ the powerful. 
Nevertheless, coercion and/or selective inducements may not work once the cost-
benefit (or power equation) shifts adversely for the dominant actors. In such cases 
the regime becomes dysfunctional, leading to changes either in or of regimes, what 
neoliberals call a ‘regime complex’. Thus, for realists, power and interests are the 
primary causal variables. Coercion and inducements are the main channels through 
which powerful actors change the behavior of weaker states. Over the years, using 
this analytical lense, realist scholars have explained the development, 
dysfunctionality, or disintegration of various international institutions including the 
climate regime(Fiammenghi 2011; Grieco 1993, 1996; Krasner 1991; Min 2003; 
Stone, Slantchev and London 2008). 
 
The foregoing discussion suggests that neorealists do not deny the possibility 
of cooperation, as alliances or a concert of powers, for balancing a stronger power. 
However, what appears like international cooperation to others, to realists it is either 
acquiescence, marriage of convenience, or an alignment of interests and threat 
perceptions. The long term stability of such alignments (including NATO and the 
EU, the strongest examples), however, is questioned by some scholars in this 
tradition (Mearsheimer 1994; 2001, 33-53). Much of the post-war cooperation among 
developed countries to erect an international liberal order, according to realists, was a 
result of the American hegemony (Gilpin 1981, 1987). Interdependence or 




2.2.4. The Neo-Neo Consensus and its Problems: Institutions and globalisation 
Note that both neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists agree on the fundamental 
assumptions about the international system. What they disagree on are the 
consequences of these assumptions that can be implied and supported by the 
evidence, particularly the consequences of internationalisation and international 
institutions. Nevertheless, there are two puzzles in the neo-neo narrative. First, by 
putting forward a functionalist rational choice demand argument (for voluntary 
creation of international institutions by states to overcome collective action 
problems), Keohane (1982) overlooks the fact that the supply of international 
institutions itself presents a collective action problem of the first order (Bates 1988; 
Ostrom 1994).  
 
This goes against the fundamental insight of Olsen’s (1971, 2) logic of 
collective action, that is ‘unless there is coercion or some other special device to 
make individuals act in their common interest, rational self-interested individuals will 
not act to achieve their common or group interests’. In fact it is this insight, made 
explicit by Olson (1971, 45) about the undersupply of international institutions, that 
led realists to put forward the hegemonic stability theory.29 That is why when the 
American hegemony is on a decline, Keohane himself observes ‘a decline in the 
coherence of some international regimes’ due to ‘divergence of interests weighted by 
                                                 
29  Some liberal and constructivist scholars may argue that the motivation is not just material 
interests but also values (Ikenberry 2011; Ruggie 1998b; Weiss 2013; Weiss and Thakur 2010). 
Nevertheless, they would agree that states are unlikely to pursue ideational objectives abroad at the 
cost of their own survival.  
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power’ (Keohane 2012; Keohane and Victor 2013). This is quite a departure from 
the argument developed in After Hegemony.   
 
Furthermore, two decades of research within the neoliberal institutional 
domain demonstrates that in various structurally different manifestations of 
collective action problems (coordination, bargaining, enforcement, and distributional 
issues) the demand and voluntary creation argument only holds in a very restrictive 
fashion. For example, contrary to what Axelrod and Keohane (1985) consider 
essential for cooperation (reciprocity and reputation), the shadow of the future can make 
the bargaining problem harder (Fearon 1998; Lake 2010). The longer the shadow of 
the future (uncertainty) the harder it would be to reach an agreement. Similarly, even 
when states are only concerned about their own gains (absolute gains) from 
cooperation, adjustment costs can be more prohibitive for one party than the other, 
again raising bargaining problems (Drezner 2007; Snidal 1985; Stein 1982; 
Urpelainen 2009). In any case, distributional issues (and value conflicts) remain at the 
centre of cooperative endeavors (Knight 1992; Koremenos 2005; Krasner 1991, 
2009; Putnam 2009). In short, no matter how we approach the problem of 
international cooperation, factors like power asymmetries, differential opportunity 
sets and differences in accrued benefits from cooperation, all have direct bearing on 
actors’ actions in an interdependent social dilemma situation. 
 
However, the above evidence does not automatically vindicate the realist 
hegemonic stability theory of international regimes. Neorealists are right in their 
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cliam that international institutions are often created by powerful actors, or actors 
with the first mover advantage, to serve their own interests. The question is, why do 
other states join and often comply? Grieco (1988a) offers a more nuanced approach 
towards international institutions by devising the following utility function of a 
cooperating state:  
U = V – k (W – V) [ where k > 0] 
  
Where U is the utility for a state from the benefits V accruing to it from 
cooperation with other states and W is the benefit from cooperation to the other 
state. Grieco argues that states care for relative gains, that means the utility of 
benefits from cooperation depends on the sensitivity coefficient k of a state to the 
difference between its own benefits V and benefits to the other state(s) W. The 
greater the sensitivity coefficient the more unlikely is cooperation even if V 
sufficiently higher as in neoliberals case for cooperation. The sensitivity coefficient, 
according to Grieco depends on a multitude of factors, including but not limited to, 
the relative power position in the international system. Therefore, the cooperation is 
easier to achieve between a great power and a small state as compared to between 
two great powers. 
 
Nevertheless, what Grieco alludes to and I argue here is that the coefficient 
of sensitivity is also dependent on domestic factors such as adjustment costs, 
historical experiences with the potential partner in cooperation, and normative 
concerns. Thus these factors play an important role in determining the policy 
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positions of a country beyond the fears of cheating or concerns for relative gains. In 
fact concerns for relative gains may arise in the first place due to historical 
experiences, domestic conditions, and normative concerns. 
 
The very fact that China, Russia and other powers seek membership in 
international institutions created by the West makes the realist argument susceptible. 
The United States’ reluctance to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and Chinese calls for the 
creation of new (and reforms of existing) international institutions indicate that 
international institutions not only matter but serve important functions for the 
actors. However, the creation or reform of international institutions presents a 
collective action problem of the first order. It requires a lot of political capital, 
bargaining and manoeuvring. Thus, international institutions become a key arena 
where international politics is played out in a complex interdependent world. Besides 
outright coercive manoeuvres, states use strategies of issue linkage, side payments, 
venue shopping, inducements, and naming and shaming.  
 
In order to develop a model of domestic and international interactions, we 
first need to analyse the character of complex interdependence and its consequences 
for the state and the international system. Complex interdependence, or simply 
globalisation, remains the central variable in the neoliberal institutionalist theory. 
Neorealists contend that globalisation has no consequences for the state and 
international politics (Waltz 1999). It brings about marginal changes in the system 
not of the system (ibid, emphasis in original). Waltz continues to state that the level of 
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interdependence has not gone beyond the pre World War I levels. He states that 
similar euphoria about interdependence was voiced by liberal scholars, who argued 
that war had become obsolete just before the the first world war broke out (Angell 
1913).30  
 
The puzzle, however, is that if states pursue relative wealth and power in the 
international system, then they can no longer rely on their internal resources alone 
(or conquest) in an internationalising world. The modern process of production and 
technology implies that states need to continually reinvent themselves. In order to 
keep or enhance their relative power position, states need to compete for scarce 
resources, capital/technology and markets, lest their competitors create more wealth 
and sophisticated security apparatus. Thus, states would be subject to the 
competitive structure of international markets, leading to a downward spiral or a 
‘race to the bottom’ similar to that of the security dilemma. Internationalisation thus 
has some ramifications for state policies. Therefore, the consequences of 
technological change and internationalisation cannot be ignored off hand.31 
                                                 
30  A similar argument is made by various scholars in different veins arguing that the level of 
violence has gone down across the world ("Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace 
and the Shrinking Costs of War"  2011; Pinker 2011) or major war is obsolete (Fukuyama 1992; 
Mueller 2009), others have statistically demonstrated the peaceful consequences of the three Kantian 
variables, namely international democracy, trade, and institutions (Russett and Oneal 2001). 
31  It requires a very strong assumption to argue that quantitative changes in the system will not 
eventually cause a change of the system. If internationalisation can change underlying interests, no 
matter how marginally, having consequences for wealth and power of states, then it is bound to 
influence international and domestic politics. In fact we are witnessing the most vivid example of this 
in the case of the rise of China and the rest. Furthermore, when it comes to international cooperation 
where common interests exist, states do employ available power resources and strategies to win the 
distributional conflict, as they do when there is outright conflict of interests. The assumption – that 
states can carefully calculate their relative gains and the consequences of these gains for the relative 




Neoliberal-institutionalists, on the other hand, claim that globalisation 
restricts states’ policy autonomy and the policy choices available to them (Keohane 
and Milner 1996). However, if this is the case, how can states adjust their policies in 
order to cooperate? For the action of adjusting presupposes agency. This 
contradiction in terms cannot be resolved unless we show that the adjustments can 
only be made in one particular direction.32 For example, ceteris paribus, two countries 
facing competitive pressures of internationalisation may either lower or raise 
environmental standards (say taxes on fossil fuels). But if they are going in opposite 
directions then we need to seek other explanations. Furthermore, a similar objection 
can be raised about power analysis. Similar to how the international power structure 
appears to be meaningless for the analysis of many international interactions, 
globalisation restricting state autonomy may also be a meaningless argument, unless 
we specify in what issue areas or under what conditions this occurs. 
 
Furthermore, supposing that under globalisation states can make adjustments 
only in one particular direction, the quantity and quality of these adjustments would 
depend on both internal and external constraints, the historical perceptions, and 
calculations of relative or absolute gains. In the original formulation of a neoliberal 
                                                 
32  Keohane himself does not seem to believe in the unidirectional movement and irreversibility 
of globalisation. Many other scholars, however, appear to believe in the unidirectional and irreversible 




institutionalist theory of international cooperation, Keohane alludes to this meaning 
of constrained government decisions: 
 
Constraints are dictated both by environmental factors such as geography and by 
powerful actors … in such a situation, we should focus first on the constraints 
unequally imposed on actors before examining their choices. More generally, we 
need to be aware that any agreement resulting from bargaining will be affected by 
the different opportunity costs of alternatives faced by the various actors (1984, 71). 
 
Nevertheless, national interest remains exogenous and constraints never get 
any extended treatment in his theory. National interest is neither a subject of 
empirical inquiry nor a priori theorising. Rather it is vaguely imported from the 
economic theory of exchange, that makes quite an unsubstantiated  assertion that 
exchange leads to collectively beneficial outcomes. Since transaction costs hinder 
such beneficial exchange, institutions are supposedly created to reduce them. 
Keohane (2002, 6) acknowledges the ‘failure to theorize domestic politics’ in order to 
develop a parsimonious systemic theory of international politics and cooperation. 
However, when examining the consequences of internationalisation for states’ 
policies, both economic and political, Keohane and Milner (1996) reach the 
conclusion that although internationalisation undermines governments’ autonomy, 
its effects vary across countries and issue areas. The main sources of variations are 
the structure of economy and path-dependent national institutions. In a first-ever 
systematic attempt to understand domestic and international interactions in a 
comparative framework, Katzenstein and his colleagues (1978) investigated the 
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responses of six industrialised states to the 1970s oil shocks. In a similar vain, they 
concluded that domestic political and economic structures explain the variances in 
responses to the common international problem.  
 
As noted earlier, Keohane (2002, 10) acknowledges that if neorealism is only 
good as a first cut, neoliberal institutionalism presents only a ‘partial’ theory of world 
politics and needs to be combined with other approaches. Waltz (1996) also 
acknowledges that neorealism is not a theory  of foreign policy but of international 
politics and applicable to only security issues among great powers. For both these 
scholars, a progressive research program needs to incorporate domestic politics, 
institutions and the role of ideas/perceptions. It is for this reason that we turn to 
discuss scholarly works in comparative political economy that shed light on the 
sources of convergence and variances across countries.   
 
2.3. Globalisation and National Responses 
From a mere methodological approach, comparative politics (or more specifically 
CPE) has emerged as a subdiscipline in itself that deals with substantive political 
questions. These questions have ranged from explanations of democratization 
(Huntington 1991; Lipset 1959; Przeworski 1991) to variances in economic growth 
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001; Acemoğlu and Robinson 2012; North and 
Thomas 1973; Sachs 2012) and foreign economic policies (Hirschman 1980; 
Katzenstein 1978; Simmons 1997) to variances in domestic political institutions 
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001; Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 
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1992; Streeck 2012; Swank 2006).33 The first question that comparativists try to 
grapple with, in the context of our discussion, is the character of the state itself and 
how it is being affected, if at all, by international forces, including globalisation. 
 
Traditionally, the state has been conceived in two ways. One, the structural 
or Hegelian concept of the state as the final stage of institutional evolution; an 
autonomous social entity independent of, and often competing with, other societal 
groups and institutons both internally within itself and externally with other states. 
As we observed in the previous section, the neo-neo synthesis treats the state in this 
sense - as an ontological given, largely autonomous from societal pressures, with its 
own interests and functions, security being the primary objective (Paul 2000; Skocpol 
1979, 1992; Tilly 1985). Second, the liberal (and to some extent Marxist) concept of 
the state, as an arena or an instrument where societal preferences compete for 
influence on collective policy. From classical liberals to modern global governance 
schools, most liberal scholars have used this pluralist concept of the state as 
articulated by Dahl (1961) and Allison (1971). 
 
The manner in which scholars conceptualise the state impinge on their 
understanding of the channels through which globalisation constrains states’ 
                                                 
33  The convergence thesis lies at the foundation of all these comparative explanations of 
variances and similarities in policy outcomes and institutional forms across countries. Marx and 
Engels in the Communist Manifesto offered the convergence thesis as ‘the bourgeoisie, by the rapid 
improvement of all instruments of production … batters down all Chinese walls … compels all 
nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production, to introduce what it calls 
civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after 
its own image’ (Marx and Engels [1847]  2000). The Solow-Swan economic growth model states that 
the output per worker would slow down with increases in capital per worker making convergence 
possible across countries. 
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autonomy, and its consequences for international cooperation. In political science, 
under the influence of the behavioral revolution in the post-War era, most public 
policy analysts and models adopted the pluralist concept of the state. IR scholars, 
since at least the 1970s, also began to observe the growing influence of transnational 
actors, including international organisations and multinational corporations, in 
national policy making (Huntington 1973; Keohane and Nye 1972). The pluralist 
tendency was so strong that Krasner (1976) in his seminal work complained: 
‘students of international relations have multinationalized, transnationalized, 
beaurucratized, and transgovernmentalized the state until it has virtually ceased to 
exist as an analytical concept’. The successive studies by scholars who came to be 
known as statists brought the state back, not only as an analytical concept but as a 
relatively autonomous political actor (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985; 
Nordlinger 1981; Skocpol 1979, 1992). Even neo-Marxists increasingly accepted a 
relatively autonomous role of the state as opposed to a mere instrument in the hands 
of bourgeoisie (Cohen 1978). 
 
It follows from the above arguments that there are two ways in which 
globalisation may affect state autonomy, depending on our understanding of the 
state itself. Neoliberal institutionalist scholars, particularly Keohane, seem oblivious 
to the contradictions arising from their acceptance of the realist notion of an 
autonomous state, as a rational unitary actor, when analysing possibilities of 
international cooperation, but switching to the pluralist conception of the state when 
assessing the impacts of globalisation. Neorealist scholars are at least consistent in 
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their treatment of the state as an autonomous entity, and hence their refusal to 
accept that globalisation makes any difference. Nevertheless, as we shall see, treating 
the state as an autonomous actor does not salvage it from the influences, no matter 
how marginal, of globalisation. 
 
2.3.1. Globalisation and the Retreat of the State: the Second Image Reversed 
The idea that domestic policy and institutional outcomes can be explained by the 
factors outside the borders of the state is traditionally referred to as ‘the second 
image reversed’ (Gourevitch 1978) or what I call the globalism thesis. The globalism 
thesis may be divided into two camps following the two distinct conceptualisation of 
the state as described above; structural and pluralist.  Taking the former conception 
to its logical conclusion, in the context of growing internationalisation and supra- 
and trans- national policy influences, many scholars observe the retreat (Strange 
1988, 1996) and even the end of the nation state (Ōmae 1995). Others observe a 
trend towards networked governance without authoritative government structures 
(Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). The increasing internationalisation under capitalism 
means markets take over the erstwheile state functions, undermine the state itself and 
dismantle its attendant authority structures (Cerny 1995; Cox and Schechter 2002; 
Evans 2008; Held 1999; Held and McGrew 2007; Strange 1996). Consequently, we 
observe a semi automatic process of adjustment leading to harmonization and 
convergence in various policy areas and organisation forms (Drezner 2001; Jensen 




These scholars argue that the state is transforming, from an ideological and 
territorial vanguard of a community of people to a mere organising and steering 
manager of an internationalised economy under the competitive logic of global 
capitalist production. Consequently the residual state is often termed as the 
competitive or regulatory state (Cerny 1997, 2000; Cox 1987; Gill 2008; Strange 
1996). The primary causal factors underlying this process, these scholars argue, are 
exogenous technological changes and inherent tendencies of the capitalist 
production process to seek cheap raw materials and new markets. The exogenous 
decrease in costs and increase in rewards of international exchange, due to 
technological advancement and institutional innovations, brings efficiency gains. 
Consequently globalisation makes those participating in the process richer than those 
who shut their doors to it (Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Katzenstein 1985; Rodrik 
2008). Once states get actively engaged in the international economy, they no longer 
can exercise their policy autonomy but merely respond to the demands of global 
capital. The Bretton Woods institutions were created to govern these processes of 
policy coordination while giving the state relatively greater autonomy in certain 
aspects of policy making, what Ruggie called embedded liberalism (Ruggie 1982). 
However, under the Washington Consensus after the Cold War, states’ policy 
autonomy is being eroded from outside as well as inside (Rodrik 1997, 2008). 
Consequently, we observe increasing policy convergence across countries (Holzinger 




A plethora of literature attempts to explain this phenomenon although often 
without sufficient attention to  broader theoretical and methodological issues 
resulting in an unwarranted diversity (Capano and Howlett 2009). A particular 
problem with these studies is the misspecification of dependent variable, as to what 
is being adopted, transferred, learned or diffused. Is it policy outputs, instruments, 
organisational makeup, objectives, or outcomes? (Howlett and Cashore 2009). 
Nevertheless, the range of explanations include policy competition (Basinger and 
Hallerberg 2004; Bennett and Howlett 1992; Meseguer 2005; Oman 2000; Paterson 
and Sloam 2005; Swank 2006; Vogel and Kagan 2004), policy imitation and learning 
(Fang 2009; Goldsmith 2003; Kanniainen and Stenbacka 2000; Thun 2004; Wagener 
2013), and policy diffusion and transfer (Appuhami, Perera and Perera 2011; Cao 
2010; Jakobi 2012; Marsh and Sharman 2009; Obinger, Schmitt and Starke 2013; 
Paterson, Hoffmann et al. 2014; Schmitt 2013; Towns 2012). Nevertheless, two 
factors can be identified as channels of influence from the international arena to 
domestic policies. Firstly, international institutions are ascribed for a large part of 
policy diffusion either through coercive means (also legal obligations) or simply 
providing information, training, and funding. Secondly, epistemic communities help 
states to learn from other states. These states may have geographical proximity, close 
commercial and cultural ties, or they may be competitors.  
 
The pluralist globalism, on the other hand, does not treat the state as a 
monolithic entity. Scholars, mainly economists or rational choice institutionalists 
from political science, conceive of the state as an aggregating instrument of societal 
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interests and preferences (Brooks 2005; Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Cox and 
Schechter 2002; Downs 1957; Scholte 2008; Shepsle 2006; Slaughter 2004). 
Consequently, they trace sources of these changes in relation to the changes in 
preferences of domestic actors. The economic theory suggests that cross border flow 
of capital and goods harmonises prices to an equilibrium level across borders 
(Cooper 1972; Garrett 1998; Samuelson 1948). The opportunities created by these 
exogenously decreasing costs and/or increasing rewards benefit certain factors and 
sectors in an economy (Frieden and Rogowski 1996). This influences the policy 
preferences of state and non-state actors by creating opportunities and constraints 
depending on the asset specificity. These groups then exert pressure on government 
policy to liberalise or protect the local economy. This implies that governments have 
little choice but to respond to the demands of societal interests.  In this line of 
analysis, political economists attempt to identify domestic interest groups, based on 
factors of production or sectors in an economy (Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Rodrik 
1997). The fundamental idea behind such distinctions is that the small organised 
groups would be more influential in policy making than other diffused interests 
(Heclo 1978; Lindblom 1977; Schattschneider 1935).34 Since globalisation empowers 
footloose international capital by giving it an ‘exit’ option (Hirschman 1970), 
governments respond to the policy preferences of capital owning classes by 
competitively lowering taxes, retrenching welfare programmes, and lax labour and 
environmental standards (Drezner 2001, 2003; Fimreite and Lægreid 2009; 
                                                 
34  The median voter theorem, however, would state otherwise (Downs 1957; Hotelling 1929). I 
discuss this perspective in the section below. 
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Weishaupt 2008). Besides affecting factors of production, globalisation may also 
impact different sectors within a country differently. For example tradeable sectors 
may become more powerful as compared to non-tradeable sectors hence acquiring 
more political voice. In short, this competition for capital among governments 
unleashes a race to the bottom (Klein 2000, 2010; Vogel and Kagan 2004).35  
 
 A liberal may see these developments as improvements in overall welfare 
and efficiency, even if inequality may increase (Friedman 2000; Wolf 2005). A 
Marxist, on the other hand, may see these adjustments as a retrenchment of the 
welfare gains won during the historical class struggles (Esping-Andersen 1990). Some 
other scholars may see these transitions as mere changes in policy instruments 
without substantial changes in policy goals. For example, there may be a shift from 
authority based policy instruments to market based policy instruments (Howlett and 
Ramesh 2006). The latter may not achieve goals like equity but only the goals that the 
market dictates, like efficient allocation of resources Nevertheles, despite strong 
deductive arguments, the retreat of the state or race to the bottom argument finds no 
empirical evidence (Basinger and Hallerberg 2004; Garrett 1998; Plümper, Troeger 
and Winner 2009; Ramesh 2006; Swank 2002). 
 
For example, in the area of environmental policy, the trend has shown 
upward improvements across countries over time (Green-Pedersen 2004; Holzinger, 
                                                 
35  For an excellent survey of the race to the bottom or top and a cogent argument on the race to 
the middle see (Knill 2005; Ramesh 2006; Weiss 2003). The shift towards flexible labour markets 
mean retrenchment of welfare policies (Collier 1999; Esping-Andersen 1996; Jessop 2001). 
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Knill and Arts 2008). In fact, globalisation may be good for the environmental 
quality, as noted by many studies, despite a popular belief of the contrary (Cao and 
Prakash 2012; Frankel and Rose 2005; Kleemann and Abdulai 2013). The reason is 
that the popular belief tends to associate globalisation with economic activity, and 
consequently the degradation of the environment (Parida and Dash 2013). However, 
economic activity can also be associated with the level of good quality governance 
institutions. Again, similar to the bidirectional relationship between economic growth 
and globalisation, there exists structural interdependence between economic growth, 
energy consumption, and governance institutions (Barro 1997; Rivera-Batiz 2002). 
Although scholars have been divided on the direction of casual relationship between 
energy consumption and economic growth, and between economic growth and 
quality of governance institutions, most studies point to simultaneous causality 
(Belke, Dobnik and Dreger 2011; Kocaaslan 2013; Paul and Bhattacharya 2004). 
Nevertheless, good governance may not cause growth but only be associated with 
the level of development, though again, scholars remain divided on the issue  (North, 
Acemoglu et al. 2008; Sundaram and Chowdhury 2012). Similarly, a survey of the 
literature on the relationship between governance and environment show no 
conclusive evidence, although some studies suggest that the environmental indicators 
with no immediate pollution effect on the neighbouring population tend to have a 






2.3.2. Varieties of Capitalism: Bringing the State Back In 
Long before the empirical evidence started to emerge in the 1990s regarding the 
continued relevance and autonomy of the state in the face of globalising forces, 
scholars recognised that the state as an autonomous actor shapes social and 
economic relations (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985; Katzenstein 1978; 
Poulantzas 1978; Schmitter 1974; Skocpol 1979). The statist view highlights that 
historically evolved political institutions within each state determine states’ policy 
choices, be it with regard to social welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990), foreign 
economic policies (Katzenstein 1978), or environmental regimes (Schubert 2008). 
Furthermore, states ‘vary dramatically in their internal structure and relations to 
society… different kind of state structures create different capacities for action’ 
(Evans 2012, 11). 
 
This structural-functionalist view of the state contends that the modern state 
has emerged as a socio-political entity to establish order and security within a given 
community (Paul 2000; Skocpol 1992; Tilly 1984, 1985). The state has its own 
interests which are relatively autonomus from societal pressures, be it from the 
capitalist or working class or transnational forces for that matter. A stronger version 
of the statist perspective in fact sees states actively engaging in internationalisation to 
capitalise on the new opportunities. International economic and political pressures 
may alter interest group configurations within the state. Consequently it may put 
some constraints on state autonomy but states have their historical identities and 
institutions which continue to shape domestic interests and national policies. To 
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statists national interests can be defined in terms of security and pursuit of power 
and wealth (Krasner 1978, 1991). States pursue these goals even when certain 
policies conflict with the interest of powerful societal actors like businesses. 
Furthermore, states’ autonomy is closely linked with its capacity to formulate and 
implement policies. Although Krasner argues that state capacity may not be uniform 
across issue areas. Nevertheless, despite increasing globalisation, we observe the 
persistence of the welfare state, improving environmental standards across the world, 
and continued national styles of policy making.  
 
The pluralist and institutional approaches too observe that state structures 
vary greatly across the world even within the industrialised world. These scholars 
argue that there are ‘varities of capitalism’ instead of one dominating logic of 
capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall and Thelen 2009; Steinmo, Thelen and 
Longstreth 1992; Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Swank 
2002). The varieties of capitalism thesis largely agrees with the structuralist view of 
the state but does not write off conflicting societal interest groups and their influence 
on policy outputs. However, more important than interest groups, in this line of 
argument, are historical institutional configurations that structure political battles of 
these interest groups (Garrett 1998; Garrett, Lange et al. 1996; Hollingsworth and 
Boyer 1997).  According to this thesis, globlisation has no effect on fundamental 
structures and functions of the state but merely empowers some interest groups and 
disempowers others, essentially making populist actions costly (Keohane and Milner 
1996, 16-24). Other scholars argue that globalisation may not influence the 
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autonomy and functions of the state but influence the way (policy instruments) states 
go about achieving those functions (Howlett and Ramesh 2006; Weiss 2003). 
Globalisation does so mainly by providing opportunities for policy learning and 
diffusion (Benson and Jordan 2011; Howlett and Rayner 2008; Marsh and Sharman 
2009; Pitlik 2007; Simmons and Elkins 2004b; Swank 2006).  
 
Hall and Soskice (2001) view the study of comparative capitalist state 
essentially as an analysis of social systems of production. This may include sectoral 
governance, national innovation systems, and flexible production regimes. In 
response to technological changes and the changes in relative prices in the 
international economy, firms – the key actors – change their strategic behavior. The 
behavior of firms is also influenced by economic and political institutions that enable 
certain strategies and constrain others. The fomer type of institutions may include 
institutions governing industrial relations, cross-sectoral linkages, access to financial 
markets, and relative strengths of forward and backward markets. The political 
institutions may include the regulatory environment, law and order, organisation of 
constituencies, and even norms and culture. Hall and Soskice identify two main 
categories of political economies, one liberal market economies (LMEs) and the 
other coordinated market economies (CMEs). The fundamental difference between 
the two remains the extent to which the state institutions step in the economy in 




Given the fact that even the most liberal states intervene in the governance 
of market relations, there are various ways in which domestic institutions may resist 
the processes of globalisation (Keohane and Milner 1996). Since economic 
globalisation is mainly about technological change and consequently changes in 
relative prices, the state institutions resist globalisation mainly blocking price signals. 
The import substitution or developmental push policies were all examples of this 
phenomenon where states would intervene to protect domestic industry or provide 
infrastructural needs of the market. The resistance to international pressures to 
policy change may be more pronounced in the short run. Nevertheless, the ability of 
state institutions to block price signals is limited because in the long-run costs of 
closure strain state resources and introduce greater inefficiences. The adjustment 
costs to governments would include mobilisation of bureaucracy and compensation 
to the adversely affected groups. The costs of closure (or those of non-cooperation) 
are of different nature. They are mainly what economists call opportunity costs. 
Since for international politics relative power is assumed to have critical importance, 
the costs of closure entail relative decline in power or wealth of an economy. Even 
the large countries with abundant resources but moderate growth rates in their 
technological and economic advancement would be on a declining path if the rest of 
the world is benefiting from increasing returns to openness. The second channel 
through which domestic institutions may resist pressures for policy reform is 
captured by the notion of ‘path dependence’ (North 1990). The party politics and 
vested networks of interests what policy literature calls ‘policy subsystems’ create 
barriers to entry into politics by new actors (Howlett and Ramesh 2006). Again, 
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however, institutional inertia has its limits. The changes in relatively prices, 
technology, and availability of information empower new organisations that exert 
their influence for institutional change.  
 
Finally, state institutions may adopt different strategies to deal with same 
kind of international pressures as a result of changes in technology and relative 
prices. For example, the plethora of literature on the welfare state demonstrates that 
states have reformed their social security and labour regimes which may not be 
necessarily called ‘retrenchment’ or ‘liberalisation’ (Swank 2002). Instead Rodrik and 
others argue that greater liberalisation of economy translates into greater state 
intervention because of the need to compensate adversely affected groups and 
mobilise state resources to make necessary adjustments (Howlett and Ramesh 2006; 
Rodrik 1997, 2008). Furthermore, as Katzenstein (1978) noted, in the wake of the 
1973 oil crisis, the OECD countries responded in different ways depending on their 
domestic structural and institutional configurations. The liberal market economies 
with abundant domestic energy resources like the United States mainly hardened its 
position towards OPEC and enacted policies for greater market coordination and 
international cooperation in strategic oil reserves. The United Kingdom while 
supported the hawkish military view of the United States but also accelerated 
government led development of alternative energy sources like North Sea. European 
corporatist countries adopted mixed strategies including a counter commercial 
offensive. Japan, on the other hand, increased its efforts to invest in other energy 




As noted above in the area of energy and environmental policy, contrary to 
the globalist thesis, the empirical evidence does not suggest a competitive lowering 
of environmental standards. Instead scholars observer some kind of policy 
convergence towards top (Holzinger, Knill and Sommerer 2008). Despite the fact 
that these scholars find some evidence of convergence under international 
competition and harmonization of policies in Europe, others point out the continued 
national trajectories mainly determined by domestic structural and institutional 
factors. For example the abundant coal resources and historically high share of coal 
in national energy baskets mean developing countries like China and India continue 
to have greater share of coal in their energy mixes. Similarly, the resistance against 
the development of nuclear power in many developed countries continue to exert 
pressure despite the evidence that nuclear power is cleaner and cheaper than other 
fossil fuels. In fact a main reason for the development of renewables in Europe is the 
strong sentiment against the nuclear option. 
 
Other scholars note that the variances in energy and environmental policy 
outcomes can be associated with formal political institutions. For example, Lijphart 
(2012) and others argue that consensus democracies due to their ‘kinder and gentler’ 
nature have better record in environmental performance as compared to majoritarian 
and authoritarian regimes (Binder and Neumayer 2005). Other scholars have shown 
an inconclusive record comparing democracies and authoritarian regimes in their 
environmental performance and by implications on their international cooperation 
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(Battig and Bernauer 2009; Bernauer 2013; McBeath and Rosenberg 2006; Steinberg 
and VanDeveer 2012; Ward 2008). However, other scholars argue that democracies 
have no superior claim to environmental performance in general but it is the kind of 
performance outcome that matters (Poloni-Staudinger 2008a). In that local and 
regional pollution is better handled by democracies on higher levels of income per 
capita. Furthermore, scholars have argued to conceptualise domestic institutions in 
more nuanced ways than dichotomous (or even ordinal) measures of democracy and 
authoritarianism since even authoritarian regimes have multiple centres of authority 
(Cao and Prakash 2012; Crepaz 2001; Gandhi 2008; Mansfield, Milner and 
Pevehouse 2007; Tsebelis 2002). I discuss the veto players theory in some detail in 
the fourth chapter. In the same vein taking some selective measures of 
‘environmental performance’, many studies compare presidential and parliamentary 
systems and show that the latter are better (McBeath and Rosenberg 2006). Similarly 
many scholars in comparative politics differentiate between party ideologies (mainly 
left and right) but when it comes to energy and environmental issues, such party 
ideologies do not matter (Jensen and Spoon 2011; Schmidt 1996; Scruggs 2003). 
 
More important than the character of legislative institutions is the quality of 
implementing institutions, since in the final analysis it is bureaucracy that would have 
to implement policies. State capacity or in other words good quality governance 
institutions are attributed to better environmental outcomes or implementing other 
programmes for that matter (Gray 2014; VanDeveer and Dabelko 2001). 
Nevertheless, scholars remain divided on the causal relationship between growth and 
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governance quality, on the one hand, and between governance quality and 
environmental policy on the other (Falola and Achberger 2013; Victor 2009; Victor, 
Raustiala and Skolnikoff 1998; Young 2013). For example, these scholars argue that 
fuel subsidies provide a more convenient policy instrument than other poverty and 
equity targeted programmes, for which many developing countries do not have the 
capacity. Following the same line of argument, what matters is the quality of 
governing institutions and not necessarily the regime type. Other scholars argue that 
the short term adverse impacts of globalisation can be mitigated through high quality 
domestic institutions by compensating losers (Frieden, Pettis et al. 2012; Rodrik 
2008). The literature on good governance also emphasises the difference that the 
quality of domestic institutions make in development policy (Beck, Clarke et al. 2001; 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999; North, Acemoglu et al. 2008). 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion helps us draw some broader conclusions that would enable 
us to develop substantive propositions to test in the next chapters. From realist and 
neorealist arguments we understand that the distribution of power in the 
international system explains outcomes of state interactions. However, the 
applicability of realist approach is confined to security issues between great powers. 
Beyond this limited area realist theories are not of much help in explaining policy 
outcomes across issue areas and countries. From the discussion of liberalism and 
constructivism we understand that institutions and ideas matter. However, these 
approaches remain imprecise in their analytical rigor as well as showing empirical 
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evidence. The neo-neo synthesis that emerged from the dialogue between 
neoliberalism and neorealism offers conflicting conclusions with regard to 
globalisation and international institutions.  
  
Nevertheless, the state for both these schools remains the primary actor in 
international and domestic politics, even if constrained due to rising power of 
transnational actors. The same conclusion can be drawn from the comparative 
discussion of the globalist and varieties of capitalism schools. However, greater 
integration into the world economy puts some constraints on the autonomy of the 
state.  On the economic front, the state must respond to the price signal emanating 
from the international economy. On the political front, the state is subject to 
international norms and institutions. In that international institutions matter. 
Nevertheless, national institutions mediate between domestic interests and 
democratic demands on the one hand and international pressures for change on the 
other. While domestic political interests, institutions, and ideas explain policy 
outputs, it is the quality of bureaucracy that explains a large part of policy outcomes. 




3. Theoretical Framework and Research Methodology 
 
Abstract: In this chapter I reconcile rationalist and constructivist 
approaches and combine systemic explanations of state action with domestic 
explanations. I offer a framework that takes into account domestic 
structural and ideational variables into account. The paper contends that 
international collective action problem shall be seen as a gap between two or 
more actors’ expectations. The gap results from their respective internal 
structural attributes, including national institutions and perceptions, as 
much as from their shared external situational attributes like anarchy. For 
international cooperation to succeed, it is imperative to reduce these gaps.  
 
What we have to do is not to talk about his will but to enquire into his power,  
the limits of that power and the character of those limits.  
--- Karl Marx --- 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we reviewed a complex world of theories that attempt to 
grasp the problem of international cooperation. Theories are situated within a 
broader theoretical approach to social science or ‘truth claims’ to put it 
philosophically. Our theoretical claims are based on different understandings of the 
world (ontology) and how can we know about it (epistemology). Only few scholars 
explicitly subscribe to a certain epistemological and ontological position. 
Nevertheless, many scholars make implicit assumptions. That is precisely why we 
have all the theoretical diversity, often unnecessary, because our different 
assumptions lead us to substantively different conclusions (Capano and Howlett 
2009; Ostrom 1990, 50).  
 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it aims to reconcile the rationalist 
and constructivist/historical/social approaches. I contend that the actual divide 
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between rationalists and constructivists is not an epistemological one (or even an 
ontological for that matter). In their soft versions both schools tend to agree more 
than they disagree on these philosophical issues. The real divide between the two 
camps is on the relative salience of their causal variables. Second, this chapter 
combines systemic explanations of state action with domestic explanations. In order 
to achieve this goal, I begin with the simple rational actor model of international 
collective action and gradually introduce domestic structure and perceptions as 
explanatory variables in that model.  
 
The resultant constrained choice framework combines elements of theories 
of international regimes and domestic policy regimes. Using this framework, I argue 
that international collective action problem should be seen as a gap between two or 
more actors’ expectations about one another’s policy actions/outcomes. These gaps 
result from their respective internal structural attributes as much as from their shared 
external situational attributes. The rationalist literature discussed in the previous 
chapter, however, is solely focused on the latter at the cost of the former. The 
respective internal environments of actors include structural and political factors; the 
latter includes perceptions and ideas. It contends that, contrary to the rationalist 
claims, the shadow of history looms larger than the shadow of the future. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, I discuss 
epistemological and ontological foundations of rationalist and constructivist theories 
followed by finding a middle ground in the structure-agency debate. The third 
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section builds on the mainstream rational actor model of the collective action 
problem followed by a modified framework to theorise about international and 
domestic interactions by relaxing the unitary rational actor assumption. The fifth 
section lays down the outlines of national policy regimes and how do they get 
changed. In the sixth section I discuss the choice of my dependent variable followed 
by research methodology. 
 
3.2 The Epistemological and Ontological Foundations 
Since the notion of science implies explaining observed regularities (causal relations) in 
the world in a way that is at least replicable and probably falsifiable, the science of 
anything is by definition positivist (Hollis and Smith 1990, 50; Popper [1934] 2002). 
A positivist ontology and epistemology means the world exists without our 
knowledge of it and we know causal relations through a combination of observation 
and deduction.36 Both neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism are united in their 
positivist outlook towards social enquiry. On the other hand, the competing 
approaches like constructivism, liberalism, and the British School object to the 
positivist approach in one or the other form. However, leaving aside more radical 
hermeneutics, most mainstream interpretivists/constructivists37 agree with the thin 
definition of scientific inquiry.  
                                                 
36  A combination of both deduction and observation allows us to avoid rationalism vs empiricism debate. 
This position is also closer to the scientific realism of Roy Bhaskar (Bhaskar and Callinicos 2007) and 
Shapiro (Shapiro and Wendt 2005) upon which I build my framework.  
37  I use the term interpretivism and constructivism interchangeably, others may call these 
paradigms reflectivism post-positivism and a host of other post-‘isms’. Whatever their disparate self-
proclaimed adherents claim, my understanding of the paradigm is closer to that of Wendt (1999) and 
Bevir and Rhodes (2010); this in simple words mean two things, (a) ideas and discourse shape 
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A thin definition of science describes scientific inquiry as ‘a systematic 
activity of organizing patterned observations’ (Marsh and Stoker 2010, 11). By this 
definition, the mere assertions that ‘ideas matter’ or ‘all research is theory laden’ 
(Quine 1980; Stone 1997) does not make constructivists unscientific or anti-
positivists for that matter; nor does it necessarily make the constructivist paradigm 
incommensurate with positivism (Beyer 2009; Checkel 1997; Moravcsik 1997; 
Shapiro and Wendt 2005). The mere fact that interpretivists offer knowledge 
propositions means that they agree with positivists on a possibility to agree on the 
criteria to judge truth claims. The differences between these schools are not 
necessarily due to their epistemological positions but their differences on the relative 
salience of causal variables; whether interests or ideas; where do they come from; and 
how do they influence each other. 
 
3.1.1. Agency 
This brings us to the structure-agency problem that all social science students need 
to tackle (McAnnula 2010; Wendt 2005). From an ontological point of view, agency 
means human individuals shape their environments either through egoist action 
(logic of consequence) or by giving meanings to actions (logic of appropriateness). 
From a methodological point of view it merely means that the appropriate unit of 
analysis is an individual (Popper [1934] 2002)38 since we cannot ascribe agency to 
                                                                                                                                     
interests, power relations, and institutions; and (b) objective science is nothing but privileging one 
particular idea of truth claim over another. 
38  Positivist scholars of particularly rational choice tradition, since at least the 1950s under the 
influence of behavioural revolution, have tried to explain everything in terms of individual actions or 
revealed preferences. Some scholars have gone so far as to demand from political scientists to 
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social entities like family, organisation, classes, nations, and states.39 A less stringent 
view of this tradition, however, concedes that agency can be attributed to any 
explicitly purposive group of people (Lars 2002). From this point of view, the agency in 
question, be it family, firm, organisation, interest group, class, nation, or the state 
may be treated ‘as if they were individuals’ (Wendt 1999).40 The neo-neo synthesis is 
based on the latter rational unitary actor understanding of the state. The state is an 
ontological given in their approach.  
 
This assumption, however, remains questionable even for some adherents of 
rational choice research programme (Milner 1997; North, Acemoglu et al. 2008). 
Milner demonstrates that relaxing the unitary rational actor assumption helps better 
predict international outcomes. This is because states are characterised by polyarchy 
and multiple actors can come to bear upon state decisions. These domestic actors 
may have different and even conflicting interests due to their place in the political 
economy of the state. Nevertheless, assuming for the sake of argument that states 
can be treated ‘as if they were individuals’, the question remains as to what the 
purpose of state action is and how much agency states have in shaping their internal 
and external environments.  
                                                                                                                                     
abandon the state or institutions as unit of analysis because all decisions are, in the final analysis, made 
by individuals (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). 
39  This reductionist view, mainly from liberal philosophers like Lock and Rousseau and 
economists like Hayek, was popularised by the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who once 
announced that ‘there is no such thing as society’. 
40  It will be in order to mention that both ontological and methodological individualisms are not 
uncontested themes even in the legal, cognitive, and neuroscience literature (see for example Chopra 




For rationalists, self-interest maximization is the primary motive for all 
action. Interests in this approach are exogenously defined, that is state security and 
welfare. The rationalist research programme is not concerned with the question as to 
how these interests or preferences are shaped or influenced by the domestic or 
international factors. Constraints on state action are endogenous to the cost-benefit 
calculus of agents in the rationalist approach. The action taken or revealed 
preference is primarily the most preferred alternative that maximises welfare and 
security of the state. From this instrumental rationality point of view, agency means 
states are autonomous to choose what they prefer given all the constraints. Scholars 
from various disciplines have questioned both these assumptions of unitary actor 
agency and instrumental rationality and offered alternative cognitive, historical, and 
social explanations on the question of the sources of state action.  
 
For example, Lindblom (1959, 1977) and Simon (1978, 1991, [1947] 1997) 
argue against a clear means-ends differentiation in decision making within complex 
organisational settings. Means and ends are not always obvious and often contradict 
each other in complex systems that involve many individuals, interest groups, 
organisations, and collection of organisations. Lindblom particularly emphasise the 
path dependent nature of policy decisions. Simon has shown that the rationality 
assumption is systematically violated because of the cognitive limits of human 
agency. The information searching and processing costs can be extremely 
prohibitive. Instead humans use socially and historically determined heuristic 
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methods to arrive on an approximate rational decision. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979, 2000) bear out these claims. They demonstrate that systematic anomalies in 
human rationality exist due to framing, uncertainty, and endowment effect. Overall 
implications of these findings are that social construction of issues what they call 
‘framing’ plays an important role in affecting decisions. Similarly, perceptions that are 
embedded in historical experiences or normative value systems guide agent’s 
decisions. 
 
Furthermore, experiments about the attitudes towards fairness have also 
demonstrated that individuals would sometimes let go their own benefits if they 
perceive a division unfair (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; López-Pérez 2012; Rabin 1993; 
Rübbelke 2011). This is not because the strangers in these experiments cared about 
the consequences of relative gains; instead it is due to the fact that these individuals 
have developed the notions of fairness from their social contexts. Since the notions 
of fairness are highly context and culture dependent, they are not always captured by 
deductive utility models. In short humans, and the organisations they occupy, are 
path dependent with a bounded rationality seeking satisficing solutions instead of 
context independent maximization. It follows from the above discussion that we 
need to abandon an omnipotent, omniscient, and ahistorical concept of the state and 






3.1.2. The Structure and the Context 
It was this understanding of the role of the socio-political context that gave rise to 
new institutionalism in political science. According to new institutionalism, 
underlying structures not only constrain agency but also determine interests, identities, 
and preferences of actors and consequently outcomes of social dilemmas. Thus 
rational choice institutionalism attempts to modify its crude behaviourism of 
neoclassical economics and their strong assumptions of rationality by incorporating 
cognitive, social, and structural dimensions in collective action situations (Me´nard 
and Shirley 2005; North 1990; Ostrom 1990, 2009). The research in historical 
institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996; Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 1992) shows 
that political institutions structure collective action behaviour by empowering some 
and disempowering other interest groups within a state. Furthermore, political 
institutions are sticky. By locking in vested interests, national political institutions 
continue on their own trajectories and resist reform. Similarly sociological 
institutionalism and organisational theories (Campbell 1998; Nee and Ingram 1998) 
emphasise, without denying the purposive nature of action, the cultural sources of 
action through role internalization or socially acceptable behaviour what March and 
Olsen (1998, 2008) call the logic of appropriateness. 
 
In IR, the increasing recognition of the above problems within the neo-neo 
research program meme and developments in the institutional literature brought 
back the importance of culture, perceptions, ideas, and national institutions. 
Constructivists emphasised the role of ideas in defining interests and how ideas can 
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persist and change consequently changing interests (Acharya 2004; Blyth 1997; 
Checkel 1997, 1998; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; 
Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Ruggie 1998a; Wendt 1992, 1999). Some scholars 
within the constructivist camp differentiate between deliberative normative ideas 
(e.g. in the case of John Ruggie) as opposed to ideas as cognitive dimensions of 
social reality (e.g. in the case of Peter Katzenstein) (Campbell 1998). The former 
conception of ideas/norms is closer to the concept that most rationalist scholars 
have increasingly accepted. In this conception ideas matter so long as they change 
incentive structure of the rational actor. The latter conception of ideas deviates from 
instrumental rationality towards a concept of rationality that is historically and 
socially governed.41 
 
This means domestic structure and experience from historical interactions 
assume a more prominent explanatory role in determining policy outputs than would 
be accorded by a rationalist approach. Consequently, constructivists offer the 
‘distribution of knowledge’ as a supplementary (and even alternative) explanation to 
international cooperation (Haas 1997). Humans and by extension states use heuristic 
devices stemming from their causal beliefs and worldviews. Goldstein and Keohane 
(1993) identify three kinds of beliefs that may shape identities and interests of states, 
namely worldviews, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs. Worldviews refer to 
broader cultural understanding of the objective reality but may not have immediate 
                                                 
41  Constitutive as Checkel calls it or communicative discourse as Habbermas and Riss-Kappen 
call it. Nevertheless, the radical interpretivists do not welcome main stream constructivists’ move 
towards what some scholars would call realism if not positivism (Checkel 2004; Zehfuss 2002). 
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consequences for policy making. Principled beliefs, on the other hand, shape actors’ 
normative approach to policy making and consequently behaviour in collective 
action situations. The most important of all with immediate consequences for policy 
making are the causal beliefs that actors uphold about an issue area and its solutions. 
The distribution of knowledge as an explanation for state action implies that states 
‘learn’ from their past and their peers’ experiences. This also implies that 
uncertainties about the future consequences of state action create a demand for 
scientific knowledge about the issue area. Thus epistemic communities across 
political borders help states reach converging knowledge about the nature of 
collective problem and its solutions (Haas 1992). 
 
Thus we recognise that these are not merely the structural attributes of the 
external international system that constrain or explain state action but in fact 
physical, cognitive, and socio-political constraints that are internal to states also hinge 
upon state action, and are often beyond the immediate control of agents. In this 
construction, anarchy (or distribution of power) becomes external structural attribute 
of the international system (a situation) that is common to all actors. But actors have 
their own internal constraints too. These include, besides distribution of material 
capabilities, national socio-political institutions and perceptions about the 
international system, fairness of international regimes, and about friendly and hostile 
states. These structural and contextual factors remain relatively stable over time and 
change only marginally as a consequence of changes in technology, availability of 




3.1.3. Reconciling the Divide 
Scientific Realism42 bridges the gaps between positivists and constructivists (Jackson 
2011; Joseph 2012; Shapiro and Wendt 2005; Wight 2006). It generally agrees with 
positivists that the physical world exists without anybody interpreting it and causal 
relations can be ascertained by a combination of both observation and deduction. 
None of this, however, implies an orthodox adherence to methodological 
individualism and rationalist approach. For scientific realists, both explicitly 
purposive and non-purposive groups (like family, interest groups, classes, and the 
state) exist and have their own identities. These agents can be treated as units of 
analysis without reducing them to a level ‘as if they were individuals’ depending upon 
the purpose of research.  
 
According to critical realism, underlying structures, including those 
constituted by resource/power asymmetries and those by intersubjective 
understandings of social reality, provide explanations of social action. These 
structures do not merely influence the means-ends calculations of rational agents but 
determine what ends actors pursue and how, henceforth termed paradigms. Paradigms 
remain open to discourse. But the discourse does not occur in vacuum. As Marx put 
it, ‘men make their own history, but they do not make it in self-selected 
circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from 
                                                 
42  To avoid confusion, the term scientific or critical realism is used when it refers to the 
philosophy of social science as opposed to realism or neorealism in IR. 
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the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains 
of the living’ (Marx [1852] 2005).  
 
The theory of structuration by Giddens (1984) elaborates on the structure-
agency relation and their interaction. Giddens accepts the constitutive role of agents 
in reproduction of their social structures. The process of reproduction of structures 
depends on modalities (institutions and resources) and interactions. It is these 
interactions where ‘frames’ (paradigms) and resources are critical in defining or 
redefining institutions. Note that how closely this understanding of the relationship 
between actors and institutions resembles with North’s (1990) framework of 
institutional change. North defines institutions as ‘the rules of the game’ that shape 
human interaction and incentive structure. He continues, ‘institutions are not 
necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the 
formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to 
create new rules’ (North 1993). This view of the polity is seconded by a number of 
scholars (Acemoglu 2002; Acemoğlu and Robinson 2012; Crouch 1983; Lindblom 
1977; Schmitter 1982). The institutional change then occurs when group of people 
(organisations) find the status-quo institutional arrangements in their disadvantage. 
The change is more likely to occur when organisations have accumulated new 
information and bargaining power due to the changes in information, technology, or 




It follows from the foregoing discussion that a multitude of domestic and 
international factors interactively determine policies that require international 
coordination. Some of these factors are structural and others are political. Together 
they constrain some and enable other policy choices. In fact they determine the 
available choice set. At any point in time, structural and institutional factors impinge 
on policy decisions and outcomes. Over time, however, political decisions, along 
with other exogenous variables, shape structural and institutional factors. This stock-
and-flow account of policy change mechanism is broadly congruent with the theories 
of institutional change (North 1990, 73-91; Ostrom 2007, 31-43; Rodrik, 
Subramanian and Trebbi 2004; Scharpf 1997, 44), comparative political economy 
(Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 1992; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Tsebelis 2002), 
international politics (Drezner 2003; Gourevitch 1978; Keohane and Milner 1996; 
Krasner 2009; Modelski 1987; Olson 1982), policy process (Baumgartner and Jones 
2009; Harris and Milkis 1989; Hofferbert 1974; Sabatier and Weible 2007; 
Sharkansky 1970), and sociological accounts of structure-agency interaction (Archer 
1995; Giddens 1984; Sewell 2009).  
 
3.3  The Rational Actor Model and Collective Action Problem  
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed by Ostrom 
(2007) is an appropriate point of departure to model the above stock and flow 
construction of policy change and evolution of institutions as a consequence of 
international interactions. The framework is specifically suitable for the game 
theoretic models that the neo-neo literature uses to model strategic interactions 
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between states. The IAD schema presented below (Figure 3.1) depicts strategic 
interactions between actors in a collective action situation (action arena). Actors in 
the action arena evaluate outcomes of interactions according to a certain criterion. 
However, unlike the neo-neo game theoretic models, the IAD does not merely look 
at the interactions (strategies) and situational attributes (number of actors and 
anarchy). In fact, the IAD situates the action situation into a broader structural 
context that includes material conditions, attributes of community, and existing rules.  
 
However, the weakness of the IAD framework is its assumption that all 
actors in an action arena share the same context. Before I highlight the problems of 
assuming that all states share the same contextual variables, it is in order to discuss 
the strategic interactions and how are they evaluated. By using the IAD framework 
with its seven main variables, Ostrom et al furnish eight necessary conditions to be 
present for actors to reach upon a negotiated institutional outcome which is ‘efficient 
and sustainable’. Most important of which are the relatively small community size, 
small transaction costs for changing rules, and shared values of trust and reciprocity. 
This means shared values or at least convergent expectations are a prerequisite for 
international institution building not a consequence.  
 
  The action situation or ‘strategic structure’ of the issue area is the most 
critical explanatory factor in the rationalist explanations of international collective 
action problem because it determines the prospects for international cooperation 
(Fearon 1998; Oye 1986; Snidal 1985). Neoliberal institutionalists argue that different 
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issue areas have different strategic structures that are largely exogenous to the 
situation (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). The strategic structure of the situation in 
game theoretic framework determines the pay-off matrix. In cases where there is a 
complete harmony of interest or a complete deadlock between two players, the 
strategic structure is not important from an international cooperation perspective. 
The strategic structure of the game becomes important in cases where achieving a 
common goal or avoiding a common threat is possible through cooperation but 
actors face a mixed motive situation. In that each actor has an incentive to free ride. 
Such an incentive structure makes credible commitments difficult.  
 
An archetypical example of such situations is Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD). PD 
refers to situations where there is conflict of interest or mixed motives and there is 
only one dominant strategy that leads to collectively suboptimal outcomes (see Table 
3.1). Let’s assume that two states (player 1 & 2)43 are considering cooperation on a 
one-dimensional policy X that ranges from 0 to 1 such that X = [0, 1]. The 
preferences of players are ranked from 4=most favoured to 1=least favoured.  
 
Table 3.1 shows the three games in normal form. In the case of PD, the 
preference ordering (DC > CC > DD > CD) is such that each player has an 
incentive to defect and that is the dominant strategy. But if both players defect both 
                                                 
43  Although some scholars argue, largely on technical grounds, that a two person and n-person 
games are fundamentally different, the two person games remain preferred way of simplification. Also 
considering a country as one player and the rest of the world as the other player makes theoretically 
sound argument without any loss of generality (see for example Drezner 2007; Milner 1997; Milner 
and Judkins 2004).  
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receive a pay-off (2, 2) that is less preferred over a pay-off (3, 3) had they cooperated. 
As a result of this disparity between individual and collective rationality, defection or 
cheating becomes a concern. PD is often a suitable representation of externalities or 
public goods problem in the literature. Even if we allow communication between 
players, as Ostrom (2005) argues, it does not change the fundamental incentive 
structure. The possibility of cheating after a contract has been negotiated remains 
present. 
 
However, there are few options, as neoliberals argue, that may make a self-
enforcing commitment problem in PD less or more sever. Firstly, if we introduce 
infinitely repetitive games instead of a one-shot game, it creates incentive for 
reciprocity norm. Secondly, if we allow for lower discount rates, the shadow of the 
future looms large and enables cooperation. Thirdly, if the difference between pay-
offs to the parties is reduced, it enables greater cooperation. Fourthly, if we increase 
the number of options that a cooperative policy X can assume between 0 and 1, it 
enables cooperation. Finally, more number of actors in a game may impede 
cooperation. Nevertheless, the use of PD is often suspected because it does not take 
into account power asymmetries and presence of multiple Pareto optimal equilibria 
(Grieco 1988b; Krasner 1991). As noted in the previous chapter, for Grieco (1988b) 
and Krasner (1991), the actual conflict is not merely due to fear of cheating but the 
actual conflict is due to the fact that a number of Pareto optimal points exist. States 
disagree on where to reach on these points, that is relative gains concerns.  
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Fearon (1998) further elaborates on this point. He argues that all 
international cooperation shall be understood, first as a coordination problem and 
then as an enforcement problem. A graduated PD (taking into account number of 
policy options, number of actors, and power asymmetries) may represent the 
enforcement problem but it does not represent the coordination or bargaining 
problem that states need to solve before enforcement of the negotiated agreement. 
Bargaining problems are often presented as the game of Stag Hunt or Battle of the 
Sexes (see Table 3.1). In this game both players prefer to hunt a stag over a rabbit 
but stag hunt requires the two players to cooperate (CC) making the pay-off (4, 4). If 
one of the players defects to chase a rabbit instead, the other cannot hunt a stag and 
goes hungry (CD) or (1, 3). Given the other player defects, the first player would like 
to chase the rabbit too (DD) making a pay-off (2, 2). Therefore, the preference 
ordering for both players is CC > DC > DD> CD. The attainment of mutually 
preferred outcome depends on assurance by both parties which in part stem from 
past experiences. Besides, there are variables completely internal to the actors which 
may determine defection, for example, if one actor is hungrier than the other or if 
one actor does not have the necessary skills required for stag hunt. 
 
Similarly, the strategic structure of Stag Hunt can be compared with that of 
the game of Battle of the Sexes. In the latter preference ordering is CC > DD > DC 
/ CD. This means both partners would like to spend time together either watching 
an opera (CC) or a football match (DD) over going to different places separately 
(CD/DC). But one player may be more concerned about his/her preference and the 
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other player may be relatively indifferent. While in Stag Hunt the fundamental 
problem is of credible commitment, in the Battle of the Sexes the fundamental 
problem is one of coordination and bargaining. Drezner (2007) develops a regulatory 
coordination model and demonstrates that the large size of domestic economy is 
more likely to yield favoured outcomes during bargaining with countries that have 
substantially small size. Fearon (1998) concurs with Grieco (1988b) and Krasner 
(1991), the sensitivity to the relative gains from bargaining depends on various 
factors that are, to a large extent, internal to the state. These include, among others, 
evaluation criterion for outcomes, discount rate for the future benefits, and 
perceptions from past experiences with specific partners.  
 
The forgoing discussion shows that the variables that are strictly internal to 
the actors play a critical role in determining the level of cooperation in a given 
strategic situation. The systemic or situational characteristic cannot account for the 
different evaluation criteria used by the two actors contemplating cooperation. The 
evaluation criterion for the outcomes of strategic interactions is not common to the 
actors but depends on their internal characteristics and respective sensitivities to 
relative gains from cooperation. Similarly, different discount rates are applied by the 
actors that may result from asymmetric power resources or varying levels of 
adjustment costs. Finally, perceptions stemming from past experiences of strategic 
interactions change from actor to actor making some actors friends and others foes. 
This implies that contextual variables in the IAD framework are common only at the 
international level but not at the domestic level.   
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Figure 3.1: Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
 
 
Source: Ostrom (2007). Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional 
Analysis and Development Framework. Theories of the Policy Process. P. A. Sabatier. 
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Table 3.1: Different Strategic Structures and Patterns of Interaction  
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3.4 The Modified Constrained-Choice Framework 
The IAD framework is only helpful in highlighting the action arena but does not 
allow us to simultaneously model differentiated domestic environments. States may 
share the international system and its characteristics during their interactions but 
each state has its own internal varied circumstances. International collective action 
problem arises from the fact that there are gaps between two or more actors’ 
expectations about one another’s policy outputs/outcomes. These gaps result largely 
from their respective internal structural attributes. The respective internal environments 
of actors include historical structural and political factors including perceptions and 
ideas. This departure from the conventional understanding of the collective action 
problem – rational actors trapped into producing suboptimal outcomes – is less 
abstract and requires minimum cognitive capacity on the part of actors in the action 
situation. This definition of collective action problems merely assumes the presence 
of multiple equilibria on the Pareto-efficient frontier, all of which can be optimal.  
 
 International cooperation, thus, means reducing the gap in expectations (and 
by implication in policy actions). The efforts to reduce the gaps in expectations or to 
adjust policies require varying levels of domestic adjustment costs. While 
international cooperation helps states in achieving some common benefits, it does 
not affect each state’s adjustment costs (Drezner 2007). The adjustment costs include 
economic, administrative, political, and ideological capital. The benefits from 
international cooperation may or may not be greater than the costs. Governments 
can rarely be certain about the full cost-benefit matrix and there are no guarantees 
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that today’s calculations would continue to hold tomorrow. Furthermore, even the 
most simplistic of cost-benefit analysis requires subjective weights. The subjective 
weights are provided by heuristic devices (the logic of appropriateness) and also 
depend on the available resources that include financial, administrative, political, and 
ideological capital. The benefits from international cooperation are uncertain and in 
the distant future. The adjustment costs are in the present and determined by the 
historical trajectories. The benefits do not accrue to the same actors that need to pay 
the adjustment costs.  
 
Therefore, states mulling over cooperation on issues like reduction in 
subsidies or carbon emissions will be faced with these adjustment costs. As we noted 
in the previous chapter, economic and institutional structure of states poses various 
levels of adjustment costs to policy change. For example, states with high quality of 
bureaucracy are better placed to implement policy reform compared to those with 
low levels of governance quality. Similarly, higher number of veto players means 
governments would find it difficult to make policy changes. Perceptions and public 
opinion also bears on adjustment costs. If there is a widespread public opinion in 
favour of policy change then it would reduce adjustment costs as opposed to when 
constituents are overwhelmingly against the proposed policy change. Furthermore, 
cooperative ventures with states that are perceived friendly are likely to incur small 
ideological and political costs as opposed to the situation where two historically 
hostile states are pondering on cooperative ventures.  
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In the mainstream rationalist literature discussed above and in the previous 
chapter, all of these domestic factors are assumed away. Scholars modelling 
international cooperation using game theoretic models define pay-off structure of the 
game solely focusing on the international level loss/benefits without paying any 
attention to the fact that domestic factors tend to influence the pay-off structure of 
the game. In the following (Table 3.2) simple cooperation game, I demonstrate that 
domestic factors impinge on the pay-off structure of the game. 
Let us denote the adjustment costs by a and b for two states A and B 
respectively. We assume that benefits from cooperation are 𝜋 for both states, such 
that the net benefits from cooperation for state A are (𝜋 – a) and for state B are (𝜋 – 
b). The game presented below (Table 3.2) can be used in both cases where two states 
are attempting to provide a public good or trying to avoid a public bad. For 
cooperation to occur, it is mandatory that 𝜋 > a AND 𝜋 > b. Since a and b are 
internal to states we cannot associate relative gains concerns to the distribution of 
power in the international system. In fact if states in our scenario are concerned with 
relative gains then 𝜋 – a = 𝜋 – b. However, if situation is such that 𝜋 – a > 𝜋 – b OR 
𝜋 – b > 𝜋 – a then states may be concerned about relative gains. Nevertheless, these 
concerns are not stemming from the changing value of 𝜋 but changing value of a or 
b, that is, different states are facing different adjustment costs and constraints, which 
may not have anything to do with fears of cheating or distribution of power in the 
system. Instead, it may very well reflect the worldviews, principled and causal beliefs 
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of states as to what is an appropriate distribution of benefits. Or it may reflect the 
rigidities in the economic and institutional structure of the state. 
 
The implications of the foregoing argument is that as a and b approach to 0, 
international cooperation becomes less constrained. Assuming that 𝜋 remains 
constant, if a > b or b > a in substantial terms then the likelihood of cooperation 
decreases. In such a hypothetical scenario where a and b approach 0, we may talk 
about concerns for relative gains or fears of cheating impeding cooperation. In that, 
the propositions developed here about the role of domestic structure and 
perceptions in facilitating or hindering cooperation are complementary to 
mainstream rationalist theories and not necessarily a call to replace them. A greater 
appreciation of these domestic binding constraints that states face would enable IR 
scholars to better understand the problems of international cooperation and how is it 
hampered by the difficulties in national policy reform (Frieden, Pettis et al. 2012; 
Rodrik 2008, 2012). 
 
Table 3.2: A Standard Game of Cooperation 
 
  State B 
  Cooperation No Cooperation 
State A 
Cooperation (𝜋 – a, 𝜋 – b) (𝜋 – a,  b) 





A necessary but not sufficient condition for cooperation is that either a and b 
approach to 0 or at least a = b. The convergence of economic structures such as 
level of industrialisation, resource endowments, and per capita income are likely to 
reduce the gap between a and b. Similarly, political institutions and more importantly 
perceptions of fairness/friendship are also likely to narrow the gap between a and b 
or at least make it less constraining. In that internationalisation facilitates, to a certain 
extent, such a convergent process in material conditions but not necessarily in 
expectations. Expectations are rooted in perceptions that are embedded in history, 
ideology, and the larger national and international context. Perceptions change 
slower than the material conditions. From an international cooperation perspective, 
change in perceptions also requires more than the mere hopes of uncertain benefits 
in the future. In short the shadow of history looms larger than the shadow of the future. The 
perceptions about the fairness (consequently legitimacy of international institutions) 
and mutual demands for action are the key element in making them effective. For 
that reason, countries would have to agree through discourse as to what is perceived 
fair and what is not. The rational choice research programme of the neo-neo 
synthesis somehow tries to shy away from these thorny normative questions. 
 
International institutions thus provide such a venue for discourse. They 
facilitate negotiations and reciprocity. Institutions do provide information and 
certainty. However, international institutions, like other institutions, may not 
perform efficiency increasing functions as neo-institutionalist theory would like us to 
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believe (North 1993). From this perspective, international institutions are cheap 
policy instruments that powerful actors use to further their interests. International 
institutions also provide a façade of legitimacy to the powerful actors and help 
cascade their policy paradigms. Ironically, when an international institution becomes 
more than a club after other states join because of their own interests, the same 
institution becomes anathema to its creators. The international institutions, once in 
place, do have an intervening explanatory power for outcomes even if at the margins. 
The indirect role of international institutions is mainly to shape the policy discourse 
and propagate certain policy paradigms. Perceptions (including so called values and 
the logic of appropriateness) play a critical role in the decisions to join these 
institutions and during the bargaining process within these institutions. The shifts in 
power tend to make these institutions dysfunctional and/or provide impetus for 
institutional change. 
 
3.5 National Policy Regimes and Policy Change 
After elaborating on the international strategic environment and how it relates to the 
domestic economic structures and political institutions, now I briefly highlight the 
domestic policy environment and how it interlinks with the international 
environment. The policy studies literature is ‘still at an early stage’ of theorizing 
about the national and international interactions (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl 2009, 
77; Real-Dato 2009). From the beginning, public policy scholars were attentive to the 
fact that small interest groups wield disproportionate influence on policy outputs 
even in democratic societies (Schattschneider 1935). The close knitted policy 
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networks between businesses, bureaucracies, and politicians were often termed as 
‘iron triangle’ (Cater 1964), ‘issue-networks’ (Heclo 1978, 1994), policy communities 
(Richardson and Jordan 1979; Wilks and Wright 1987), epistemic communities (Haas 
1989) and advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 2007; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). 
  
However, later studies demonstrated that these policy networks or iron 
triangles might not be as all powerful as many scholars had come to believe. 
Dissatisfied by a pure liberal pluralist conception of the state, on the one hand, and a 
pure Marxist instrumental view of the state, on the other, policy scholars began to 
focus on the policy process and how various actors, ideas, and institutions influenced 
policy outputs. The concept of policy subsystem emerged as a result of nuanced 
analysis of the policy process (Freeman and Stevens 1987). Freeman defined policy 
subsystems as political relations among people in special policy areas coming from 
different institutions and organisations in the larger system. The notion of policy 
subsystem implies that the policy process is characterized by a confluence of 
interests and patterned relationships among legislators, administrators, and interest 
groups. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) define subsystems as the core element of 
policy process ‘as established coalitions of interests who interact regularly over long 
periods to influence policy’. 
  
 Sabatier (2007) expands on the concept of policy subsystems and offers an 
‘advocacy coalition framework’ (ACF) putting more emphasis on actors and their 
shared beliefs. He argues that policy actors (private, public, and experts) in a 
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particular sector or issue area have relatively stable and structured patterns of 
interaction over long periods of time (usually a decade or more) transcending various 
levels of government and civil society. These actors have expert knowledge and 
resources. Scope or boundary of policy subsystems can overlap with and be nested 
within other subsystems. In that defining the boundaries of a subsystem is left to the 
researcher. The framework attempts to explain both policy stability and change. 
Policy stability results from the presence of a dominant coalition that translates its 
normative and causal belief systems into government programmes. Policy change 
occurs from both within and outside the subsystem. From within the subsystem, 
changing nature of the problem, socio-economic conditions, or lesson drawing all 
were identified as sources of policy change. From outside the subsystem, policy 
decision from other subsystems, availability of new information, and crisis were the 
sources of change from outside. The process of change is often led by dissatisfied 
coalitions or ‘policy brokers’.  
 
Sabatier’s policy broker is like Kingdon’s ‘policy entrepreneur’ (Kingdon 
1995). While Kingdon left too much on the contingent nature of the policy windows, 
Sabatier leaves too much on the change in the belief system of individuals and their 
convincing power without explaining the underlying reasons for changes in the belief 
systems. The ACF is also very similar to the ‘punctuated equilibrium framework’ 
(PEF) by Baumgartner and Jones (2009). Baumgartner and Jones (2009) also argue 
that a relatively stable and more structured pattern of interaction between subsystem 
actors make it possible to bring something onto agenda or to deny agenda to others. 
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This conception combines the institutional and ideational elements with actors. The 
actors are part of institutional settings. They share beliefs and have repetitive 
structured interaction leading to monopoly over interpretation of issues and their 
solutions till it is challenged by another set of actors. The new set of actors changes 
policy image and venue. Both the PEF and ACF attempt to explain observed 
stability of the policy process and sudden changes. The former however is least 
concerned with the actual process of change and is largely descriptive. The ACF, 
however, attempts to ‘explain’ the change and stability in the policy process but the 
concept of subsystem and change in belief system as core driver of change remains 
problematic. The ACF does not explain as to what kind of constraints these 
coalitions face and what causes change in their belief systems. 
 
To overcome these challenges and combine insights from various 
frameworks, the most advanced literature in policy studies employ the concept of 
‘policy regime’ in order to explain the relatively stable constellations of institutions, 
interests, and ideas in a polity (Eisner 1994; Esping-Andersen 1985; Hall 1993; May 
and Jochim 2013; Wilson 2000). Although distinct from international regimes, the 
policy regimes literature heavily borrows from the IR and CPE literature. The 
concept of national policy regimes emerged from an earlier generation of 
comparative studies. These studies identified three distinct state-society arrangements 
that could explain welfare or foreign economic policies of the developed countries. 
The three governing arrangements were termed liberal, corporatist, and social 
democratic regimes (Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990; Katzenstein 1978). Nevertheless, 
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these studies dealt with macro political institutions or as Hall and Soskice (2001) call 
it ‘social systems of production’. At the same time scholars in IR were observing that 
in certain issue areas states coordinate their policies through ‘international policy 
regimes’.  As discussed in the previous chapter, scholars observed an increasing 
harmonisation of policy regimes across countries often under the auspices of an 
international policy regime, like civil aviation, communications, trade, and monetary 
regimes. Nevertheless, there remain differences between various national policy 
regimes across countries. 
 
Going beyond broader state-society and international arrangements, policy 
scholars identified regimes that were specific to issue areas within states. These 
policy regimes are often termed ‘boundary spanning subsystems’ and defined as 
‘governing arrangements that foster integrative actions across elements of multiple 
subsystems’ (May and Jochim 2013). Wilson (2000) defines a policy regime as 
combination of four dimensions, (a) power arrangement, (b) policy paradigm, (c) 
organisation, and (d) policy itself (see figure below). Power arrangement means any 
policy regime needs to be supported by powerful interests. These powerful interests 
could be advocacy coalitions, businesses, classes, or the state itself given enough 
resource endowment or least opposition. Secondly, the power arrangements are 
sustained with an attendant paradigm; the ideological or normative aspects as well as 
causal beliefs. Policy paradigms are often constructed by intellectuals and academics 
supported by the powerful actors. Thirdly, power arrangements and their attendant 
paradigms create their own organisational setup. Organisation of policy regimes can 
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be conceived as institutional settings that are created to formulate and implement 
policies. Finally, policies mean a policy regime produces a multitude of policies 
across subsystems in order to achieve the goals of the regime. Policy instruments 
employed by a particular regime are directly dependent on the regime paradigm and 
organisational apparatus. According to Wilson, ‘every aspect of the policy regime 
contributes to the long-term stability… this tendency is encouraged by the brokerage 
role of the state’.  However, regimes do not change spontaneously. He suggests five 
stages of a regime change (stressors/enablers, paradigm shifts, legitimacy crisis, 
power shifts, organisational and policy change). These stages influence each of the 
above four dimensions and may or may not occur in sequence. However, his 
framework does not answer as to why these five stages would occur in the first place. 
 
I slightly modify Wilson’s policy regime change framework in order to show, 
(a) how do contradictions between domestic policy regimes and the international 
political economy or regimes give rise to the pressures for change, and (b) how do 
national policy regimes persist or change. Figure 3.2 depicts the schema for this 
conceptualisation. Stressors or enablers arise through three ways to change the 
existing policy regime. Firstly, exogenous technological changes or 
internationalisation of the economy, change relative prices of final goods and factor 
inputs. These changes in relative prices are either passed-through by the existing 
regime or absorbed. In the former case, these may empower new interest groups 
bringing about power crisis. In the latter case, it may enable the existing regime to 
assert its legitimacy but eventually organisational crisis would follow due to a strain 
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on the government resources. Secondly, changes in the availability of information 
tend to delegitimise the existing paradigm. Like in the case of ACF, if availability of 
new information is enough to empower the competing paradigm, we can expect a 
new paradigm emerging but until there is a shift in power the competing paradigm 
may not succeed. International institutions play the most critical role in 
dissemination and consequently delegitimising the existing paradigm. Finally, 
structural changes like demography and discovery or depletion of resources also 















3.6 Dependent Variable: Operationalizing Energy Policy 
Howllet and Cashore (2009) elaborate on the perverse nature of the dependent 
variable problem in policy sciences. Scholars and students alike talk about policy 
change without operationalizing it and when they do; they tend to convolute various 
aspects without fully appreciating the consequences of their research methodology 
choices. First among such issues is the identification of the issue boundary. Energy 
policy regime (including environmental objectives), like any other issue area, is a 
highly complex web of interrelated policies generally formed around few particular 
broad objectives. The exact goals of energy policy may differ from country to 
country in details and may never be available in a coherent and concrete way. 
Furthermore, a wide array of policy instruments is used to achieve those goals.  
 
Further complications arise in drawing boundary around an energy regime 
because of its linkages with other issue areas. As figure 3.3 depicts, energy policy, 
first of all, is directly linked with a country’s defence posture. Since military hardware 
requires secure supplies in times of peace and war, ensuring those supplies takes 
precedence in almost every country over everything else. The technological 
innovations in military hardware need to take into account available energy resources 
and certainty of their supplies. Once particular equipment becomes the core of 
military strategy, it cannot be easily shifted. The military of a country also 
incorporates in its strategy defence of transport routes and major energy installations 
as one of the top priorities. Energy policy is also closely linked with a country’s 
foreign policy. Countries need friendly relations with net energy exporters and transit 
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countries. They also seek energy technologies and investments from countries that 
have such resources. Even when the whole of this activity is being carried out 
through market mechanisms, the major corporations involve in these transactions 
closely work with their governments and often need government backings and 
approvals to do business. Similarly, climate change negotiations and other demand 
and supply related international negotiations become part of foreign policy where 
domestic energy related issues are compared with other foreign policy goals and 
appropriate strategies are devised. 
 
While energy’s linkage with defence and foreign policy has a clear ‘foreign’ 
dimension, its links with other policies have dubious distinctions. The next in line is 
the link with monetary policy. Since most energy transactions involve foreign 
currency, the exchange rate plays an important role in determining not only the 
energy import bill but also determining the total demand through a complex web of 
linkages. Inflation, the primary subject of monetary policy, is also directly linked with 
energy. Rises in energy product prices tend to have spillovers across the economy 
making inflation targeting difficult for the central bank. Many banks across the world 
have begun to account energy inflation separate from normal inflation. Fiscal policy 
becomes entangled with energy policy for obvious reasons of taxes and subsidies. 
Both these instruments directly affect production and consumption of energy 
resources and have the most vocal political dimensions. Since this is one of our 




The less obvious but, nonetheless, close links of energy policy are with trade 
and investment, industrial, agriculture, and social welfare policies. Countries have 
special investment policies in the energy sector and often trade in energy is highly 
regulated. Similarly, a country with an active industrial policy would be concerned to 
meet energy needs of particular industries. Energy industries themselves tend to 
develop their own clusters of industries with forward and backward linkages. Even if 
a country does not have an active industrial policy, government decisions to make 
shifts in the energy basket, imposing taxes and providing subsidies (or revoking) all 
have significant adjustment costs for industries. Consequently we would expect a 
highly politicized struggle in these decisions. The agriculture sector is often at the 
receiving end of huge subsidies for energies that not only keep farm prices low, 
ensure food security, mitigate rural poverty and provide large constituencies to 
politicians. Similarly, countries provide universal or selective energy related subsidies 
under their social welfare programmes. 
 




















Secondly, I choose policy outcomes as my dependent variable because 
researchers need to choose between policy outputs and policy outcomes. Policy 
outputs are explicit government decisions taken to achieve a certain policy goal. 
Policy outcomes, on the other hand, are impact of those decisions on the relevant 
population. Choosing policy output and explaining its determinants has several 
advantages and drawbacks. The advantage is that its direct link with the related issue 
at hand can be traced. Take for example, capital account policy change. Many 
scholars measuring shifts in capital account policy can exactly link a decision 
(submitted to IMF) with capital account and decisions’ direction (liberalise or 
protectionist). The problem arises when governments take dozens of such decisions 
in a year. Simple counting is of no help, as one particular decision may have 
exponential impact and the other may not. Some scholars have tried quantitative 
studies by differentiating de jure and de facto capital account policies (Simmons and 
Elkins 2004a). This suggests that the policies on the ground may not be the same as 
on paper. Governments often make policies to satisfy domestic or foreign 
constituencies. Such policies either are not implemented or the government in 
question knows that they don’t have capacity to implement such policies. The 
literature on the politics of implementation also indicates that not all policy outputs 
seamlessly translate into policy outcomes. The comparative environmental policy 
literature, like the policy convergence literature, is rife with such problems because 
most studies choose policy outputs as their dependent variable (Busch and Jorgens 
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2005; Heichel, Pape and Sommerer 2005; Knill, Schulze and Tosun 2012; Konisky 
and Woods 2012). 
 
Furthermore, choosing outputs leads us to another challenge that is analysing 
policy ‘change’ becomes an elusive task. In the policy studies literature, the 
definition, operationalization, and measurement of policy change has been a 
contested issue. Any endeavour in analysing ‘energy policy change’ would have to 
make hard choices. Hall’s (1993) widely acknowledged identification of three orders 
of policy change are not always easy or even possible to distinguish. Long before 
Hall, Lindblom (1959) and (Simon [1947] 1997) highlighted the problems with 
conventional ends-means divide in the policy process models. While it is relatively 
easy to identify a paradigm shift (third order), it’s not easy to identify change in first 
(degree) and second order (instruments). For example diversification of type and 
sources of energy may be a goal for security and foreign policy and this goal can be 
coordinated with industrial and energy policy departments. These departments in 
turn then would use various instruments to achieve this goal. Reducing subsidies is a 
policy goal as well as means to achieve the overall goal of reducing carbon emissions. 
Goals come in a nested fashion. Moreover means to achieve a particular goal may be 
conflicting with the goal of another policy. Finally, from an international cooperation 
perspective, international negotiations only yield policy outputs, for these agreements 
to be effective the implementation phase remains. Only when compliance/ 
implementation has been done we can say cooperation has occurred and not before. 




The key purpose of any energy regime is to provide energy security for a 
country (Kruyt, van Vuuren et al. 2009; Sovacool and Mukherjee 2011; Winzer 2012). 
Consequently, from an international cooperation perspective the purpose of a global 
energy regime is to provide global energy security. Energy security, as noted in the 
first chapter, is defined as ‘uninterrupted availability of energy resources at affordable 
prices’ (IEA). This definition, however, is more explicit on the supply side issues 
while underplaying the demand side. It also overemphasises oil as compared to other 
energy resources (Alhajji 2007). Furthermore, since prices are largely determined by 
demand, in addition to other geopolitical factors, an increase in demand elsewhere in 
the world may adversely affect prices for all. This is a primary reason behind a 
renewed and heightened interest in energy security. The rise of China, India, and 
other emerging economies has resulted in an unprecedented demand growth for 
energy resources. The rising concerns about the climate change have further shifted 
the focus towards demand side, carbon emissions, and sustainability issues. The use 
of fossil fuels – the largest source of energy and also the largest source of carbon 
emissions – needs to be efficient and where possible countries need to move away 
from fossil fuels towards renewable, hydro, and nuclear power. 
  
From the above discussion we identify two goals of a comprehensive 
contemporary energy regime of a country. One concerns the supply side, more 
important for net importers and countries with no refining capacities, and has a more 
prominent foreign dimension. Second, concerns the demand side, equally important 
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for net importers as well as exporters. The demand management has three goals, 
improving energy efficiency, reducing dependence on fossil fuels, and curbing 
carbon emissions. Similarly, the supply side has two goals, enabling local production 
and securing energy from abroad. To achieve these goals, governments use all kind 
of policy instruments mixing authority and market mechanisms such as; (a) direct 
organisation of production and distribution, (b) redistribution across resources, sectors and 
income groups through loans/subsidies/taxes to guide markets, (c) regulation of 
demand and supply to guide consumers and suppliers, and (d) information collection 
and dissemination (Hood and Margetts 2007).44   
 
Countries achieve energy security, when they secure supplies, consume less, 
emit fewer pollutants, and diversify energy resources and import sources.45 To secure 
supplies, they acquire energy assets abroad, sign long-term contracts with energy 
providers, stock supplies, and safeguard onshore and offshore transport routes. To 
consume less and reduce carbon emissions, countries promote energy efficient 
technologies and lifestyles. To diversify energy sources, they reduce overall energy 
imports, often termed ‘energy independence’, and encourage domestic exploration of 
existing and new resources. More importantly, however, they import from diverse 
sources instead of relying on few high risk suppliers. To diversify energy resources 
                                                 
44  For a detailed discussion of policy instruments and designs used by governments see 
(Howlett, Ramesh and Perl 2009, 114-34) and (Howlett 2010). 
45  This applies to both net energy importers as well as exporters. Although demand shocks are 
less frequent and disruptive than supply shocks in the energy markets, there is no difference between 
net importers and exporters in terms of sensitivity and vulnerability. Net exporters need to diversify 
their export destinations as well as to a lesser extent their energy resources. However, what is more 
important than the latter for net exporters is to diversify their sources of revenues so that their 
sensitivity to international demand shocks does not amplify their vulnerability. 
131 
 
and reduce imports, countries shift away from expensive and/or environmentally 
harmful fossil fuels to relatively cheaper and/or more environment friendly 
resources like renewable, hydro, and nuclear energy.46  
 
The four dependent variables in the next chapter (subsidies/taxes, energy 
mix, energy efficiency, carbon emissions) measure the outcomes for two goals; 
namely (a) reducing consumption and emissions, and (b) diversification of energy 
resources. The other two goals of securing supplies and supply routes and 
diversifying import sources do not lend themselves to be measured quantitatively 
that befits a large-N comparative statistical model.4748 To achieve these goals, besides 
regulations and government investments in large projects (e.g. hydro and nuclear), 
the key policy instruments available to governments is subsidies and taxes to guide 
markets in the desired direction. Similarly, supply side has two goals, enabling local 
                                                 
46  This presents a real dilemma for governments facing trade-offs between cheap but 
environmentally harmful resources like coal and environment friendly but expensive resources like gas 
and renewables. Same can be said about large hydro damns and nuclear power, both cheaper and 
environment friendly resources of energy but with substantial life and livelihood risks for the 
surrounding population. 
47  Few exceptions that attempt to build political risk index for importing countries include 
(Gupta 2008; Lesbirel 2004; Neff 1997; Wu, Liu and Wei 2009). However, all of these studies suffer 
sparse availability of country level time series data. The assembling of such a dataset is beyond the 
scope of this work and also in the end boils down to nothing as many studies have found that there is 
little countries can and have done in terms of source diversification since 1990 (Cohen, Joutz and 
Loungani 2011). 
48  However, since reduction in consumption and diversification of resources are also touted as 
ways to achieve energy independence, a word would be in order. Luring as it may be, energy 
independence remains a utopia. After many decades of pursuing the elusive quest, the US and all 
other major energy consumers are advised by experts to abandon ‘the chimera of [energy] 
independence’ (Deutch, Schlesinger and Victor 2006; Vivoda 2009). Instead, they argue, countries 
should focus on developing a foreign policy that ensures energy dependence would not undermine 
security and economy. That is more reason for international cooperation and coordination.   
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production and securing energy from abroad. In all four goals, governments use a 
mix of market and authority based instruments to achieve these goals.  
Together these dependent variables represent outcomes of energy policy 
regime of a country irrespective of the fact whether countries have an integrated de 
jure energy policy statement or not. Nonetheless, all major energy consumers and 
producers have stated policy goals for all dependent variables that I use. Together all 
these goals can be observed in four policy outcomes: 
1. Balanced energy mix 
2. Harmonisation of prices with the international market 
3. Efficient use of energy resources 
4. Reduction in carbon emissions 
 
3.7 Research Methodology 
The research takes a quantitative approach. It uses Cross-Sectional-Time-Series panel 
dataset assembled from various sources. The unit of analysis is country-year. The 
statistical model used is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. The panel dataset 
comprises 60 countries over 20 years (1993-2012) slightly unbalanced due to missing 
values. For the 60 countries selected, there are 28 OECD and 32 non-OECD 
countries considering 2012 as base year, or 23 and 37 respectively considering 1993 
as base year. Together these countries consumed over 90 percent of total world 
petroleum consumption, 80 percent of total world primary energy consumption, and 
emitted 90 percent of all energy related per capita carbon emissions in the world. As 
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such my sample size is virtually the whole population of interest. Throughout this 







4. Determinants of Energy and Climate Policy Outcomes 
 
Abstract: This chapter formalises and empirically tests the propositions 
developed in chapter 3 to explain energy and climate policy outcomes using 
panel data (N=60, T=20). The analysis suggests that the variations across 
countries in energy and climate policy outcomes can be explained by the 
membership in international institutions, level of globalisation, and character 
and quality of domestic governing institutions. The results reinforce the point 
that domestic conditions systematically explain policy outcomes. The results 
also indicate a convergent pattern across the world that may be termed as a 
‘marathon to the top’ contrary to the popular belief of a ‘race to the bottom’ 
for environmental indicators.  
 
An ounce of Algebra is worth a ton of verbal argument 
--- J.B.S. Haldane --- 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we established that a multitude of domestic and 
international factors interactively determine policy outputs. Some of these factors are 
structural and others are political. Together they constrain some and enable other 
policy choices. In fact these structural and political factors determine the available set 
of policy choices. At any point in time, structural factors impinge on policy decisions 
and outcomes. Over time, however, political decisions on the margins, along with 
other exogenous variables, shape structural factors. This stock and flow 
conceptualisation of the policy process is in line with the theories of policy and 
institutional change (North 1990, 73-91; Ostrom 2007, 31-43; Rodrik, Subramanian 
and Trebbi 2004; Sabatier 2007; Scharpf 1997, 44) and the structure-agency 
relationship in the theory of structuration (Archer 1995; Giddens 1984; Sewell 2009).  
 
In this chapter, I identify the relative salience of structural and political 
explanatory variables through Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions. The four 
dependent variables include fuel subsidies/taxes, national energy mixes, energy 
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efficiency, and carbon emissions. Together these four variables constitute the energy 
and climate policy outcomes of a country. The explanatory variables include 
international institutions, globalisation, relative power, vulnerability and sensitivity, 
and domestic institutions (veto points, bureaucratic quality, regime type, and 
government ideology). I control for various aspects like level of industrialisation, 
resource endowment, economic development, and growth. In the previous chapter, I 
put forward the proposition that structural convergence (besides the perceptions of 
fairness and friendship) at the domestic level is likely to facilitate international 
cooperation in the area of energy and climate change. 
 
The findings from the large-N quantitative analysis in this chapter show that 
the world is in fact on a convergent path. The convergent path indicates sorts of 
‘marathon to the top’ contrary to the popular belief of a ‘race to the bottom’. The 
world, overall, is subsidizing fossil fuels less and less (more taxes), diversifying 
national energy baskets, using energy more efficiently, and cutting down on carbon 
emissions (or growth in carbon emissions). However, these trends differ between the 
OECD and Non-OECD countries, the latter showing a lot more variance within the 
group than the former. The variances across countries can be explained by the 
character and quality of domestic governing institutions, level of globalisation, and 
the membership in international institutions. 
 
 The findings support the neoliberal institutionalism’s claim that international 
institutions and level of internationalisation matter. The parties to the Kyoto 
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Protocol are more likely to tax fossil fuels, use energy more efficiently, and cut on 
their carbon emissions. Similarly, increasing level of globalisation of a country is 
associated with less subsidies (or more taxes) on fossil fuels, more efficient use of 
energy resources, and cuts on carbon emissions. Nevertheless, the analysis also lends 
some support to the neorealist claim that the more powerful actors are able to isolate 
themselves from international influences. However, contrary to the neo-neo 
synthesis that we can ignore domestic institutions, my findings suggest that the 
character and quality of domestic governing institutions systematically explain policy 
outcomes. A large part of variances across countries is explained by the domestic 
structural and political factors. Therefore, we cannot ignore domestic politics and 
institutions (alongside perceptions) if we are to understand the sources of conflict 
and cooperation in the international arena. 
 
   The domestic institutions mediate international pressures for policy 
change. For example, an increase in veto points is associated with more subsidies on 
gasoline. This suggests that countries with multiple centres of power (or 
fractionalised politics) would not, at least in the short run, phase out subsidies or 
reduce carbon emissions. Similarly, high quality of bureaucracy is associated with 
lower levels of subsidy (or higher levels of tax). This suggests that countries with 
higher quality bureaucratic institutions would be able to phase out subsidies or cut 
carbon emissions more effectively as compared to their peers with lower levels of 
bureaucratic quality. Nonetheless, the nuanced analysis of interaction between the 
level of globalisation and quality of bureaucracy further elucidates that the impact of 
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internationalisation of an economy on energy policy outcomes is dependent on the 
quality of bureaucracy and vice versa. At the lower levels of globalisation, 
improvements in bureaucratic quality have greater impact on reducing subsidies or 
cutting carbon emissions as compared to when countries are at the higher level of 
globalisation. Alternatively, at the lower levels of bureaucratic quality, increasing 
globalisation has greater impact on reduction in subsidies or carbon emissions as 
compared to when countries are at the higher levels of bureaucratic quality.   
 
Furthermore, contrary to the traditional belief, democracy or ideology of the 
ruling party has no statistically significant association with either subsidy on gasoline 
or cuts in carbon emissions. The results reinforce two points as discussed in the 
previous chapters. First, the veto players theory offers a more sophisticated way of 
conceptualising differences across political systems as compared to simplistic 
measures of regime type (binary or ordinal measures of democracy/non-democracy) 
or political systems (presidential/parliamentarian). Second, in the post-Cold War era 
the traditional measures of ‘left’ or ‘right’ party ideology have become meaningless. 
This is not only due to the difficulty of subjectively coding a party ‘left’ or ‘right’ but 
also due to the fact that across the world both left and right oriented parties have 
followed by and large similar policies.  
 
In short, controlling for other factors, the relatively greater convergence 
within OECD in domestic factors like higher quality of bureaucracy, higher levels of 
globalisation, and membership in international environmental institutions leads to 
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fewer subsidies on fossil fuels, more energy efficiency, and decrease in carbon 
emissions (the United States remains an outlier in certain aspects). In non-OECD 
countries, on the other hand, the relative divergence in domestic factors and 
relatively lower quality of bureaucracy, lower levels of globalisation, and non-
membership in international environmental institutions leads to more subsidies, 
lesser energy efficiency, and greater carbon emissions. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section introduces a 
set of dependent variables that together constitute ‘energy policy outcomes’. Section 
4.3 briefly revisits our explanatory concepts and introduces their corresponding 
indicators. Section 4.4 introduces the empirical model followed by an explanation of 
descriptive statistics. I discuss my empirical findings in section 4.5 followed by 
concluding remarks. 
 
4.2. The Dependent Variables 
We have already discussed, in chapter 3, the difficulties of drawing boundaries 
around policy issues, identifying means and ends, recognizing order of policy change, 
and isolating the actual outcomes of policy outputs. In chapter 3, I argued that the 
choice of dependent variable, between policy outputs or policy outcomes, shall be 
determined by the purpose and level of analysis. As discussed, for our purpose, the 
outcomes of the various interlinked decisions of a country’s energy policies are the 
most suitable dependent variables. In this way, we can identify long term 
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determinants of changes in energy policy outcomes.49 This would include the 
unintended complementary and contradictory consequences of various policy means 
and ends that cannot be neatly identified.  
 
For most governments, all kinds of policy instruments are available to 
influence energy and environmental policy outcomes. Depending on the 
constitutional structure, governments may be directly involved in production and 
supply of energy products. Alternatively, governments may use regulatory or treasury 
instruments. Governments may also be involved in awareness raising campaigns. No 
matter which policy instrument is used, the policy outcomes approach would reveal 
the end results and their determinants over long term. However, besides government 
policies, there are a multitude of other factors that influence these outcomes, for 
which we would like to control as much as possible. After controlling for many of 
these sources of variations, the residual discrepancies would be of small 
consequence, in our context, when compared to the problems that would arise when 
using policy outputs as the dependent variable, as discussed in the third chapter.  
 
The four dependent variables for the purpose of quantitative analysis include: 
(a) subsidies/taxes, (b) energy mix, (c), energy efficiency and (d) carbon emissions. 
The brief explanations, units, and codes for these variables are provided in (Table 
4.10). I will now discuss the substantive and operational issues in detail below. 
                                                 
49  The diversification of energy import sources, long-term contracts abroad, and security of 
supply routes do not lend themselves to a quantitative analysis. Similarly, another candidate variable 
could be investments in R&D/patents in efficient and renewable energy technologies. But the data on 




4.2.1. Fuel subsidies/taxes 
The least contentious issue on the international energy and environmental 
cooperation agenda is the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies (Keohane and Victor 
2013). Fossil fuels constitute roughly 85 percent of the total primary energy supply of 
the world. The G20, OECD, IEA, and countries under some IMF and WB credit 
programmes, have all pledged to phase out or ‘rationalise’ fossil fuel subsidies 
(Coady, Gillingham et al. 2010; G20 2009).  A text book argument for government 
intervention with subsidies (or taxes for that matter) is largely based on the rationale 
of market failure.50 Governments subsidise (or tax) in order to achieve some social 
policy goals or correct market failures, while simultaneously balancing between 
equity and efficiency concerns (Gupta, Verhoeven et al. 2000). The argument against 
subsidies rests on the point that government interventions in the market create more 
distortions than they correct.  
 
Firstly, fossil fuel subsidies encourage wasteful consumption of energy 
resources and are counterproductive to climate change policies. Secondly, subsidies 
are a burden on fiscal resources of both net importer and net exporter countries. 
Finally, fossil fuel subsidies create distortions in the market instead of reaching their 
intended target group, which in this case are poor households. The IEA estimates 
                                                 
50  Nevertheless, a plethora of literature indicates that fuel subsidies serve as payments for gaining 
political support because resource rich countries are prone to conflict between competing groups 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon 2005; Karl 1997; Keen 2012). Other scholars argue that, from an 
administrative perspective, subsidies offer an easy, albeit expensive, policy instrument for achieving 
social goals (Victor 2009). There is some empirical evidence for both these arguments (Cheon, 
Urpelainen and Lackner 2013). 
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indicate that fossil fuel subsidies amounted to USD 544 billion in 2012, up from 
USD 300 billion in 2007 (IEA 2013b). The IEA suggests that every ton of carbon 
emitted in the atmosphere receives USD 110 as government support worldwide! By 
phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, governments can reduce their fiscal burdens, 
enhance the effects of their climate change policies, and in certain cases may channel 
the saved amounts to subsidise renewable and efficient energy technologies. Moving 
away from subsidies, the next step would be to coordinate optimal tax levels on 
fossil fuels that may accurately reflect the amount of externalities.  
 
However, there are widespread disagreements on the definition of subsidy 
and how to measure it.  A textbook definition of subsidy is that ‘any government 
action that raises the price received by energy producers, lowers the cost of energy 
production, or lowers the price paid by energy consumers’ (OECD 2013) or in other 
words the support provided by the government for the price of a product. It may 
also include opportunity costs or forgone benefits such as tax exemptions. The 
OECD measures subsidies as budgetary transfers or foregone revenues. It closely 
follows the WTO definition of a subsidy and identifies 250 price support 
mechanisms within the OECD countries (OECD 2013). The IEA measures 
subsidies as the difference between domestic price of the product and international 
reference price. In this price-gap approach, the domestic fuel prices are subtracted 
from the prices at the nearest international hub and adjusted for transportation costs. 
The difference indicates the presence of subsidies or taxes. The IMF approach 
follows the IEA price-gap method but further differentiates between pre-tax price 
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comparisons and post-tax price comparisons. This calculation ensures that the 
energy policy regime is not confused with the tax policy regime. The OPEC 
countries, however, disagree with all these approaches and prefer a cost-recovery 
approach (IEA, OECD et al. 2011). In the cost-recovery method, the cost of 
producing the product and a premium, subjectively defined by that country, becomes 
the reference price. The difference between this reference price and domestic prices 
of the product is referred to as subsidy. Nevertheless, none of these methods are free 
from criticism (Koplow 2009). All these approaches are highly contentious and 
involve a lot of subjective judgements. Furthermore, there is no dataset that is large 
and comprehensive enough that can be used for cross-country and over time 
comparisons. Therefore, researchers face a number of trades-offs. 
 
The obvious choice is to restrict our panel to the OECD countries where 
relatively comprehensive and reliable, though small, panel data is available on the 
subsidy/tax incidence. However, by design I am more interested in developing Asian 
countries and how they have been responding to the challenges of 
internationalisation and cooperation, compared to the developed world. A second 
option is to focus on general movements in prices, controlling for as many factors as 
possible. A third option is to follow the IEA and IMF method of price difference 





Taking the third approach, I limit my analysis to only gasoline instead of all 
fossil fuels for three reasons. First, this choice is appropriate for the purpose of a 
comparative analysis of domestic responses to internationalisation. Gasoline forms 
the largest component of all petroleum products. It is also a politically sensitive issue 
as an overwhelming majority of the electorate is affected by changes in gasoline 
prices. These changes have economy wide repercussions that are more pronounced 
than any other petroleum product. Second, subsidies on petroleum make up more 
than 70 percent of all fossil fuel subsidies (IEA 2010).51 Third, oil constitutes the 
largest component of internationally traded energy commodity and is more likely to 
be sensitive to the international market. In the case of natural gas, more often than 
not, its price is pegged with the international price of crude oil. The existing regional 
differences in natural gas prices are likely to disappear with increasing international 
trade in gas, as is happening in the LNG market. This means that our main results 
are likely to hold for gas as well. Coal remains the least internationalised of all fossil 
fuels and is least likely to be influenced by international markets.52 
 
My first dependent variable is the level of subsidy or tax, in USD2011 
constant prices, on per litre of gasoline (coded as SUB). This is because, unlike the 
                                                 
51  Governments, mainly across the developing world, have been reluctant to pass-through the 
rise in international oil prices to consumers. In some countries an increase in fuel prices is a politically 
sensitive issue due to popular reactions against inflation. In others, particularly industrial countries, it 
is a matter of international competitiveness of their industry. The latter is particularly a contentious 
issue even within OECD. For example, European and Japanese consumers and manufacturers 
complain about bearing twice or more of the burden of energy input prices compared to their 
American counterparts (IEA 2013b). In some cases even Chinese and Indian consumers pay twice as 
much as their American counterparts on fuel prices. 
52  Nevertheless, coal price (including subsidy/tax) is likely to be influenced by climate change 
concerns. This aspect is largely covered in our energy intensity and carbon emission variables. 
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aim of many studies mentioned above, we are more interested in identifying the 
sources of variations across countries and over years, rather than the exact amount 
of subsidy incidence. The indicator is conceptualised, following the IEA approach, as 
the difference between the gasoline price in the United States and the target country. 
This is a simplifying assumption compared to the IEA approach. The United States 
gasoline prices, as many studies have concluded, are associated with a relatively no-
tax-no-subsidy regime since at least the Reagan era, and have been used by various 
studies as reference point (Coady, Gillingham et al. 2010; GIZ 2011).53 The pair-wise 
correlation between my measure of the level of subsidy/tax per litre of gasoline and 
the IEA estimates of absolute dollar value of subsidies for all petroleum products is 
0.63 (for 100 observations that correspond) and is statistically significant at the 0.01 
significance level (p<0.000). This validates the construct validity of my indicator. The 
main benefit of this approach is that we can have data for many countries over the 
years; additionally we cover a wide range of policy instruments and institutional 
settings through which governments may influence energy and environmental policy 
outcomes.  
 
The table below (Table 4.1) shows the gasoline prices and tax/subsidy rate in 
OECD and non-OECD countries over time. The rising international crude oil prices 
have not been passed-through uniformly across countries over the years. We observe 
that the mean of gasoline prices across the world has increased from USD 0.66 in 
                                                 
53  As I have noted, some studies argue that not taxing ‘enough’ implicitly constitutes a subsidy. 
Others point to the regulations, like ban on crude exports, which have kept gasoline prices artificially 
low in the United States. 
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1995 to USD 1.45 in 2012 with a concomitant increase in variation across countries 
from 0.39 to 0.61 over the same period. Nevertheless, all of the observed divergence 
comes from the non-OECD countries where the variation has almost doubled from 
0.26 in 1995 to 0.53 in 2012. The OECD countries, on the other hand, show some 
convergence where the variation has declined from 0.39 to 0.38 over the same 
period.  
 
Similarly, these patterns are consistent with the tax/subsidy values. In the 
right hand table below (Table 4.1), a negative value indicates a tax while a positive 
value indicates a subsidy on a litre of gasoline in constant USD 2011 prices. The 
tax/subsidy value is the difference between the domestic and the US gasoline prices. 
We observe that on average the world taxed its gasoline by USD 0.30 per litre vis-à-
vis the United States in 1995. This value has increased to USD 0.45 in 2012. 
However, what is more interesting to us is the fact that the variation has increased 
from 0.39 to 0.61 over the same period. All of this increase in variation, again, comes 
from the non-OECD countries where the average tax has declined from USD 0.12 
per litre in 1995 to USD 0.09 per litre in 2012. The doubling of standard deviation 
from 0.26 to 0.53 over the same period suggests that some countries were able to 
pass-through the rise in international oil prices while others failed to do so. The 
OECD countries, on the other hand, are on a convergent pattern and increasing the 
tax on their petroleum use from USD 0.58 in 1995 to 0.87 per litre in 2012. The 
graphs below (Figure 4.1) show the trends in domestic petroleum prices and level of 
subsidy per litre over the years, comparing the two groups.   
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Table 4.1: Gasoline Prices and Tax/Subsidy (constant 2011 USD/ltr) 
Price World OECD Non-OECD 
Mean    
1995 0.66 0.94 0.47 
2012 1.45 1.87 1.09 
Std. dev.    
1995 0.39 0.39 0.26 










Tax/Subsidy World OECD Non-OECD 
Mean    
1995 -0.30 -0.58 -0.12 
2012 -0.45 -0.87 -0.09 
Std. dev.    
1995 0.39 0.39 0.26 










Source: GIZ/IEA.  





Figure 4.1: Domestic Gasoline Prices (left) and Subsidies/Tax (right)  
  
Note: The line in the centre is mean and the shaded area is confidence interval of the fitted lines. A negative (-) value 
indicates a tax and positive (+) value indicates a subsidy. In 1995 total numbers of countries are 22 and 32 in OECD 
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4.2.2. Energy Mix 
The prices of energy products are also a policy instrument to achieve other goals of 
energy policy like diversification. Diversification of energy resources is one of the 
primary goals of energy policy. Traditionally coal and oil dominated the national 
energy baskets of all major energy consumers. The promise of nuclear and 
hydroelectricity in the 1960s brought about a shift of focus to these resources. The 
1970s oil shocks further facilitated this shift. However, in the 1980s the risks of 
nuclear disasters and ecological consequences of large-scale dams became all too 
clear due to major accidents like the Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Banqiao (and 
recently Fukushima) accidents. The oil prices also came down in the 1980s due to 
reduced demand and ineffectiveness of OPEC in controlling oil prices (Colgan 2014; 
Mabro 1998).  
 
Today, once again, governments across the world are focusing their efforts to 
move away from coal and oil towards gas, nuclear, hydro, and renewable 
technologies. This time around the high oil prices are not politically motivated supply 
shocks, but are the inflationary result of growing demand from Asian economies. 
The era of cheap oil is not only over, but the trend of rising prices seems irreversible 
(de Almeida and Silva 2011). Governments are also concerned about climate change, 
and coal and oil remain the largest sources of carbon emissions. Besides geographic 
and historical reasons, a particular country's national energy mix reflects the choices 
of successive governments  to spread risk and balance the trade-offs between cheap 
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and clean energy (for relative cost-benefit of different energy resources see Casten 
and Smith 2009; McCubbin and Sovacool 2011; Moniz 2011).   
 
Therefore, the outcomes of policies aimed at diversifying energy resources 
would be reflected in the shift from one energy resource to another, irrespective of 
the policy instruments chosen to influence business and household decisions. There 
is no universal ideal energy mix that countries pursue. Depending on resource 
endowments, import dependence, level of economic development, and 
environmental commitments, we expect countries to be moving away from oil and 
coal to other resources; away from the oil mainly because of rising prices and the 
attendant political and economic risks of over dependence on imported oil in 
particular; away from coal because of growing environmental concerns, which we 
expect to be more pronounced in the developed countries as compared to the 
developing world. 
 
My second dependent variable is Energy Diversity Index (coded as EDI) to 
capture the success or failure of the diversifying efforts by governments. I develop 
the index after the concept of Hirschman-Herfindahl-Index (HHI). The HHI is a 
measure of market concentration and is commonly used for the application of 
antitrust laws. The basic idea is that the higher the value of the index the more 
concentrated the market. It is calculated as follows: 
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EDI = ∑  𝑋𝑖2𝑛𝑖=1       (1) 
Where X is the share of firm i in the market and n is the total number of firms. The 
value of EDI varies from 1/n to 1. In our case, I substitute firm with fuel type. The 
resultant index would indicate the level of diversification or concentration. For 
example if a country relies only on oil for all its needs, the EDI value is 1. 
Alternatively, if a country has four fuel types with an equal share in the national 
energy basket then the EDI value is 0.25. To further normalise this index so that the 
values fall between 0 and 1, I use the following normalizing function: 
EDI =  𝐸𝐸𝐸− 1𝑛
1− 1
𝑛
      (2) 
The EDI is, however, sensitive to the definition of substitutability. In our 
formulation, the implicit assumption is that every country has four fuels (coal, oil, 
gas, others) and the fuels are perfectly substitutable in the long run. This assumption 
may be true for all fuels that are used for electricity generation. However, it may not 
be true for oil in the transport sector. The experience across the world shows that 
the transport sector has a limited number of choices other than oil, namely 
compressed natural gas or electricity. These choices of gas fuelled and electric 
vehicles, however, suffer from entry barriers, technological bottlenecks, and 
infrastructure problems. Nevertheless, relative successes in demand management and 
eliminating electricity generation from oil would reflect the diversification efforts. 
Since we are primarily concerned with shifts away from oil and coal, and the data on 
other fuel types is limited, I assume that there are a total of four fuel types, namely 
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oil, gas, coal and others. The ‘others’ category would capture all hydro, nuclear and 
renewable resources. 
 
The initial reading of the data suggests that there is a convergent pattern 
across the world in terms of diversification of energy inputs (Figure 4.2 and 3.6 
below). This is particularly impressive for developing countries like China and India 
because there has been a manifold increase in urbanization, transport sector, and 
overall energy demand over the last two decades. Nevertheless, the IEA estimates 
suggest that coal use is on the rise and would continue this trajectory for some time 
to come, mainly in the developing countries. The table and graphs (Table 4.2 Figure 
4.2) below show that all major economies have either reduced or halted the growth 
of their oil and coal use as a percent of total primary energy consumption. 
 
The convergent trend is prevalent across the world (see Table 4.3 and  
Figure 4.3 below).  However, this trend is more prominent within OECD as 
compared to the non-OECD countries. The share of oil in national energy baskets 
across our sample has declined from 47 percent in 1995 to 40 percent in 2012. A 
decrease in standard deviation from 18 to 14 over the same period is indicative of a 
convergent pattern with a downward shifting mean. Similarly, while the share of coal 
has shown little change, the standard deviation has slightly decreased. This is partly 
explainable by the fact that many countries in the non-OECD group are resource 
rich net oil and gas exporters and often depend on one fuel type. However, as we 
discussed earlier in chapter 2, the rising oil and gas prices shall pose larger 
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opportunity costs and these countries shall gradually diversify. We observe such a 
trend beginning to take shape at least since 2009. Similarly, the overall EDI value has 
declined from 0.25 in 1995 to 0.19 in 2012 with a concomitant decline in the 
variation from 0.16 to 0.15 over the same period. Nevertheless, the OECD countries 
have been more successful in diversifying their national energy mixes as compared to 




Table 4.2: Top Six Energy Baskets (1990-2012) in mtoe (% share) 
Rank Country Oil Gas Coal Nuclear Hydro others World Share 
3 China (1990) 116 (19) 14 (02) 465 (77) - 10 (2) - (8) 
1 China (2012) 452 (18) 122 (05) 1,866 (74) 21 (1) 59 (2) 6 (0) (21) 
1 USA (1990) 861 (43) 497 (25) 451 (23) 150 (8) 25 (1) 7 (0) (25) 
2 USA (2012) 961 (41) 627 (27) 463 (20) 206 (9) 28 (1) 40 (2) (20) 
2 EU (1990) 664 (44) 301 (20) 349 (23) 185 (12) 23 (2) 2 (0) (14) 
3 EU (2012) 694 (42) 443 (27) 205 (13) 224 (14) 26 (2) 42 (3) (19) 
4 Russia (1993) 190 (25) 411 (54) 111 (15) 30 (4) 15 (2) - (8) 
4 Russia (2011) 138 (18) 465 (60) 114 (15) 42 (5) 14 (2) - (7) 
6 India (1990) 59 (34) 12 (07) 95 (55) 1 (1) 6 (4) - (2) 
5 India (2012) 174 (32) 59 (11) 297 (54) 8 (1) 11 (2) 2 (0) (5) 
5 Japan (1990) 269 (61) 54 (12) 61 (14) 50 (11) 8 (2) 1 (0) (6) 































Table 4.3: Oil and Coal Share, Mean and Variance (percent of total energy 
consumption) 
Oil World OECD Non-OECD 
Mean    
1995 47 45 49 
2012 40 39 42 
Std. dev.    
1995 18 13 20 











Coal World OECD Non-OECD 
Mean    
1995 16 16 16 
2012 16 15 16 
Std. dev.    
1995 18 12 21 













Table 4.4: Energy Diversity Index 
EDI World OECD Non-OECD 
Mean    
1995 .25 .17 .30 
2012 .19 .12 .25 
Std. dev.    
1995 .16 .11 .17 











Figure 4.3: Energy Diversity Index 
 
Note: The line in the middle is the mean of the sample and the shaded area is confidence interval. The 




















4.2.3. Energy Intensity 
Besides diversification, governments also aim for demand management. 
Governments achieve this goal through reducing consumption and, more 
importantly, putting energy into more efficient uses. Energy efficiency or intensity is 
defined as units of energy consumed to produce one unit of GDP. It measures the 
relative efficiency of energy use with respect to economic activity. Variance in energy 
intensity across countries is also a function of geography, weather, and economic 
structure.54 Nonetheless, since the geographic factors are largely time invariant, 
improvements in energy intensity over time are indicative of more efficient use of 
energy (IEA 2013a).  
 
Thus, my third dependent variable is energy intensity (coded INTENSITY). 
The Table 4.5 below shows a declining trend in energy intensity across the world. 
Energy intensity decreased from 8,474 Btu in 1993 to 7,049 Btu in 2012 across the 
world. The improvement in energy efficiency is on a convergent path showing a 
substantial decrease in variation from 4,954 to 3,404 over the same period. 
Surprisingly, the pattern is equally pronounced in both the OECD and non-OECD 
countries (Figure 4.4). In fact if we observe the growth rates, instead of absolute 
values, the improvements in energy intensity of developing countries are impressive. 
                                                 
54  For example economies with a greater share of oil & gas, steel, cement, and fertiliser 
production in their GDP would have relatively high energy intensity (Feng, Sun and Zhang 2009). 
Similarly, countries with a large service sector, compared to industrial output, would show lower 
energy intensity. The structural adjustments of an economy introducing or phasing out such activities 
would impact energy intensity. I cross-check suspected cases in the next chapter and control for such 




They appear to be making improvements in using energy faster than the OECD 
countries. Both the improvements and convergence appear inconsistent with the 
conjectures made by the Kuznet curve for energy use and environmental pollution 
(Arrow, Bolin et al. 1995). The inverted U-shape of the Kuznet curve would imply 
that at an early stage of economic development, the level of energy intensity and 
pollution may go up, but after achieving a threshold of economic growth these levels 
would start declining (Levinson, Harbaugh and Wilson 2007; Mills and Waite 2009).  
A counter argument to the Kuznet curve is that at an early stage of 
development it is easier to improve energy efficiency, and by the same logic 
pollution, compared to a mature stage of development (Deacon and Norman 2006). 
However, given the level of technological improvements and internationalisation, it 
makes sense that today’s developing countries are producing one unit of GDP with 
lesser energy inputs as compared to developing countries in the past. Nevertheless, 
the question is how can we explain these unexpected convergent patterns in the face 
of continued variations across countries and varying degrees of improvements over 





Table 4.5: Energy Intensity Mean and Variance (Btu per 2005 USD PPP) 
 World OECD Non-OECD 
Mean    
1993 8,476 7,928 8,816 
2010 7,049 6,034 7,936 
Std. dev.    
1993 4,954 2,765 5,936 














Figure 4.4: Energy Intensity (left) and its Growth Rates (right) 
  
Source: EIA/WB.  
Note: The line in the middle is the mean of the sample and the shaded area is confidence interval. The number of 




























































4.2.4. Carbon Emissions 
Finally, all of the above policy means and goals would ultimately reduce carbon 
emissions. Success or failure in achieving above goals would also be reflected in the 
level and rate of carbon emissions, even if reducing carbon emissions was not the 
primary goal. More importantly, where reducing carbon emissions (or halting the rate 
of growth of carbon emissions) is the stated policy goal, the policy outcomes are 
readily measureable, irrespective of the means employed to achieve these goals. 
However, policy makers and scholars alike have been divided on the ‘right’ measure 
of comparison for carbon emissions.  
 
Some policy makers and scholars have voiced opinions in favour of using 
absolute levels of emissions by country. The OECD emissions have been stagnating 
or even slightly declining. However, huge variations remain within the group. The 
United States is the primary source of all of this variation within OECD. The United 
States carbon emissions reached 5,500 mmt in 2012 while the emissions levels of all 
the other OECD countries fell below 800 mmt. In the non-OECD group, there has 
been a steady increase in average yearly emissions reaching 414 mmt in 2011. Almost 
the entire divergent pattern among the non-OECD countries is led by Russia, China, 
India, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. All of these five countries are emitting above 500 mmt 
while the rest are falling below that level.  
 
Since country level emissions are of little use from a comparative perspective, 
some policy makers and scholars argue that the comparisons shall be based on 
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carbon emissions per unit of GDP produced or carbon emissions per capita. It is 
argued that the former indicator favours an efficiency criterion while the latter 
favours an equity criterion. Nevertheless, the data suggests similar trends regardless 
of the indicator used. The graph below (Figure 4.5) shows that carbon emissions per 
thousand units of GDP (2005 USD PPP) have declined from 0.68 mt in 1993 to 0.47 
mt in 2011 across the world. The declining standard deviation and growth rates are 
also indicative of the fact that there is a converging pattern in terms of reductions in 
carbon emissions per unit of GDP. The trend is consistent in both OECD and non-
OECD countries. The decrease is essentially reinforcing what we observed in terms 
of energy intensity. The conclusion is that the world as a whole is becoming more 
efficient in using energy resources and there is a definite convergence to the top, 
within as well as outside of OECD.  
 
My fourth dependent variable is carbon emissions per capita (coded as 
EMISSIONS). I chose carbon emissions per capita as an indicator because it 
incorporates the view that access to energy is also part of the human development 
agenda. This is also the indicator that is most widely used by the UNFCC and 
scholars in the debate on carbon reduction. In terms of carbon emissions per capita, 
however, the good news becomes a bit muddled. As expected, we observe a slightly 
different pattern here (Figure 4.6). The per capita emissions have been growing 
steadily across the world from 7 mt in 1993 to 8 mt in 2011. We also observe a 
diverging pattern since the variation has increased, from 6.96 to 8.17, over the same 
period. However, almost all of this increase in per capita carbon emissions comes 
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from developing countries. The carbon emissions per capita of non-OECD 
countries have gone up from 5.67 mt in 1993 to 7.47 mt in 2012. There is also a 
growing divergence within this group as can be noted from an increase in variation 
from 7.91 to 10.63 over the same period. In the OECD group, per capita carbon 
emissions have been declining or halting, and we also observe a convergent pattern. 
This pattern is expected to continue for some time to come, until the developing 
countries reach a more mature level of development. The difference may also be 
reflective of the fact that the Asian economies are growing at a much higher rate 
compared to the developed world.   
 
The heightening global warming concerns, technological improvements, and 
institutional innovations across the developing world are playing a critical role in 
halting the growth rates of carbon emissions. We do not have the luxury of 
counterfactual, but if history is any guide the growth rates of carbon emissions would 
have been much worse, in both the developed and developing countries, without an 
ideologically heightened policy environment, competitive pressures for 
improvements in energy efficiency, technology innovation and transfers. 
Nevertheless, the question is as to what explains these variations and similarities 












Table 4.6: Carbon Emissions per capita (metric tons) 
 World OECD Non-OECD 
Mean    
1993 7.19 9.62 5.67 
2011 8.11 8.83 7.47 
Std. dev.    
1993 6.96 4.18 7.91 



















Note: The line in the centre is mean and the shaded area is 95 and 99 percent confidence interval respectively. The 




Figure 4.6: Carbon Emissions per capita (left) and its Growth Rate (right)  
  
Note: The line in the centre is mean and the shaded area is 95 and 99 percent confidence interval respectively. The 

































































































4.3. Explanatory Variables 
After choosing and operationalizing the four dependent variables (subsidy/tax, 
energy mix, intensity, emissions) that together constitute ‘energy policy’, I turn to 
operationalizing the critical explanatory variables. My modified framework and the 
constrained choice structural model conceptualises international cooperation as 
reducing the gap between expectations and outcomes without any reference to 
efficiency considerations or behavioural tendencies. Recall that my point of 
departure was that governments face varying domestic adjustment costs for 
international cooperation, depending on the available resources that include financial, 
administrative, and political capital. Therefore, the first task is to identify the sources 
of those costs and gaps so we can appreciate the structural and political constraints 
that hinder international cooperation. 
 
From the discussion in the previous chapters, we identified power, interests, 
institutions, and ideas, in both domestic and international spheres, as the 
determinants of policy change. None of these concepts are easy to operationalise, 
particularly when we use them to explain policy change and cooperation. The 
operationalization of any of these concepts always generates some controversies. 
These variables may belong to either domestic or international sphere if we follow 
the traditional conceptualization. They may also belong to either the category of 
economics or politics. Nevertheless, following my argument against the strict 
conceptual divides between domestic-foreign and economics-politics, the empirical 
model developed in section 4.4 treats all these factors equally. The table below (Table 
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4.7) summarises the main explanatory variables of the empirical model; namely (a) 
globalisation, (b) international institutions, (c) domestic institutions, (d) relative 




Table 4.7: Explanations of Policy Change and Energy Policy 
 Structural Institutional 
International relative capabilities, market power, and globalisation 
UNFCC (Kyoto Protocol), 
IMF, WB, etc. 
Domestic 
 




political institutions  / veto players, 





We identify globalisation as the greater mobility of goods, capital, people, and 
information/ideas across political borders. The rise in the volume of external 
transactions, relative to domestic transactions, indicates the level of 
internationalisation of an economy. These flows are an indicator of the underlying 
exogenous changes in transaction costs, that is, the ease of exchange facilitated by 
technological changes as well as government policies. This conceptualization of 
internationalisation and its resultant channel of policy influence is closer to the 
                                                 
55  It would have been ideal to include ideational/perception variables here. However, the only 
cross national time series dataset that asks environmental questions is World Value Survey. Some of 
the waves of these surveys asked questions that could be relevant in the context of climate policy and 
international cooperation. Unfortunately, it does not provide enough consistent data points to include 
them in our regressions.  
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archetype ‘complex interdependence’, as conceptualised by Keohane and Nye ([1989] 
2012).  
 
As we discussed in the previous chapters, the concept of internationalisation 
goes beyond the mere movement of capital and goods. The external transactions also 
include the concepts of epistemic communities, transnational linkages, and issue 
linkages. As we noted in the literature review, a lot of government policies are also 
influenced by various learning channels including the exchanges between policy 
elites. Similarly, transnational business, production, and social networks influence 
preferences of these actors towards more standardised ways that consequently 
influence government policies. The complex webs of interrelationships that emerge 
from the two previous dimensions make it harder for governments to deal with the 
issues in isolation, within their political borders as well as when dealing with their 
counterparts outside. All of these dimensions work in tandem to push governments 
to harmonise their policies. The competitive pressures of international economy 
compel countries to use resources efficiently. 
 
Nevertheless, the resistance to such competitive pressures for policy change 
may be more pronounced in the short run. The path dependent institutional 
arrangements and their paradigms may exert pressure on governments to resist 
change. The adversely affected groups may demand more protection or 
compensation. The vested interests in the status quo would use various venues. The 
access to resources, policy elites, influence on existing paradigms, and policy 
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discourse all have a bearing on the prospects of success and failure for these groups. 
On the one hand, this means good quality governance institutions are likely to be 
more path dependent. On the other, these institutions are likely to be more 
responsive to population demands. In the long run, however, various kinds of 
relative costs of not reforming are likely to increase and consequently pressures to 
change. 
 
Therefore, the propositions put forward in the previous chapter with regards 
to the effects of internationalisation on government energy policy, and consequently 
cooperation, can be formalised with respect to our dependent variables as follows: 
 
H1: The increasing internationalisation would negatively influence energy subsidies, energy 
diversity index, energy intensity, and carbon emissions (meaning good news for energy security and 
international cooperation) 
 
These effects are expected to be dependent on various factors, but most importantly on the character 
and quality of domestic political institutions and processes 
 
To measure internationalisation, scholars traditionally use the trade to GDP 
ratio as an indicator. However, this is very restrictive and does not fully capture the 
concept of internationalisation as defined above. These indicators only capture the 
actual flows but not the restrictions that may influence these flows, which is separate 
from what business logic would dictate the actual flows to be. Therefore, we also 
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need to include restrictive policies on the movement of capital and goods. Trade to 
GDP ratio is also sensitive to normal business fluctuations. For example, the 2008 
financial crisis has adversely affected the trade flows without substantially changing 
the underlying structural forces that have been at the forefront of opening up 
economies.  
 
Therefore, I use a more comprehensive measure of internationalisation that 
is the KOF index of globalisation (Dreher 2006). It measures the level of 
globalisation on an index ranging from 0 to 100. The KOF index is comprised of 
three roughly equally weighted components, namely economic (37 percent), social 
(37 percent), and political (26 percent) globalisation. The economic component gives 
equal weight to actual flows and restrictions. The data for both flows and restrictions 
comes from the UNCTAD and IMF financial statistics, respectively. The social 
component measures the flow of people and information using various proxies like 
internet, telephone, newspapers, and tourism traffic from outside. The political 
component measures the embedded-ness of a country in the overall dynamics of 
international relations. The proxies include the number of foreign embassies, 
memberships in international organizations, participation in UN missions and the 
number of multilateral treatise signed by a country. 
 
Nevertheless, the use of a measure of composite globalisation (coded as 
GLOBAL) does not affect the fundamental dynamics of openness. As the table 
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(Table 4.8) below shows, there is a very high (0.89) correlation between overall 
globalisation and economic openness. 
 
Table 4.8: Correlation of Globalisation Index with its Component Parts 
Globalisation Index Economic Social Political Overall 
Economic 1.00    
Social 0.81 1.00   
Political 0.41 0.39 1.00  
Overall 0.89 0.89 0.73 1.00 
 
 
4.3.2. International Institutions 
I concurred that international institutions are created by a concert of powerful actors. 
The reason other countries outside the concert join international institutions is to 
avail opportunities provided by them. Besides performing the functions of 
information gathering and dissemination, international institutions offer various 
opportunities and benefits that range from economic to technology to policy 
advice/transfer. On the political side, international institutions provide convenient 
forums for issue linkages and side payments, as well as bargaining in a multilateral 
environment. International institutions also give less powerful members a collective 
voice in agenda setting and in influencing the policy discourse even if on the 
margins.  
 
In our case of energy and climate change the only relevant international 
institution is UNFCCC. I identified the IEA and OPEC as clubs and therefore not 
relevant for the quantitative analysis here. The WTO does not cover energy issues. 
The IMF and WB are marginally relevant, at least in the case of subsidies. The 
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structural adjustment programmes and liberalisation processes are linked with a 
reduction in subsidies (Hope and Singh 1995). The IMF has been particularly 
proactive on the removal of fuel subsidies. Many countries under the IMF debt 
programmes are also advised to apply fiscal discipline and raise revenues (Coady, 
Gillingham et al. 2010; Sippel and Neuhoff 2009). The WB has a number of large 
scale energy related programmes in many developing countries that have some 
influence on energy policies of those countries.  
 
The propositions on the role of international institutions are formalised as follows: 
 
 H3: Being party to the Kyoto Protocol would have a negative effect on energy subsidies, energy 
diversity index, energy intensity, and carbon emissions (meaning good news for energy security and 
international cooperation) 
 
The IMF and WB may have such an influence on subsidies but are unlikely to have a major 
impact on other dependent variables 
 
The institutional variable is a discrete one (coded as KYOTO). The first 
commitment period for Annex I parties to the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol began 
from 2008. However, the Protocol came into effect in 2005 and parties to it were 
more likely to be preparing since then. Moreover, taking into consideration the pre 
2008 economic recession period would also help us in isolating the effects of the 
recession on carbon emissions. The variable KYOTO takes the value of 0 if the 
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country is not an Annex I member and takes the value of 1 if a country is an Annex I 
member, in that year. The proxy for the influence of IMF and WB (coded as 
IMFWB_GDP) is the IMF plus WB loans to the country in that year as a percent of 
GDP. 
 
4.3.3. Domestic Institutions: Regime type, Ideology, Veto Players, and Bureaucratic Quality 
In the previous chapters, I highlighted the problems with various approaches to 
cross country comparisons of political processes and institutions. The often used 
explanatory variables that range from interest groups (capital or labour) to party 
ideology (left or right) to systems of government (presidential or parliamentary) to 
regime types (democracy or autocracy) all are problematic. While the interest group 
approach helps in our conceptualisation of the policy process it has two problems, 
one substantive and the other methodological. The methodological challenge is to 
operationalise interest groups for a large-N study since process tracing is not 
sufficient. The substantive problem is that interest groups can only influence policies 
through political actors (Milner and Judkins 2004). Therefore, what may be more 
important for our purpose here is the orientation of political parties in the 
government and opposition. The political parties are commonly divided as left, 
centre, and right based on their ideology.  
 
However, taking ideological orientation of political parties as an explanatory 
variable introduces many complications. First, besides the availability of data, the 
assignment of a party to either left, right or centre in the most widely used Polity IV 
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dataset is quite arbitrary (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). The Polity IV dataset uses 
subjective understandings of what is left and right and assigns values to the parties 
based on policy statements in their manifesto. However, this approach has been 
criticised on two grounds. One parties change their policy orientations quite 
frequently. For example, following the three worlds of capitalism concept of Esping-
Andersen (1996), Garrett and Mitchell (2001) argue that globalisation is associated 
with a reduction in welfare spending and this is more pronounced if rightist 
governments have been in power for long. However, scholars have argued, often 
with repeating regression results on the same data, that structural breaks in the 
economy and introducing spatial variables makes the party orientation variable 
meaningless and statistically insignificant (PlÜmper, Troeger and Manow 2005; 
Simmons and Elkins 2004b; Swank 2006). A second argument against this approach 
is that parties do not always do what they promise in their manifestos. Given these 
reasons and accounting for the fact that many parties across the world, particularly in 
developing Asia, cannot be easily categorised as left or right, therefore I tilted in 
favour of the structural notions of the state and its institutions. 
 
The structural or institutional approaches to the state as opposed to interest 
group pluralism argue that preferences of interest groups are aggregated through 
political institutions (Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse 2007). An earlier generation 
of studies in the institutional domain argued that variances in various policy 
outcomes are result of different systems of government, e.g. presidential vs 
parliamentary or unicameral vs bicameral or democracies vs autocracies. However, 
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significant differences exist within these political systems and dichotomous or even 
ordinal measures do not effectively capture these differences. From a policy 
dynamics and international cooperation perspective, we are mainly interested in the 
variables that explain policy change and its direction. The theory of veto players put 
forward by Tsebelis (2002) contends that the real distinction between political 
systems is the number of veto points that impinge on policy decisions. The number 
of veto points increases with (a) an increase in the number of actors who have veto 
power over policy decisions and (b) with an increase in the divergence of preferences 
of these veto players. Thus the possibility of policy change from status quo is 
inversely proportional to the number of veto players or the increase in divergence in 
preferences of veto players, irrespective of the political system and regime type. 
 
The benefit of using veto players is that the index is structurally derived, as 
opposed to datasets on the regime type or regime ideology that use mostly subjective 
and often arbitrary categorisations.. It also provides a theoretically more robust 
comparative approach than systems of government. CPE scholars have increasingly 
used the concept of veto points as a more sophisticated way to do comparative 
analysis of policy outputs/outcomes, than the traditional approaches of 
differentiating political systems across countries (Basinger and Hallerberg 2004; 
Kastner and Rector 2003; König, Tsebelis and Debus 2010; Mansfield, Milner and 




Nevertheless, for the purpose of robustness, I also regress on regime type, 
party ideology, and margin of majority for the government party. Scholars have been 
divided on the question of whether democracies are more prone to subsidising fuel 
consumption than autocracies (Cheon, Urpelainen and Lackner 2013; Coady, 
Gillingham et al. 2010; Gupta, Verhoeven et al. 2000; Strand 2013; Victor 2009). 
Democracies supposedly subsidise fossil fuels either to increase voter support or 
because they succumb to mass protests and temporary inflationary pressures. 
Autocracies (often resource rich) supposedly subsidise more heavily to remain in 
power and share national wealth. (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon 2005; Karl 
1997; Keen 2012). Other scholars argue that, from an administrative perspective, 
subsidies offer an easy, albeit expensive, policy instrument for achieving social goals 
(Victor 2009). There is some empirical evidence for both these arguments (Cheon, 
Urpelainen and Lackner 2013). 
 
This picture, however, gets blurred when it comes to reducing carbon 
emissions and increasing energy efficiency. The governments that are subsidising 
fossil fuels are unlikely to achieve environmental goals if they have any. However, 
despite the fact that we do not have any solid theoretical arguments as to ‘why’ 
democracies or left-wing governments are supposedly more environmentally 
friendly, there are number of studies making this conjecture (Binder and Neumayer 
2005; Fredriksson and Wollscheid 2007; Lijphart 2012; Poloni-Staudinger 2008b) but 
empirical evidence is not conclusive (Reuveny 2007; Ward 2008). One prominent 
line of argument is that democracies, particularly in developed economies, have a 
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constituency that is sensitive to environmental damage. Another prominent 
argument is that the left-wing governments are inherently pro-environment because 
of their anti-business sentiments. On the other hand, right wing governments are 
pro-growth irrespective of its consequences for the environment. Nevertheless, the 
margin of victory between government and opposition party also matters, on the 
grounds that a convenient majority makes it easier for governments to enact policies 
by reducing veto points.  
 
More important than the character of legislative institutions is the quality of 
implementing institutions, since in the final analysis it is bureaucracy that would have 
to implement policies. State capacity or in other words good quality governance 
institutions are attributed to better environmental outcomes or implementing other 
programmes for that matter (Gray 2014; VanDeveer and Dabelko 2001). 
Nevertheless, scholars remain divided on the causal relationship between growth and 
governance quality, on the one hand, and between governance quality and 
environmental policy on the other (Falola and Achberger 2013; Victor 2009; Victor, 
Raustiala and Skolnikoff 1998; Young 2013). For example, these scholars argue that 
fuel subsidies provide a more convenient policy instrument than other poverty and 
equity targeted programmes, for which many developing countries do not have the 
capacity. Following the same line of argument, what matters is the quality of 
governing institutions and not necessarily the regime type. Other scholars argue that 
the short term adverse impacts of globalisation can be mitigated through high quality 
domestic institutions by compensating losers  (Frieden, Pettis et al. 2012; Rodrik 
174 
 
2008). The literature on good governance also emphasises the difference that the 
quality of domestic institutions make in development policy (Beck, Clarke et al. 2001; 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999; North, Acemoglu et al. 2008). 
 
The above propositions can be formalised as follows: 
 
H4: an increase in veto points would have a positive effect on the change in the level of energy 
subsidies, energy diversity index, energy intensity, and carbon emissions (meaning bad news for 
energy security and international cooperation) 
 
H5: democracies and left governments are likely to have a negative effect on the change in the 
level of energy subsidies, energy diversity index, energy intensity, and carbon emissions (meaning good 
news for energy security and international cooperation) 
 
H6: an increase in bureaucratic quality is likely to have a negative effect on the change in the 
level of energy subsidies, energy diversity index, energy intensity, and carbon emissions (meaning good 
news for energy security and international cooperation) 
 
Since I hypothesised that the effects of globalisation may differ country to country depending upon the 
quality of domestic institutions, I add an interaction term in the explanatory variables that is:  
Globalisation * Quality of government 
The interaction term would tell us if the impact of globalisation is the same or different across 
different qualities of institutions, taking into account the level of development and short and long 
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term horizons. By the same token, the interaction term would also tell us if improvements in quality 
of governance institutions have the same impact on the dependent variables across different levels of 
globalisation. 
 
In order to operationalise the concept of veto points, Henisz (2002) creates 
an index. The veto player index builds on the idea of checks and constraints on 
policy making by Beck, Clarke et al. (2001). The index assumes a one-dimensional 
policy space populated by various institutional actors with differing preferences. The 
index first identifies the number of independent government branches (executive, 
lower and upper legislative chambers, judiciary, and sub-federal political entities). 
Henisz (2002) exploits the asymptotic theory to develop veto player index and 
explains the construction in these words:  
 
The preferences of each of these branches and the status quo policy are 
independently and identically drawn from a uniform, unidimensional policy space. 
This initial measure is then modified to take into account the extent of alignment 
across branches of government using data on the party composition of the executive 
and legislative branches. Such alignment increases the feasibility of policy change. 
The measure is then further modified to capture the extent of preference 
heterogeneity within each legislative branch which increases (decreases) decision 
costs of overturning policy for aligned (opposed) executive branches. The main 
results are that (1) each additional veto point (a branch of government that is both 
constitutionally effective and controlled by a party different from other branches) 
provides a positive but diminishing effect on the total level of constraints on policy 
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change and (2) homogeneity (heterogeneity) of party preferences within an 
opposition (aligned) branch of government is positively correlated with constraints 
on policy change. 
 
The resultant index (VETO) is a measure from 0 to 1. Countries that are 
absolute autocracies like Saudi Arabia rank 0 and countries like Switzerland, with 
many sub-federal units and different parties, rank closer to 1 (0.89). Although slightly 
different from a measure of the level of democracy, the way veto players are 
conceptualised and measured results in this indicator being very closely related to the 
democratic structure of a polity, Corr(veto, polity)>0.73. This implies that a country 
might have full democracy but may still have relatively few veto players compared to 
other democracies. On the other hand, a country cannot have relatively more veto 
players if it is not a democracy, but it may still have more or less veto players 
compared to other non-democracies.  
 
These variables are from the Polity IV dataset developed by Marshall and 
Jaggers (2002). The POLITY variable measures the level of autocracy or democracy 
taking values from -10 to 10 respectively. Although the subjective element remains, 
the POLITY index is constructed by assigning or deducting points for each country 
on five dimensions, namely competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of 
executive recruitment, constraints on chief executive, regulation of participation in 
politics, competitiveness of participation. Similarly, LEFT and RIGHT are discrete 
variables taking the value of 1 if the party in government is categorised as left or 
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right respectively otherwise being a 0. The variable MARJ is a ratio indicator of the 
margin of victory between the government and the opposition and ranges from 0 to 
1. The quality of government (QOG) variable is an index ranging from 0 to 1 
developed by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). It includes subjective 
and objective measures on three dimensions, namely corruption, law and order, and 
quality of bureaucracy. 
 
 
4.3.4. Relative Capabilities and Market Size 
According to realists, the distribution of power in the international system is a key 
element that explains a large part of outcomes of international interactions. 
However, as we noted, the definition and operationalization of the concept of power 
remains elusive and controversial in political science. Military spending, either in 
absolute dollar terms or relative to GDP/other states, is the most simple and 
common indicator. Nevertheless, as we discussed, we cannot imply influence being 
exercised just by looking at the military might of a state.  The second most common 
approach is the material capabilities approach which, although still suffers from the 
same problem, substantially broadens the scope and domain of power analysis. The 
relative material capabilities approach is also justified on the theoretical grounds that 
larger economies are better equipped to isolate their policies with a larger domestic 
dimension from international influences. Material capabilities indicator also captures 
almost all dimensions of structural power of an economy. Therefore, I use country 
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GDP as percent of total world GDP as an indicator of the size and power of an 
economy (coded as GDP_RW).  
 
 For this purpose, simple GDP could suffice. But using country GDP as a 
ratio to world GDP captures the ‘relative’ dimension emphasised in the realist 
literature. The use of this indicator is consistent with the Composite Index of 
National Capabilities (CINC) indicator. The CINC is a widely used index in the 
international relations literature from the Correlates of War project. It combines 
relative measures of six indicators, namely military personnel, military expenditure, 
primary energy consumption, steel and iron production, urbanisation, and total 
population. Since I am already using many energy related variables as controls, the 
relative GDP measure would effectively capture the whole of CINC. The table 
below (Table 4.9) shows that the correlation between relative GDP and CINC is 
significantly high (0.72).  
 
 
Table 4.9: Correlation of Relative GDP to other Measures of Size and Power 
 Relative GDP GDP CINC 
Relative GDP 1.00   
GDP 0.98 1.00  
CINC 0.72 0.72 1.00 
 
 
States with more relative capabilities and market power are likely to invest 
more in securing energy supplies, either domestically or from abroad, using their 
hard power. The likelihood of these states taking policy measures that are beneficial 
in terms of global energy security and cooperation is low. Nevertheless, this makes 
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the expected relationship, between power and globally cooperative energy policy 
measures, more complicated. For example, the powerful actors are likely to be 
indifferent to diversification of energy sources to a certain extent, or would focus on 
energy self-sufficiency through domestic exploitation of resources. On the other 
hand, these very measures may force these countries to adopt energy efficient 
policies and inadvertently reduce their energy intensity and carbon emissions. Thus 
we can’t predict with certainty how the overall economic and military might may 
impact energy policies of a country. The relationship is expected to be shaped by the 
perceived level of sensitivity and vulnerability of these powerful actors. While the 
perceptions of relative costs and benefits of international cooperation is a subject of 
my case studies, for quantitative purposes, I include structural aspects of the 
economies. 
 
4.3.5. Sensitivity and Vulnerability (power in the issue area) 
The concept of sensitivity and vulnerability of a country to the international political 
economy is essentially an issue-specific concept of relative power. As we discussed, 
greater openness brings greater sensitivity. But vulnerability also depends on 
available alternatives. Therefore, in the energy sector the sensitivity is operationalised 
as total energy and, particularly, by the proportion of petroleum imports to total 
energy or oil consumption respectively. The vulnerability is then determined by 
resource endowments and the dependence of an economy on energy resources. 
While some powerful actors may seek security against their vulnerability using 
traditional geopolitical means outside their borders, less powerful actors are expected 
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to favour a stabilised international institutional environment and adjust their policies 
domestically.  
 
Both sensitivity and vulnerability, depending on the institutional capacity of a 
country, are likely to force countries to adjust their policies on subsidies, diversity of 
energy baskets, and energy efficiency. For example, a country importing three 
quarters of its oil needs would be sensitive to the changes in the international oil 
market. But if it has enough excess oil reserves, the sensitivity may not translate into 
vulnerability. On the other hand a country which has no alternatives would be more 
vulnerable. In such a scenario the likely course of action is to diversify energy 
resources and use energy more efficiently. Similarly, rising oil prices in the 
international market would affect both net importers (rising costs of imports) and 
exporters (rising opportunity costs). In the short run, net exporters may be able to 
bear the opportunity costs but in the long run fiscal constraints are likely to force 
these countries to phase out their subsidy policy. Net importers on the other hand, 
particularly those facing fiscal constraints, would be under pressure to pass-through 
the rise in international oil prices to end consumers. The indicators for energy and oil 
imports are the proportion of imports to total consumption (coded as OIL_IMP and 
EN_IMP). 
 
4.3.6. Structure of the Economy  
The economic structure and resource endowments bear upon all of our dependent 
variables, and need to be controlled for. First of all, the level of industrialisation is 
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likely to explain the high energy intensities and emissions. I use the share of industry 
in GDP (codes as INDUSTRY) as a control variable. For the level of development, I 
use log of per capita income (coded as GDP_PC) as control variable. Ceteris Paribus, 
countries at the advanced stages of development are less likely to subsidise fuel, 
more likely to diversify energy baskets, and more likely to use energy efficiently. 
However, the relationship of the level of development with the level of carbon 
emissions is not very obvious. If we follow the general environmental conjecture 
offered by Kuznet we can expect an inverted-U shaped relationship between the 
level of development and carbon emissions. This conjecture also fits well with 
Inglehart’s sociological propositions regarding the relationship between the change in 
values and preferences and the change in the level of development. Both these 
conjectures imply that at an early stage of development emissions would go up, but 
after reaching a level of maturity and rising environmental concerns the emissions 
would tend to decline. Since carbon emissions and energy intensity are also a 
function of GDP growth (coded as GDP_GRT), the growth rates are expected to 
have a positive relationship with both these indicators, controlling for the level of 
development.  
 
Furthermore, fiscal space is required for subsidising (or not taxing), therefore I 
control for budget balance as percent of GDP (coded as FIS). It is likely that 
governments that are running high fiscal deficits are more likely to be under pressure 
to do away with the subsidy regime. However, the influence of fiscal constraints may 
not be that pronounced in other dependent variables. Other controls include 
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international oil prices in constant 2011 USD. For subsidy data the constant terms 
are used (against a basket of currencies using IMF REER) to control for movements 
in inflation and exchange rates. 
 
Finally, the available oil, gas, and coal reserves (coded as OIL_RES, 
GAS_RES, and COAL_RTP) are likely to determine the level of subsidies on a 
particular fuel and the share of that fuel in the national energy mix. Since energy 
intensity is measured as the units of energy consumed to produce a unit of GDP, 
irrespective of the type of fuel used, resource endowment may not be correlated to 
energy intensity. However, coal and oil rich countries are likely to consume more of 
these fuels and consequently contribute more to carbon emissions. Some energy 
experts prefer to use reserve to production ratio instead of reserves. However, for 
our purpose that is not an appropriate indicator since the reserve to production ratio 
carries implicit policy assumptions. For example, government decisions to not 
exploit domestic resources would lead one to a biased inference regarding the actual 
structural weaknesses and strengths of the state. Only in the case of coal, I use 
reserve to production ratio due to the lack of time series data on reserves. The 2011 
level of reserves is divided by the production levels in all other years to obtain a 
reserve to production ratio for other years. 
 
4.4. The Statistical Model 
To capture the dynamic effects of all variables of interest, I specify the following 
general Ordinary Least Square (OLS) base model: 
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𝑌𝑗,𝑖𝑖 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑘=1  +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜏𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑖    (3) 
Where 𝑌𝑗,𝑖𝑖 is an observation on country i at time t for the dependent variable j, and i 
= 1, …, N and t = 1, …, T.  𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑖 is an observation on the explanatory variable k on 
country i at time t; k includes all primary variables of interest and control variables. 
The error term of the model is 𝜀𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽0 is the intercept. The country-fixed effects 
𝛼𝑖 and time-fixed effects 𝜏𝑖 are included in the model to control for unobserved time 
and state invariant heterogeneity. The choice of a fixed effect model is motivated by 
both theoretical considerations as well as technical tests. Theoretically, I argued that 
each country has its own structural differences while all countries face the same 
situational aspects of internationalisation and international institutions. Technically, 
in all six regressions, the Hausman test results suggest the presence of country 
specific effects. To control for country and time specific effects, I use the Least 
Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) model in equation 3 above instead of a ‘within’ 
fixed effect model.56 Although both models report identical parameter estimates, the 
LSDV is preferred because it can accommodate time invariant variables of interest 
which would otherwise drop out in a ‘within’ specification. Secondly, the ‘within’ 
fixed effect model reports smaller standard errors that may lead to wrong inferences 
when testing our hypotheses. The LSDV reports larger standard errors due to a loss 
in degrees of freedom because it includes all dummy country variables on the right 
hand side.  
                                                 
56  A within fixed effect model  uses the difference from group mean instead of actual 
observations on dependent and independent variables, e.g.   𝑌𝑖𝑖 −  𝑌𝚤∗� = 𝑋𝑖𝑖 −  𝑋𝚤∗� + 𝜀𝑖𝑖 −  𝜀𝚤∗� . The 
LSDV, on the other hand, includes country dummy variables as regressors, giving a different intercept 




A characteristic of all of our j dependent variables is that the values in year t 
are likely to be correlated with the values in year t-1. Tests for serial correlation also 
indicated the presence of autocorrelation of the first order. Due to the variability of 
data across countries or over time, heteroscedasticity was also a major concern. The 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier tests indicated that the normal distribution 
of modelling errors cannot be assumed. Therefore, my main model uses Newey-
West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors adjusted for 
first order lags. Some scholars, however, argue that including a lagged dependent 
variable (LDV) is a more robust approach for data with autocorrelation and a 
substantially larger time dimension compared to a cross-sectional dimension (Beck 
and Katz 1995, 2009; Stock and Watson 2007, 543). The argument is that including 
LDV would produce consistent and efficient estimates under conditions of strictly 
exogenous explanatory variables and a time dimension of 30 or above; as T→∞ the 
asymptotic assumptions would hold (Beck and Katz 2009; Keele and Kelly 2006). 
This is not the case with our panel dataset. Also, given the structural 
interdependence of our variables, the strictly exogenous explanatory variables 
assumption is unrealistic. 
 
Furthermore, some scholars have questioned the unexamined application of 
the LDV models to political economy data (Achen 2000; PlÜmper, Troeger and 
Manow 2005). These scholars argue that including a lagged dependent variable 
produces efficient, consistent, but biased parameter estimates, due to the absorption 
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of all variation in the dependent variable by the LDV. The LDV technique may be 
justified on technical grounds but carries little theoretical support. The inference 
from the coefficient on LDV is also controversial. It is not straight forward to treat it 
as a path dependent component of the time series. Other scholars have suggested a 
bias correction method for the LDV models (Bruno 2005; Kiviet 1995). The spatial 
interdependence in my panel dataset is also a matter of concern, for which both the 
Newey-West model and the LDV bias corrected models are considered insufficient 
(Driscoll and Kraay 1998). Furthermore, the Driscoll Kraay (D&K) solution is not 
suitable either for large cross sectional and small time series dimension datasets. 
Instead I control for spatial interdependence using dummy variables for regions. 
Nevertheless, I report the results for all three models.  
 
I use a second, slightly different, model to observe the trends in the rate of 
growth of energy intensity and carbon emissions, to test if there is a convergence. 
The model for collective action and the problem of cooperation that I developed in 
the last chapter conceptualises the gaps as the main source of contention. If these 
gaps are reducing, for whatever reasons, it is easier to achieve cooperation as 
opposed to when these gaps are increasing. The model is inspired by Plümper and 
Schneider (2009). The model is specified as:  
 




Where Ϫ𝑌𝑖𝑖 is the change in the level of carbon emissions or energy intensity of 
country i in year t from year t-1. The logic of the model is such that if 𝛽1 is 
statistically significant that means that there is evidence of convergence. The sign on 
𝛽1 would tell us the direction of convergence. A negative sign means declining levels 
of energy intensity or carbon emissions. All other variables are the same as explained 
above, but the added interaction term of the level of dependent variable in the 
previous year with 𝑍𝑖𝑖, where Z is the variable of interest upon which the 
convergence or divergence may depend. Z can be a variable that conditions the 
process of convergence or divergence which, in our case, is internationalisation and 
state capacity measured as bureaucratic quality.  It can also be a group dummy, like 
OECD in our case, to observe if there are clubs within which we observe such 
trends. 
 
4.5. Descriptive Statistics 
The unit of analysis is country-year for a slightly unbalanced (because of missing 
values) Cross-Sectional-Time-Series dataset. The panel dataset is comprised of 60 
countries over 20 years (1993-2012). For the 60 countries selected, there are 28 
OECD and 32 non-OECD countries considering 2012 as base year, or 23 and 37 
respectively considering 1993 as base year. Throughout this chapter, I referred to this 
universe of countries as ‘the world’. The criterion to choose this dataset and its 




I chose all the countries for which data was available on most of our 
dependent and independent variables from different sources. Then I dropped all 
those countries which consumed the least amount of petroleum or emitted the 
lowest amounts of carbon. These are often the countries where data on most 
independent variables are missing. The combination of data availability and 
elimination by the above method helped to arrive to the sample size of 60. Together 
these countries consumed over 90 percent of total world petroleum consumption, 80 
percent of total world primary energy consumption, and emitted 90 percent of all per 
capita carbon emissions in the world. As such my sample size is virtually the whole 
population of interest. 
 
For the number of years, the decision criterion followed the common 
consensus among policy scholars, that most policy change outcomes shall be studied 
over a 10 year period (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Sabatier 2007). Furthermore, the 
overall energy policy is a special case where policy decisions demand long-term 
commitments from successive governments (Baccini, Lenzi and Thurner 2013; 
Goldthau 2013; Winzer 2012). Almost all energy infrastructures are characterised by 
high asset specificity. The policy instruments to influence energy production/import 
or consumption decisions may be handily available to governments. But the 
economy-wide structural transformations required to align with the new incentive 
structure take more than a decade. The choice of number of years is also motivated 
by statistical theory. To estimate dynamic effects using panel data in CPE, most 
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scholars argue that a T > 20 shall be the minimum requirement (Beck and Katz 
2009). 
 
The tables below (Table 4.10) explain all the variables, their definitions, and 
unit of analysis. Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 show descriptive statistics and correlation 





Table 4.10: Variables and Definitions 
Variable Code Definition & Rationale 
Subsidy/Tax level SUB An indicator for the level of subsidy or tax on each litre of gasoline consumed. Taxes and 
subsidies are the main policy instruments through which governments can influence the 
consumption patterns, consequently energy mix, and carbon emissions.  
= constant USD2011 per litre of gasoline only (World-Reference-Price= United States) 
= gasoline price in US – gasoline price in domestic market, data for domestic fuel prices 
come from the German Agency (GIZ 2011).  
Turkey (-1.95) and Venezuela (+1.07) are the two ends of the spectrum. 
Note: the correlation between my measure of subsidy and the IEA estimates is 0.63, 
despite the fact that my dataset captures only gasoline. 
Energy Diversity 
Index 
EDI An index created by the author to measure the concentration of fuel type in the national 
energy basket based on the Hirschman-Herfindahl (HHI) method 
= 0 to 1, normalised sum of squares of the share of four fuels (oil, gas, coal, others) , 1 
means fully balanced national energy mix 
Singapore (0.10) and Germany (0.97) are the two extreme ends of the spectrum. 
Energy Intensity INTENSITY An indicator of the energy efficiency of an economy. It measures the units of energy 
consumed to produce one unit of GDP 
= Btu per constant USD 2005 PPP 
Bangladesh (1700) and Ukraine (35000) are the two extreme ends of the spectrum.  
Energy Intensity 
Growth Rate 
INT_GRT Growth rate of energy intensity 
Carbon Emissions EMISSIONS An indicator of contribution to global warming measured as CO2  emissions per capita 
from all energy use (does not include other GHG emissions from other sources) 
= Metric tons of carbon per capita 
Bangladesh (0.15) and United Arab Emirates (47) are the two extreme ends.  
Carbon Emissions 
Growth Rate 
EMI_GRT Growth rate of carbon emissions per capita 
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Kyoto Protocol KYOTO Annex-I country from 2008-2012 (1st commitment period) 
=1 if party, 0 otherwise 
Globalisation GLOBAL An indicator that combines more than traditional openness (trade/gdp) measures. It 
effectively measures the level of integration by including investments and restrictions on 
capital accounts as well as some socio-political aspects.  
KOF index; 0 = least, 100=most ; from (Dreher 2006) 
Bangladesh (22.4) and Netherlands (92.5) are the two extreme examples. 
 
Weights = economic (*37) + political (*26) + social (*37) (details in appendix) 
Note: the mere fact that since the 2008 financial crisis, the index virtually halted and even 
reversed in OECD means taking mere trade over gdp as internationalisation is not enough 
for our purposes, nevertheless I do use trade/gdp for robustness checks. Furthermore, 
Corr(globalisation, trade/gdp) >0 .70 and Corr(globalisation, 
trade/gdp+investments+restrictions) > 0.85. Nevertheless, due to relative stable 
components of politics and society which are substitutable in the index, it would vary less 
with momentary fluctuations in trade data. 
Veto Players VETO A measure of constraints on policy change. The assumption is that a country’s uniform 
uni-dimensional policy space is populated by heterogeneous institutional actors and their 
preferences. An increase in number of players or divergence in preferences favours status-
quo (Henisz 2002; Tsebelis 2002).  
0= central planner, 1=many veto players with divergent preferences 
Saudi Arabia (0) and Switzerland (0.89) are the two extreme ends of the spectrum. 
Regime Type POLITY A measure of the level of institutionalised democratic or autocratic state authority 
structures (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). The index is a composite measure that includes 
various indicators on the process of executive recruitment and level of political 
participation and competition, the weights are theoretically justified. 
= -10 to +10, where -10 is the autocratic and +10 is the democratic polity. Again, Saudi 
Arabia (-10) and Switzerland (+10) are the two extreme ends of the spectrum. 
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QOG An indicator for state capacity or bureaucratic efficiency. Since the implementation of all 
legislation agreed nationally or internationally depends on the bureaucracies of countries 
irrespective of their polity type. The quality of government measured by International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) combines score on corruption, rule of law, and bureaucratic 
quality. The index contains more objective measures than most other perception based 
indexes available like World Bank Governance Indicators. 
 = 0 to 1, where 0 is the lowest and 1 is the highest comparative quality of government 
Bangladesh, Nigeria, Venezuela on the lower most end and Norway, Germany, Sweden on 
the higher most end. 
Margin of majority in 
the ruling party 
MARJ The indicator measures the divided or cohesive governments. It is the proportion of 




IMFWB_GDP An indicator to show the influence of IFIs in either policy making or through running 
their own programmes, also a proxy for policy transfer and diffusion through international 
institutions. Both these institutions have played important role in policy reforms across the 
developing world. 
IMF + WB  borrowings (current USD) / GDP 
Budget balance FIS Fiscal space is required to use subsidise or redirect resources 
Percent of GDP 
Share of industry in 
GDP 
INDUS The level of industrialisation in an economy has a bearing on energy intensity and 
emissions 
Industrial value added in GDP as a percent of GDP 
Oil import 
dependence 
OIL_IMP An indicator of sensitivity (and to some extent vulnerability) of a country to international 
oil markets 





EN_IMP An indicator of sensitivity (and to some extent vulnerability) of a country to international 
oil markets.  
= total energy imports as percent of total energy consumption  
Relative economic 
power 
GDP_RW Measures the size of an economy relative to the size of the international economy 
(correlation with GDP>98.5), GDP in constant 2005 USD 
= GDP as percent of World GDP 
Level of wealth and 
development  
GDP_PC Measures the level of development & wealth of an economy 
GDP per capita constant 2005 USD 
Growth rate of the 
economy 
GDP_GRT GDP growth rate 
Oil reserves OIL_RES Resource endowment of a country  
Billion barrels of oil reserves 
Gas reserves GAS_RES Resource endowment of a country  
Trillion cubic feet of gas reserves 
Coal reserve to 
production ratio 
COAL_RTP Resource endowments, but using reserve to production ration due to unavailability of time 
series data on coal reserves, 2011 reserve data serve as the nominator for all years. 
Years of coal left at current production rates 
International crude 
oil prices 




Table 4.11: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SUB 1092 -0.29 0.47 -1.95 1.02 
EDI 1200 0.22 0.15 0.00 0.91 
INTENSITY 1123 7920.43 4391.28 1675.73 35605.83 
INT_GRT 1063 -0.01 0.05 -0.38 0.33 
EMISSIONS 1121 7.58 6.97 0.15 47.66 
EMI_GRT 1061 0.01 0.06 -0.33 0.29 
KYOTO 1200 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
GLOBAL 1121 66.76 16.24 22.44 92.50 
VETO 1183 0.57 0.29 0.00 0.89 
POLITY 1177 5.69 6.07 -10.00 10.00 
QOG 1110 0.67 0.21 0.19 1.00 
MARJ 826 36.87 16.02 7.45 97.73 
IMFWB_GDP 1181 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.21 
FIS 1146 -1.89 4.39 -30.54 29.80 
INDUS 1143 33.02 8.54 6.97 66.76 
OIL_IMP 1200 -28.28 244.79 -1482.55 100.00 
EN_IMP 1167 -0.13 1.31 -8.10 1.00 
GDP_RW 1181 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.29 
GDP_PC 1181 16519.22 16250.69 286.05 67740.42 
GDP_GRT 1179 0.03 0.04 -0.30 0.15 
OIL_RES 1175 14.67406 43.29982 0 267.02 
GAS_RES 1163 70.33734 228.1173 0 1700 
COAL_RTP 817 987.3345 4254.169 1.227597 63333.41 









Table 4.12: Correlation Matrix 
 SUB EDI INTENSITY INT_GRT EMISSIONS EMI_GRT KYOTO 
SUB 1.00 
      EDI 0.21 1.00 
     INTENSITY 0.33 -0.01 1.00 
    INT_GRT 0.06 0.12 0.00 1.00 
   EMISSIONS -0.09 0.11 0.36 0.01 1.00 
  EMI_GRT 0.11 0.10 -0.02 0.53 -0.03 1.00 
 KYOTO -0.44 -0.21 -0.08 -0.06 0.05 -0.20 1.00 
GLOBAL -0.54 -0.26 -0.09 -0.16 0.51 -0.17 0.30 
VETO -0.45 -0.46 -0.07 -0.06 0.22 -0.15 0.21 
POLITY -0.46 -0.45 -0.18 -0.13 -0.03 -0.15 0.18 
QOG -0.54 -0.19 -0.09 -0.04 0.44 -0.09 0.16 
MARJ 0.14 0.27 -0.03 0.04 0.15 0.03 0.00 
IMFWB_GDP 0.21 0.02 -0.08 0.05 -0.43 0.06 -0.04 
FIS 0.04 0.16 0.10 -0.06 0.14 0.09 -0.14 
INDUS 0.54 0.21 0.35 0.08 0.04 0.10 -0.19 
OIL_IMP -0.29 -0.22 -0.13 -0.02 -0.10 0.03 0.09 
EN_IMP -0.41 -0.20 -0.10 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.10 
GDP_RW -0.06 -0.25 -0.02 -0.04 0.25 -0.04 0.00 
GDP_PC -0.54 -0.16 -0.09 -0.09 0.60 -0.15 0.28 
GDP_GRT 0.21 0.18 -0.13 -0.21 -0.05 0.41 -0.28 
OIL_RES 0.40 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.31 0.03 -0.06 
GAS_RES 0.31 0.01 0.36 0.01 0.14 0.05 0.01 
COAL_RTP 0.13 0.19 -0.10 -0.07 -0.17 -0.03 -0.06 
CRUDE -0.25 -0.11 -0.14 -0.12 0.04 -0.03 0.50 




      VETO 0.56 1.00 
     POLITY 0.51 0.73 1.00 
    QOG 0.72 0.56 0.45 1.00 
   MARJ -0.05 -0.38 -0.32 -0.06 1.00 
  IMFWB_GDP -0.52 -0.30 -0.23 -0.49 0.07 1.00 
 FIS 0.12 -0.06 -0.05 0.10 -0.02 -0.13 1.00 
INDUS -0.31 -0.40 -0.52 -0.43 0.00 -0.04 0.29 
OIL_IMP 0.14 0.19 0.29 0.21 0.04 0.07 -0.31 
EN_IMP 0.23 0.28 0.32 0.31 0.00 0.01 -0.25 
GDP_RW 0.14 0.22 0.18 0.24 0.08 -0.20 -0.08 
GDP_PC 0.77 0.52 0.39 0.78 -0.10 -0.52 0.18 
GDP_GRT -0.15 -0.24 -0.24 -0.18 0.05 0.06 0.26 
OIL_RES -0.11 -0.26 -0.43 -0.16 0.03 -0.14 0.13 
GAS_RES -0.17 -0.14 -0.21 -0.22 0.00 -0.11 0.09 
COAL_RTP -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.20 0.05 0.08 -0.01 
CRUDE 0.19 -0.04 0.02 -0.11 0.01 0.00 0.05 
 INDUS OIL_IMP EN_IMP GDP_RW GDP_PC GDP_GRT OIL_RES 
INDUS 1.00 
      OIL_IMP -0.48 1.00 
     EN_IMP -0.50 0.92 1.00 
    GDP_RW -0.20 0.11 0.12 1.00 
   GDP_PC -0.32 -0.09 0.05 0.31 1.00 
  GDP_GRT 0.16 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.19 1.00 
 OIL_RES 0.49 -0.42 -0.45 0.01 -0.01 0.00 1.00 
GAS_RES 0.21 -0.25 -0.25 0.06 -0.10 0.04 0.40 
COAL_RTP 0.11 -0.26 -0.36 -0.06 -0.13 0.05 0.03 
CRUDE -0.02 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.05 
 GAS_RES COAL_RTP CRUDE     
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GAS_RES 1       
COAL_RTP 0.023 1      




4.6. Findings and Discussion 
The findings from the regression analysis are summarised in the table below ( See 
Table 4.13 below). Firstly, we find that international institutions matter. The 
statistically significant negative sign of the coefficient on KYOTO for all of our four 
dependent variables (subsidies/taxes, energy diversity, energy intensity, and carbon 
emissions) suggests that international institutions play a critical role in ensuring 
cooperative energy policy outcomes. Being party to the Kyoto Protocol is associated 
with a USD 0.20 per litre reduction in gasoline subsidies (or an increase in taxes) 
compared to those not bound under the Kyoto protocol. The results are statistically 
significant on a 0.01 level (99 percent confidence level). The Kyoto Protocol 
commitment is also associated with an increase in diversification of national energy 
baskets. Although the results are statistically insignificant and the magnitude (-0.008) 
is miniscule on a scale of 0 to 1, the negative sign is nevertheless suggestive. 
Similarly, the Kyoto Protocol commitment is associated with a 7.1 and 3.7 percent 
reduction in energy intensity and carbon emissions respectively. This finding serves 
to reinforce the point that international institutions matter, even if at the margins, 
and that is precisely why we observe tough negotiations and a deadlock in the climate 
regime negotiations. 
 
 Secondly, veto players are associated with more subsidies. A one unit 
increase in veto points is associated with USD0.19 increase in subsidy per litre of 
gasoline. This is despite the fact that a large number of subsidizing countries in our 
sample score low on veto point index. This seems to vindicate the proposition that 
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countries with multiple centres of power or fractured polities find it difficult to 
reduce subsidies or increase taxes on fossil fuels. Nevertheless, the effect of veto 
players on energy intensity and carbon emissions is negative, although statistically 
insignificant in the latter case. The results indicate that more veto players are 
conducive to energy efficiency and by the same token in reducing carbon emissions 
though statistically insignificant. As I argued before, democracy and ideologies of 
political parties are not appropriate indicators in the post-cold war period for two 
reasons, namely the structural change that followed and the subjectivity of these 
indicators. Even after including the margin of majority for the ruling party, the 
results remain statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, in most cases the democracy 
indicator has the expected negative sign, but the right and left parties are largely 
indistinguishable. 
 
 Thirdly, globalisation has an impact on energy policy outcomes of countries. 
However as hypothesised, the impact of globalisation is blocked or mediated by 
domestic institutions, like the number of veto players and the quality of governance. 
Globalisation negatively affects all of our four dependent variables. For example, for 
subsidies/taxes on gasoline, one unit increase in globalisation is associated with USD 
0.02 per litre reduction in subsidies on gasoline (or increase in taxes). But because 
this effect is dependent on quality of governance (QOG), the actual amount is (-
0.023 + 0.030*QoG). In other words, if we assume QoG as a discrete variable taking 
values of 0 for low quality governance and 1 for high quality governance, a one unit 
increase in globalisation in countries with high quality of governance results in 
USD0.007 more subsidies per litre compared to those with low quality institutions, 
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taking into account all other factors. To put things in perspective, the difference in 
the level of globalisation in 2011 between China (60.5) and India (50.4) is 10 units. If 
India were to reach the globalisation level of China, holding its quality of governance 
at the same level of 0.58, it would reduce subsidies (or increase taxes) on per litre of 
gasoline by USD0.056 calculated as follows: (-0.023+ 0.030*0.58)*10.09 = -.056. 
Similarly, if China were to improve its level of governance from current 0.48 to the 
Indian level of 0.58 holding its level of globalisation at the same level it would reduce 
subsidies by a mere (-1.84 + 0.03*60.5)*0.10=-0.0025. But if India were to increase 
its level of bureaucracy by the same 10 point, holding its level of globalisation 
constant, it would reduce subsidies by USD0.033 on per litre of gasoline calculated 
as follows: (-1.84 + 0.03*50.4)*0.10 = -0.033. At higher levels of globalisation, 
improvements in bureaucratic quality have a lower impact compared to 
improvements at the lower levels of globalisation. Similarly, improvements in level of 
globalisation at a higher level of bureaucratic quality have a lower impact compared 
to improvement in level of globalisation at the lower level of bureaucratic quality (see 
Figure 4.7). 
 
On the diversity of energy mix and intensity, despite expected signs, the 
evidence is statistically insignificant. The results indicate that the two variables are 
largely determined by other structural variables. On carbon emissions, the results are 
consistent with the above proposition as well. A one unit increase in globalisation is 
associated with 0.6 percent per capita reduction in carbon emissions, but because this 
effect is again dependent on quality of governance, the actual amount is (-0.006 + 
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0.005*QoG). This means good quality institutions would tend to resist efficiency 
pressures of globalisation. To put things in perspective, the difference in the level of 
globalisation in 2011 between China (60.5) and the United States (74.9) is 14.4 units. 
If China were to reach the globalisation level of the United States holding its quality 
of governance at the same level of 0.48, it would reduce its per capita carbon 
emissions by 5.2 percent as given below: (-0.006 + 0.005*0.48)*14.4 = -.052. But if 
Chinese level of governance quality improves from 0.48 to the level of the United 
States (0.83) holding its level of globalisation at the current level, its per capita 
carbon emissions would go up by 2.4 percent as given below: (-.234 + 
0.005*60.5)*0.35 = .024.   
 
The results are in line with the proposition that, in the short run, domestic 
institutions may block competitive pressures from international political economy 
that are perceived as adverse for the national economy (Frieden and Rogowski 1996; 
Rodrik 2008; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2004). The results also seem to reject 
the null hypothesis that governments may use subsidies as easy-to-implement policy 
instruments put forward by some scholars (Cheon, Urpelainen and Lackner 2013; 
Victor 2009). The findings also tend to support many of the studies surveyed in 
chapter two. A number of scholars have demonstrated that trade/globalisation can 
be beneficial for the environmental standards (Frankel and Rose 2005; Kleemann 
and Abdulai 2013). The literature also suggested that where immediate consequences 
of pollution are not borne by the local population; good governance has a negative 
correlation on the environmental indicators (Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 
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2009). However, in the long run, the marginal changes continue to move countries in 
one particular direction, that is, to reduce subsidies and increase taxes on gasoline.  
 
 Fourthly, relative power, as expected, has mixed results. A one percent 
increase in a country’s share of total world GDP is associated with USD0.11 
decrease in subsidies (or increase in taxes). The decrease in subsidy could be due to 
efforts to increase self-sufficiency and reduce imports. Nevertheless, the coefficients 
on energy diversity and intensity are positive but statistically insignificant. The results 
suggest that the powerful countries are likely to subsidise gasoline less, but may not 
pay much attention to diversity and efficiency. This means energy security policy is 
focused on an external dimension instead of an internal dimension. The findings on 
carbon emissions are consistent with these results. A one percent increase in a 
country’s share of total world GDP is associated with a 2.6 percent increase in per 
capita carbon emissions. These results also support the above analysis that the 
environmental Kuznet curve may only be relevant for those pollutants which have 
an immediate effect on the local population. 
 
 Finally, the results on all other structural and institutional variables are 
according to expectations, although statistically insignificant in a few cases. As 
expected fiscal surplus enables governments to subsidise gasoline but governments 
facing fiscal constraints tend to phase out subsidies. The level of energy imports only 
marginally impacts the outcomes on all four of our dependent variables. Similarly, 
resource endowments have expected but marginal influence. The higher indebted a 
country to the IMF and World Bank the more likely it is to phase out fossil fuel 
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subsidies. For reducing carbon emissions, improvements in energy intensity and 






Table 4.13: Determinants of Energy Policy Outcomes (A Summary) 
 





Kyoto Protocol -0.202*** -0.008 -0.071*** -0.037*** 
Globalisation -0.023*** -0.001 -.002 -0.006*** 
Veto Players 0.195** 0.007 -0.096** -0.011 
Bureaucratic 
Quality -1.843




0.030*** -0.002 0.004 0.005* 
Relative Power -11.955*** 0.374 0.063 2.682* 
















  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Other independent and control variables and standard errors not reported in this 
summary table. For full results see the respective regression tables. All results are from the 
Newey-West Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors of 
first order lags (model-6 in detailed results). For the detailed results of convergence on 




4.6.1. The Convergence Debate  
As our descriptive discussion of all the dependent variables indicated, there are 
convergent trends across the world in the direction that is conducive for the global 
energy and climate cooperation. The modified statistical model in equation (2) above 
tests if these trends are statistically significant. Furthermore, it tests if the trends are 
conditional on some of our variables of interest. The results in Table 4.18 and Table 
4.19 show that there is an unambiguous statistically significant evidence of declining 
rates of energy intensity and carbon emissions controlling for all other factors. The 
dependent variables in both these regressions are the yearly change in level of energy 
intensity and carbon emissions. The negative and statistically significant sign on the 
lagged variables of energy intensity and carbon emissions indicates that every year 
the world overall is reducing its energy intensity and carbon emissions.  
 
 To observe if the trend of convergence is conditional upon level of 
globalisation or quality of bureaucracy, I include the interaction of both these 
variables with the lagged levels of energy intensity as well as lagged levels of carbon 
emissions in the two regressions. The negative, although statistically insignificant, 
sign on the combined interaction term (model 5) is indicative of the fact that 
controlling for other factors increasing globalisation and increasing levels of 
bureaucratic quality push countries towards convergence. The direction of 
convergence is indicative of improving levels of energy efficiency and reductions in 
carbon emissions. To observe if there are convergence clubs, I include the 
interaction term of binary variables OECD and NON-OECD with the lagged levels 
of energy intensity and carbon emissions. In terms of energy intensity, we observe 
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some convergence in the OECD group. The United States remains an outlier and 
excluding it from the regression improves statistical significance as well as the 
magnitude of our coefficients. However, there are divergent patterns within the non-
OECD group. This can largely be explained by the fact that the level of globalisation 
and quality of bureaucratic institutions vary greatly within this group as compared to 
the OECD group. In terms of carbon emissions, the statistically insignificant 
coefficients indicate that the trends are not dependent on being member of OECD 
or non-OECD. 
 
 Despite a halting or declining rate of growth of carbon emissions, we find 
little reason to be optimistic because the magnitude is minuscule. To put things in 
perspective, the world needs to reduce its total carbon emissions by 33 percent from 
the 1990 levels  in order to halt global warming at 2 0C by 2050 (IPCC 2014). 
Assuming that my model correctly predicts the decline in year to year change in the 
levels of carbon emissions and holding everything else constant, then the world need 
to reduce carbon emissions at least 2 percent a year as opposed to the predicted 0.44 
percent. This implies that major emitters need to take stringent actions in order to 
accelerate the decline in carbon emissions. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
In the previous chapter I put forward the proposition that structural convergence 
(besides the perceptions of fairness and friendship) at the domestic level is likely to 
facilitate international cooperation in the area of energy and climate change. 
Furthermore, I hypothesised that if domestic variables systematically explain the 
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variances in policy outcomes across countries then the explanations of international 
cooperation and discord would be incomplete without a discussion of domestic 
variables. In this chapter, I set out to identify the relative salience of these domestic 
and international structural and political variables through Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regressions on a panel data for four dependent variables, namely 
subsidies/taxes, national energy mixes, energy intensity, and carbon emissions.  
 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the world is in fact on a convergent 
path. I term this convergent path as a ‘marathon to the top’ contrary to the popular 
belief of a ‘race to the bottom’; to the top because the world on average is 
subsidizing fossil fuels less and less (more taxes), diversifying national energy baskets, 
using energy more efficiently, and cutting down on carbon emissions (or growth in 
carbon emissions); a marathon, instead of a race, because the pace of change is 
extremely slow, particularly when it comes to carbon emissions. Nevertheless, 
substantial variations persist across countries particularly across OECD and non-
OECD group. The non-OECD countries show a lot more variance within their 
group. In the OECD, the United States is the only outlier. The variances across 
countries can be explained by the character and quality of domestic governing 
institutions, level of globalisation, and the membership in international institutions. 
 
The findings support the neoliberal institutionalism’s claim that international 
institutions and level of internationalisation matter. The parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol are more likely to tax fossil fuels, use energy more efficiently, and cut on 
their carbon emissions. Similarly, increasing level of globalisation of a country is 
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associated with less subsidies (or more taxes) on fossil fuels, more efficient use of 
energy resources, and cuts on carbon emissions. Nevertheless, the analysis also lends 
some support to the neorealist claim that the more powerful actors are able to isolate 
themselves from international influences. However, contrary to the neo-neo 
synthesis that we can ignore domestic institutions, my findings suggest that the 
character and quality of domestic governing institutions systematically explain energy 
and climate policy outcomes. The international pressures for policy change are 
mediated by domestic institutions. In that more veto players tend to block 
international competitive pressures and resist international obligations. Countries 
with high quality bureaucracy are better placed to deal with the challenges. Since a 
large part of variances across countries is explained by domestic structural and 
political factors, therefore, we cannot ignore domestic politics and institutions 
(alongside perceptions) if we are to understand the sources of conflict and 





Figure 4.7: Interaction between Globalisation and Quality of Bureaucracy 
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Table 4.14: Determinants of Changes in Subsidy/Tax Levels 
Dependent Variable: Subsidies/Taxes 
 OLS LDV D&K L(1) Newey-West L(1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
kyoto -0.226*** 0.002 -0.146* -0.146*** -0.154*** -0.202*** -0.100* 
 (0.035) (0.022) (0.068) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.039) 
imfwb_gdp -1.060*** 0.009 -0.875 -0.875 -0.796 -0.220 0.444 
 (0.259) (0.292) (0.520) (0.499) (0.484) (0.440) (0.881) 
global 0.002 0.005** 0.007 0.007* -0.018** -0.023*** -0.015 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
fis(lag) 0.009*** 0.004* 0.010** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.005* 0.008* 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
qog -0.440*** -0.030 -0.429*** -0.429** -2.849*** -1.843*** -1.409* 
 (0.089) (0.101) (0.107) (0.141) (0.513) (0.465) (0.684) 
veto 0.022 0.107* 0.206 0.206** 0.195** 0.195**  
 (0.039) (0.044) (0.106) (0.073) (0.074) (0.070)  
glob_qog     0.041*** 0.030*** 0.021* 
     (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) 
polity       -0.012 
       (0.013) 
left       -0.009 
       (0.041) 
right       0.017 
       (0.042) 
marj       -0.001 
       (0.001) 
asia    -0.428 0.506 -0.330 1.853* 
    (1.010) (0.964) (0.628) (0.821) 
europe    -2.584* 0.242 -0.269 -1.114 
    (1.056) (1.147) (0.884) (1.198) 
mena    -0.139 0.157 -0.347 0.000 
    (0.843) (0.809) (0.703) (0.690) 
samerica    0.038 0.152 -0.345 -0.021 
    (0.928) (0.886) (0.720) (0.396) 
gdp_wr 1.347*** -3.501* -14.679** -14.679*** -14.367*** -11.955*** -28.422*** 
 (0.227) (1.667) (4.038) (3.222) (2.782) (3.060) (3.834) 
crude -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.019) 
oil_imp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
oil_res_bb 0.002*** 0.000 0.001* 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
gas_res_tcf 0.000** 0.001*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
industry 0.008*** 0.006** 0.010 0.010** 0.010** 0.009* 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
intensity 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln_gdp_pc -0.135*** 0.014 0.041 0.041 0.038 -0.034 0.284 
 (0.020) (0.071) (0.162) (0.112) (0.106) (0.115) (0.215) 
LDV  0.691***      
  (0.033)      
F 110.53 145.83 1482.60 259.53 236.15 2176.65 712.02 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 820 791 820 820 820 820 476 
State FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No No No No No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001;   
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Table 4.15: Determinants of Changes in Energy Diversity Index 
Dependent Variable: Energy Diversity Index 
 OLS LDV D&K L(1) Newey-West L(1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
kyoto -0.049*** -0.002 -0.006  -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.017 
 (0.014) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
global -0.003*** -0.001** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
qog 0.050 0.001 0.077*** 0.077* 0.195 0.172 0.164 
 (0.037) (0.013) (0.014) (0.030) (0.102) (0.113) (0.187) 
veto -0.291*** 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007  
 (0.032) (0.006) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)  
glob_qog     -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
     (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
polity       -0.008** 
       (0.003) 
left       -0.006 
       (0.008) 
right       -0.003 
       (0.008) 
marj       0.001 
       (0.000) 
asia    0.319*** 0.324*** 0.335 -0.345 
    (0.096) (0.087) (0.216) (0.184) 
europe    0.246* 0.233*** 0.214 0.540* 
    (0.112) (0.070) (0.215) (0.232) 
mena    0.452*** 0.449*** 0.438** 0.147 
    (0.075) (0.072) (0.167) (0.127) 
samerica    0.220** 0.213** 0.185 -0.199 
    (0.075) (0.072) (0.181) (0.114) 
gdp_wr -0.835*** 0.199 0.606* 0.606 0.596 0.374 0.943 
 (0.071) (0.183) (0.240) (0.341) (0.331) (0.364) (0.618) 
crude -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
energy_imports -0.009** 0.001 0.023** 0.023** 0.023** 0.025** 0.072*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) 
oil_res_bb -0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
gas_res_tcf -0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
industry -0.001 0.001 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
intensity 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln_gdp_pc 0.043*** 0.010 -0.021 -0.021 -0.022 -0.009 -0.056 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.050) 
LDV  0.812***      
  (0.035)      
F 67.64 1779.48 1951.43 448.68 437.79 381.56 275.13 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 950 903 950 950 950 950 547 
State FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No No No No No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 4.16: Determinants of Changes in Energy Intensity 
Dependent Variable: Energy Intensity 
 OLS LDV D&K L(1) Newey-West L(1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
kyoto 0.046 -0.005 -0.071* -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.063* 
 (0.046) (0.007) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.025) 
global 0.010*** -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
qog 0.129 0.070* 0.206** 0.206* -0.128 -0.050 0.169 
 (0.101) (0.033) (0.056) (0.091) (0.339) (0.338) (0.287) 
veto 0.066 0.002 -0.095* -0.095** -0.097** -0.096**  
 (0.064) (0.015) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)  
glob_qog     0.006 0.004 -0.001 
     (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
polity       -0.002 
       (0.004) 
left       -0.004 
       (0.019) 
right       -0.001 
       (0.018) 
marj       0.000 
       (0.001) 
asia    -2.455*** -1.145 -1.144** -3.358*** 
    (0.686) (0.681) (0.430) (0.336) 
europe    -0.236 -0.229 -0.243 0.791*** 
    (0.659) (0.596) (0.484) (0.136) 
mena    -0.393 -0.388 -0.390 -1.868*** 
    (0.524) (0.584) (0.310) (0.263) 
samerica    -0.878 -0.858 -0.884** -2.320*** 
    (0.561) (0.624) (0.325) (0.221) 
edi -0.003 -0.014 -0.249*** -0.249 -0.238 -0.259 -0.539*** 
 (0.097) (0.052) (0.044) (0.138) (0.137) (0.142) (0.143) 
gdp_wr 0.742*** 1.070* 0.227 0.227 0.244 0.063 0.815 
 (0.200) (0.447) (1.513) (1.385) (1.376) (1.464) (1.201) 
crude -0.004*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
energy_imports 0.046*** 0.038*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.133*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.030) 
oil_res_bb 0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
gas_res_tcf 0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
industry 0.027*** 0.001 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.005** 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
ln_gdp_pc -0.036 -0.082*** -0.269*** -0.269*** -0.266*** -0.252*** -0.733*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.056) (0.066) (0.067) (0.071) (0.086) 
LDV  0.813***      
  (0.027)      
F 110.83 2030.66 302.27 30527.11 33913.28 485.87 856.61 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 950 903 950 950 950 950 547 
State FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No No No No No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 







Table 4.17: Determinants of Changes in Carbon Emissions 
Dependent Variable: Carbon Emissions per capita 
 OLS LDV D&K L(1) Newey-West L(1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
kyoto -0.006 -0.021*** -0.029 -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.037*** -0.033* 
 (0.033) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) 
global 0.008*** 0.002* 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.006* -0.006* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
qog -0.298*** 0.030 0.071* 0.071 -0.166 -0.234* -0.342 
 (0.072) (0.022) (0.030) (0.037) (0.120) (0.127) (0.216) 
veto -0.037 0.003 -0.018 -0.018 -0.020 -0.011  
 (0.037) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)  
glob_qog     0.004* 0.005* 0.005 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
polity       -0.000 
       (0.003) 
left       -0.002 
       (0.015) 
right       -0.007 
       (0.015) 
marj       0.000 
       (0.000) 
asia    0.937*** 0.950*** 0.998*** -0.666*** 
    (0.078) (0.218) (0.249) (0.168) 
europe    0.157*** 0.160* 0.175 0.374 
    (0.036) (0.062) (0.122) (0.230) 
mena    0.719*** 0.753*** 0.804*** 0.000 
    (0.115) (0.112) (0.131) (0.260) 
samerica    0.835*** 0.495*** 0.536*** -0.284 
    (0.070) (0.094) (0.081) (0.240) 
lnintensity 1.045*** 0.570*** 0.912*** 0.912*** 0.908*** 0.922*** 0.927*** 
 (0.017) (0.039) (0.034) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.057) 
edi 0.457*** 0.190*** 0.224** 0.224*** 0.230*** 0.249*** 0.193 
 (0.073) (0.039) (0.060) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.104) 
gdp_grt 0.266 0.342*** -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 0.031 0.086 
 (0.245) (0.051) (0.079) (0.056) (0.055) (0.061) (0.084) 
gdp_wr 1.232*** 1.949*** 2.751*** 2.751* 2.755* 2.682* 2.140* 
 (0.137) (0.541) (0.628) (1.163) (1.135) (1.215) (0.909) 
crude 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
oil_res_bb 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
gas_res_tcf 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
industry -0.004* -0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
ln_gdp_pc 0.552*** 0.424*** 0.774*** 0.774*** 0.776*** 0.772*** 0.985*** 
 (0.014) (0.056) (0.040) (0.072) (0.071) (0.076) (0.072) 
LDV  0.453***      
  (0.037)      
F 2256.74 21749.05 4214.76 14613.13 14087.20 10231.13 7095.30 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 934 887 934 934 934 934 543 
State FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No No No No No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 4.18: Convergence in decreasing levels of Carbon Emissions  
Dependent Variable: yearly change in level of carbon emissions (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
lnemissions(lag) -0.503*** -0.522*** -0.570*** -0.422*** -0.440*** -0.452*** -0.428*** 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.042) (0.062) (0.054) (0.056) (0.057) 
qog_laglnemissions  0.027      
  (0.026)      
glob_laglnemissions   0.001***     
   (0.000)     
glob_qog_laglnemissions    -0.080 -0.061 -0.060 -0.060 
    (0.041) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
oecd_laglnemissions      0.026  
      (0.030)  
oecd      -0.033  
      (0.057)  
nonoecd_laglnemissions       -0.020 
       (0.030) 
nonoecd       0.021 
       (0.058) 
qog 0.046 0.009 0.061* 0.194* 0.145* 0.147* 0.149* 
 (0.024) (0.037) (0.025) (0.077) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073) 
global 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.003* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
kyoto -0.009 -0.008 -0.012* -0.008 -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
veto 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.008 0.017 0.017 0.017 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
ln_gdp_pc 0.447*** 0.452*** 0.471*** 0.451*** 0.421*** 0.426*** 0.425*** 
 (0.056) (0.054) (0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) 
gdp_grt 0.364*** 0.360*** 0.353*** 0.364*** 0.357*** 0.353*** 0.354*** 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) 
industry 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
lnintensity 0.525*** 0.528*** 0.543*** 0.532*** 0.533*** 0.540*** 0.539*** 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) 
F 15.02 14.92 15.31 15.13 13.30 13.27 13.26 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
r2 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.60 
N 917 917 917 917 917 917 917 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 











Table 4.19: Convergence in decreasing levels of Energy Intensity  
Dependent Variable: yearly change in level of energy intensity (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
lnintensity(lag) -0.159*** -0.117* -0.136** -0.158*** -0.141*** -0.133*** -0.196*** 
 (0.027) (0.054) (0.042) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) 
qog_laglnintensity  -0.071      
  (0.062)      
glob_laglnintensity   -0.000     
   (0.001)     
glob_qog_laglnintensity    -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
oecd_laglnintensity      -0.066*  
      (0.031)  
oecd      0.584*  
      (0.285)  
nonoecd_laglnintensity       0.063* 
       (0.031) 
nonoecd       -0.558* 
       (0.280) 
qog 0.069* 0.711 0.066* 0.078 0.059 0.021 0.022 
 (0.030) (0.556) (0.030) (0.094) (0.087) (0.088) (0.088) 
global -0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
kyoto -0.014** -0.015** -0.015** -0.014** -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
veto 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
ln_gdp_pc -0.062*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.062*** -0.038 -0.036 -0.036 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
gdp_grt -0.308*** -0.306*** -0.301*** -0.308*** -0.409*** -0.398*** -0.399*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.074) (0.070) (0.090) (0.089) (0.089) 
industry 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
F 5.22 5.03 5.19 5.17 5.26 5.28 5.28 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
r2 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.35 0.35 
N 935 935 935 935 935 935 935 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 




5. Concluding Remarks 
 
‘The characteristic vice of the utopian is naivety; of the realist, sterility’ 
--- E. H. Carr--- 
This thesis attempts to answer two questions: Why does the level of international 
cooperation vary across countries and issue areas, and how can variances in energy 
and climate policy outcomes across countries be explained? The mainstream 
rationalist answer to the first question is that concerns for relative gains and/or fear 
of cheating hinder cooperation. In issue areas where these concerns have negligible 
consequences and common interests exist, states do cooperate. This thesis offers an 
alternative explanation. The level of cooperation differs across countries and issue 
areas because of the variances in structural and political factors that are internal to 
states.  
 
Contrary to the neo-neo synthesis perspective, according to which we can 
ignore domestic factors, my proposition is that domestic structural and political 
factors systematically explain variances in energy and climate policy outcomes and by 
extension the level of cooperation. Therefore, we cannot ignore domestic factors if 
we are to understand the sources of conflict and cooperation in the international 
arena. In short, controlling for other factors, the relatively greater convergence 
within OECD in domestic factors (higher quality of bureaucracy, higher levels of 
globalisation, and membership in international environmental institutions) leads to 
fewer subsidies on fossil fuels, more energy efficiency, and decrease in carbon 
emissions (the United States remains an outlier in certain aspects). In the non-
216 
 
OECD countries, on the other hand, the relative divergence in domestic factors and 
relatively lower quality of bureaucracy, lower levels of globalisation, and non-
membership in international environmental institutions lead to more subsidies, 
reduced energy efficiency, and greater carbon emissions.  
 
The empirical findings affirm that the domestic structural and political 
factors systematically explain the variances in energy and climate policy outcomes. 
First, the higher level of globalisation and quality of governing institutions have a 
negative impact on fossil fuel subsidies and carbon emissions, and a positive impact 
on fossil fuel taxes, fuel diversification, energy efficiency, and carbon emissions. 
Contrary to the common belief, the converging trend across the world does not 
reflect a race to the bottom, but symbolises more of a marathon to the top in terms of 
global energy and environmental concerns. Nevertheless, visible variances persist, 
particularly between the two groups of OECD and non-OECD countries, largely as 
a result of structural and political features of states. These differences are gradually 
shrinking under increasing internationalisation and the role of international 
institutions and have important facilitative consequences for international 
cooperation.  
 
Domestic institutions mediate international pressures for policy change. For 
example, an increase in veto points is associated with more subsidies on gasoline. 
This suggests that countries with multiple centres of power (or fractionalised politics) 
would not, at least in the short run, phase out subsidies or reduce carbon emissions. 
Similarly, high quality of bureaucracy is associated with lower levels of subsidies (or 
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higher levels of taxes). This suggests that countries with higher quality bureaucratic 
institutions would be able to phase out subsidies or cut carbon emissions more 
effectively as compared to their peers with lower levels of bureaucratic quality. 
Nonetheless, the nuanced analysis of interaction between the level of globalisation 
and quality of bureaucracy further elucidates the impact of internationalisation of an 
economy on energy policy outcomes as dependent on the quality of bureaucracy and 
vice versa. At the lower levels of globalisation, improvements in bureaucratic quality 
have greater impact on reducing subsidies or cutting carbon emissions as compared 
to more globalised countries. Alternatively, increasing globalisation has greater 
impact on reduction in subsidies or carbon emissions in countries with low 
bureaucratic quality as compared to the countries with the higher levels of 
bureaucratic quality.   
 
Furthermore, contrary to the traditional belief, democracy or ideology of the 
ruling party has no statistically significant association with either subsidy on gasoline 
or cuts in carbon emissions. The results reinforce two points. First, the veto players 
theory offers a more sophisticated way of conceptualising differences across political 
systems as compared to simplistic measures of regime type (binary or ordinal 
measures of democracy/non-democracy) or political systems 
(presidential/parliamentarian). Second, in the post-Cold War era the traditional 
measures of ‘left’ or ‘right’ party ideology have become meaningless. This is not only 
due to the difficulty of subjectively coding a party ‘left’ or ‘right’ but also due to the 
fact that both left and right oriented parties across the world have followed by and 




Finally, international institutions matter. They facilitate negotiations and 
reciprocity. They also provide information and certainty. Nevertheless, the raison 
d’etre for international institutions may not be their efficiency enhancing function as 
neoliberal institutionalism claims, but their role as forums to shape the policy 
discourse and propagate certain policy paradigms. Perceptions (including so called 
values and the logic of appropriateness) play a critical role in the decisions to join 
these institutions and in the bargaining process within these institutions.  
 
5.1. Limitations and Future Research 
This thesis is definitely not a conclusive treatise on the problem of international 
cooperation. It has at least three limitations. The first limitation arises from the fact 
that I only consider one issue area that is energy and climate policy. A large part of 
energy and climate policies is determined by structural economic forces. 
Government policies are facilitated or constrained by these structural factors. In 
other areas, government policies may be less or more constrained. I chose this issue-
area because of two reasons. First, it is one of the most pressing collective action 
challenges of the day. Second, it lies at the centre of two spectrums, namely high-low 
politics and domestic-foreign policies (recall Figure 1.1).  However, there are other 
issue areas that are more or less political such as nuclear disarmament or issues of 
saving endangered species. Similarly, there are issue areas that have more or less 
foreign dimension such as coordination of exchange rates or social security policies. 
How these dimensions may alter the structure of the problem of international 




Secondly, the quantitative nature of this research does not deal in any detail 
with the issue of private interest groups and their influence on government policies. 
Interest groups can influence government policies in two ways, namely voice or exit 
(or threat of exit).  It does not matter if these interest groups voice their policy 
preferences or use threats of exit; the premise is that interest groups would influence 
policies through the political processes like political parties and regulatory 
institutions. In that sense this thesis is more favourably placed towards a statist view 
of the political economy. Nevertheless, pluralists from both the globalist and 
varieties of capitalism schools give more weight to various interest groups and the 
way they respond to the economic forces, institutional environment, and 
government policies. The existing political economy literature that develops 
deductive models of interest groups based on factors of production or sectors of 
industry is superficial. We need a deeper understanding of the mechanisms through 
which various interest groups are affected by the developments in the national and 
international political economy. Further research also needs to highlight the specific 
channels through which these groups influence government policies.  
 
Finally, this research lacks one critical explanatory variable in quantitative 
analysis that is public opinion. Currently, there is no cross-country time series survey 
data that enables us to test the influence of public opinion on policy outputs and 
outcomes. The closest we have in that kind of surveys is the WVS. However, it does 
not have consistent questions with regards to environment and energy across 
countries over the years. For example, it asks respondents if they agree with the 
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statement that we need to save the environment, even if at the cost of economy 
growth and employment generation. The percentage of people strongly agreeing with 
this statement varies greatly across countries and over the years. Similarly, another 
question asks respondents if they would be willing to pay some environmental tax in 
order to mitigate the global warming. Nevertheless, these questions are not asked in 
all waves of the survey and not all waves of the survey cover the same countries. 
This makes it virtually impossible to use these data in an OLS regression. A pooling 
of various waves of the WVS and other similar surveys would enable future research 
to quantitatively analyse the impact of public opinion on policy outputs and 
outcomes.  
 
5.2. Theoretical Implications 
For too long the IR literature has been stagnant, particularly the rationalist research 
programme has entered a cul-de-sac. The increasing specialisation and sophisticated 
mathematical modelling of the rational actor model of the state and the international 
system does not add much into our understanding of the sources of cooperation and 
discord. The increasing integration of economies and its political consequences 
require new ways of thinking about the national and international interactions. This 
thesis makes two specific contributions to the existing literature on the issue of 
international cooperation or collective action problems. 
 
First, at a certain level states may be treated as rational unitary actors, but for 
more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the state action we need to open 
the black box of the state and appreciate the structural and ideational differences 
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among states. For we need to redefine the international collective action problem. 
The rationalists construe international collective action problem as states failing to 
cooperate because of the concerns for relative gains and/or fear of cheating; and 
international institutions are created to overcome international collective action 
problem. However, this thesis contends that for international institutions to exist 
meaningfully there needs to be a convergence in expectations. Therefore the 
collective action problem is redefined as a gap between two or more actors’ 
expectations about one another’s policy actions/outcomes. These gaps result from 
their respective internal structural and political environments. This definition 
recognises pre-existing structural and ideational differences between states. 
 
Second, following the above definition, the international cooperation thus 
means reducing these gaps in expectations. The gaps in expectations result from the 
states’ respective internal structural and political attributes including perceptions of 
fairness and friendship between countries. In other words, the shadow of history 
looms larger than the shadow of the future. So long as these gaps are reducing 
because of deliberative policy decisions, we call it cooperation. This definition of 
cooperation does not mean that there is a harmony of interests, but it means that at 
least two processes are bridging the gaps between two or more countries. First, 
internationalisation of economies puts pressures for harmonisation. In the case of 
energy and climate that implies the harmonization of fuel prices across countries, 
improvements in energy efficiency, and consequently a reduction in carbon 
emissions. The second process is more agential as compared to the structural forces 
that bring countries closer. It includes political efforts by states to compromise and 
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meet each other’s demands for mutual policy adjustments. The political bargaining 
results not necessarily from states caring about relative gains or cheating, but from 
the national perceptions of fairness. 
 
5.3. Policy Implications 
The foregoing analysis has important policy implications for the development of 
international energy and climate governance. The emphasis on domestic factors as 
sources of international cooperation and discord means that policy makers involved 
in cooperative endeavours need to be more attentive to each other’s domestic 
environments. The four specific policy implications can be drawn from this thesis.  
 
Firstly, the international norm of common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities is the linchpin of international cooperation on the issue of 
climate change. The perceptions of fairness and legitimacy are critical for any 
international governance regime to exist and be effective. For the international 
climate regime to be effective it has to be perceived by both developing and 
developed countries as fair. In that all major polluters would have to compromise 
and meet in the middle. The normative questions on this issue cannot be wished 
away.  
 
Secondly, it is a misconception that globalisation leads to a race to the 
bottom in terms of environmental standards. In fact, the empirical evidence suggests 
the contrary. The more countries integrate into the world economy, the more their 
environmental standards improve. There are two channels through which 
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globalisation work its magic. First, efficiency pressures emanating from the 
international political economy cause firms and countries to adopt ever more 
efficient policies. Secondly, the more countries interact, the more learning 
opportunities are there from the best practices of other countries. In that 
globalisation works like Adam Smith’s invisible hand; every country and firm 
pursuing their own self-interest brings about a collectively benevolent outcome. 
Therefore, instead of creating barriers to greater integration, policy makers would be 
well advised to lower them. 
 
Thirdly, it is a misnomer that democracies are inherently well poised to enact 
environmentally friendly policies. In fact, the conjecture is not supported by 
empirical evidence. The findings from this thesis support the proposition that 
simplistic dichotomous or even ordinal measures of democracy and authoritarianism 
can’t account for the progress in energy and environmental issues. Similarly, 
dichotomous differentiation between left or right party ideology also has no 
significant explanatory power. Nevertheless, a more nuanced and sophisticated 
measure of a polity - veto players - has a stronger explanatory power than either 
dichotomous variable on democracy or party ideology. Thus, statesmen need to 
appreciate institutional diversity across the world when assessing domestic 
conditions of their negotiating partners. 
 
Finally, high state capacity measured as quality of bureaucracy is an important 
factor in explaining better management of energy and environmental issues, holding 
everything else constant. There is no surprise that developing countries participating 
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in the international climate regime negotiations emphasise the ‘respective capabilities’ 
of countries. The demands for funding, technology transfer, and capacity building do 
not necessarily stem from values of fairness. But these demands also have a matter of 
fact element. The developing countries simply do not have required state capacity to 
implement policies that improve efficiency and curb carbon emissions. Therefore, 
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